Nordstrom Shoplifting defenses |
Nordstrom Shoplifting defenses
Thestate must prove the Defendant had the knowing intent to commit a criminal act in a shoplifting case.
Sometimes the defendant was not aware that there was a criminal act being committed because of mental issues.
NJSA 2C: 4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense.
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind, which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect, which would negate a state of mind, which is an element of the offense.
Criminal Indictable and Disorderly Offense Penalties
Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court
Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum
probation 1-2 year
community service 180 days maximum
mandatory costs, VCCB and other penalties
Disorderly- fines: 2C: 43- 3 $1,000 Fine maximum
There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.
Indictable Criminal Penalties [Felony type] [ Superior Court]
Jail potential Fine max Probation
1st degree 10- 20 years $200,000 [presumption of jail]
2nd degree 5-10 years $150,000 [presumption of jail]
3rd degree 3- 5 years $15,000 1 year- 5 year
4th degree 0- 18 months $10,000 1 year- 5 year
The NJ Model Jury charges set forth the elements of SHOPLIFTING [CONCEALMENT]
(N.J.S.A. 2C: 20-11b(2))
The statute provides in pertinent part that it is a crime for:
any person purposely to conceal upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof.
In order for the finder of fact to find the defendant guilty of shoplifting, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. that defendant purposely concealed upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by (name of commercial establishment);
2. that (name of commercial establishment) was a store or other retail mercantile establishment; and
3. that defendant did so with the purpose of depriving the merchant of the processes, use, or benefit of such merchandise [OR of converting such merchandise to his/her use] without paying the merchant the value thereof.
The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant purposely concealed upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail establishment. The term conceal means to conceal merchandise so that, although there may be some notice of its presence, it is not visible through ordinary observation.1 The term merchandise means any goods, chattels, foodstuffs or wares of any type and description, regardless of the value thereof.2
A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his or her conduct or a result of his conduct if it is the persons conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. That is, a person acts purposely if he or she means to act in a certain way or to cause a certain result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if the person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.3
1 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11a(6).
2 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11a(3).
3 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).
Purpose is a state of mind. A state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. Therefore, it is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said he/she had a certain state of mind when he/she engaged in a particular act. It is within the fact finders power to find that such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the nature of his/her acts and his/her conduct, and from all he/she said and did at the particular time and place, and from all of the surrounding circumstances.
..
The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant acted with the purpose of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise [OR converting such merchandise to his/her use] without paying the merchant the value of the merchandise.
WHEN OFFENSE CHARGED REQUIRES A PURPOSEFUL OR KNOWING STATE OF MIND, CONTINUE CHARGE AS FOLLOWS:
Although the statute refers to mistake of fact or law as a defense, caselaw makes it clear that it is not genuinely a defense at all: instead, it is an attack on the prosecutions ability to prove the requisite mental state for at least one objective element of the crime. State v. Sexton, 160 N.J. 93, 99-100 (1999). Since it is obviously impossible for any single charge to explain precisely how the offered defense plays into the element[s] of every possible offense that mistake of fact or law could apply to (Sexton, 160 N.J. at 106), and at best can offer a more general charge on the subject of mistake of fact or law (State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 319 (2004)), this model charge is organized by reference to the state of mind under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b contained in the offense charged by the State, and then by the degree to which the mistake of fact or law exonerates or mitigates the defendants guilt. As always, the trial court must tailor the precise type of mistake that defendant relies on to the facts of the particular crime or offense charged and the facts adduced at trial. State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379-380 (1988).
2 Since even an unreasonable mistake can negate the required state of mind for the charged offense, the statutory requirement that the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake was eliminated and, therefore, is not referred to in this model charge. Sexton, 160 N.J. at 105; Pena, 178 N.J. at 306.
3 Sexton, 160 N.J. at 100; Pena, 178 N.J. at 306.
STATE OF MIND
Purpose/knowledge/intent/recklessness/negligence is/are condition(s) of the mind, which cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts.
A state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. It is the fact finders job to find that such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the nature of his/her acts and his/her conduct, and from all he/she said and did at the particular time and place, and from all of the surrounding circumstances.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
This defendant(s), as are all defendants in criminal cases, is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
REASONABLE DOUBT
The prosecution must prove its case by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, yet not necessarily to an absolute certainty.
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty in your minds about the guilt of the defendant after you have given full and impartial consideration to all of the evidence. A reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence. It is a doubt that a reasonable person hearing the same evidence would have.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendants guilt. In this world, we know very few things with absolute certainty. In criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.
2C:20-11 b.Shoplifting. Shoplifting shall consist of any one or more of the following acts:
(1) For any person purposely to take possession of, carry away, transfer or cause to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the full retail value thereof.
(2) For any person purposely to conceal upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof.
(3) For any person purposely to alter, transfer or remove any label, price tag or marking indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining value affixed to any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment and to attempt to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or some part of the value thereof.
(4) For any person purposely to transfer any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail merchandise establishment from the container in or on which the same shall be displayed to any other container with intent to deprive the merchant of all or some part of the retail value thereof.
(5 )For any person purposely to under-ring with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value thereof.
(6 )For any person purposely to remove a shopping cart from the premises of a store or other retail mercantile establishment without the consent of the merchant given at the time of such removal with the intention of permanently depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.
c.Gradation.
Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the second degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is $75,000 or more, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is $1,000 or more.
(2) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $1,000.
(3) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not exceed $500.
(4) Shoplifting is a disorderly persons offense under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $200.
The value of the merchandise involved in a violation of this section may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense where the acts or conduct constituting a violation were committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, or were committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise.
Additionally, notwithstanding the term of imprisonment provided in N.J.S.2C:43-6 or 2C:43-8, any person convicted of a shoplifting offense shall be sentenced to perform community service as follows: for a first offense, at least ten days of community service; for a second offense, at least 15 days of community service; and for a third or subsequent offense, a maximum of 25 days of community service and any person convicted of a third or subsequent shoplifting offense shall serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 90 days.
d. Presumptions. Any person purposely concealing uppercased merchandise of any store or other retail mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store or other retail mercantile establishment, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such merchandise with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the full retail value thereof, and the finding of such merchandise concealed upon the person or among the belongings of such person shall be prima facie evidence of purposeful concealment; and if such person conceals, or causes to be concealed, such merchandise upon the person or among the belongings of another, the finding of the same shall also be prima facie evidence of willful concealment on the part of the person so concealing such merchandise.
Copyright 2016 Vercammen Law
More info at http://www.njlaws.com/shoplifting.html
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Kenneth Vercammen is a Middlesex County Trial Attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on Criminal Law, Probate, Estate and litigation topics.
He was awarded the NJ State State Bar Municipal Court Practitioner of the Year.
He lectures and handles criminal cases, Municipal Court, DWI, traffic and other litigation matters.
To schedule a confidential consultation, call us or New clients email us evenings and weekends via contact box www.njlaws.com.
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C,
2053 Woodbridge Avenue,
Edison, NJ 08817,
(732) 572-0500
Tuesday, June 25, 2019
Nordstrom Shoplifting defenses
Non-Litigation Information Sheet
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Non-Compete Covenants in Employee Agreements - Dont Let Your Employees Steal Your Clients
Non-Compete Covenants in Employee Agreements - Dont Let Your Employees Steal Your Clients |
By Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Most businesses spend thousands of dollars developing client lists, training staff and promoting and advertising their businesses. After investing substantial time and money in good will, an owner wants to protect the business from employees attempting to leave and take away accounts. Without a restrictive covenant, an employee can open up a competing business on the same street! An employer does not want to pay an employee to build relationships and develop a business, only for that employee to leave, take the fruits of the employers investment, and compete directly against the employer. Restrictive covenants are very useful for businesses to prevent an employee from taking your clients and your business. Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc 179 N.J. 439, 846 A.2d 1222. (2004) Karol Maw began working for Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc. (ACCI) as a graphic designer on November 1, 1997. ACCI provides marketing and educational services for the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries. Maw had been hired to design written materials used by ACCI in its marketing and educational programs. Maw was promoted to Senior Graphic Designer in January 2001. Thereafter, pursuant to a new company policy, ACCI required all of its employees at or above the level of ³coordinator² to sign a non-compete agreement as a condition of continuing employment. The agreement precluded, among other things, Maw from becoming employed by any competitor or customer of ACCI for a period of two years following the termination of her employment. Maw was informed that she could seek legal advice concerning the employment agreement. Maw consulted her father, an attorney, who suggested changes. Maw presented those revisions to ACCI¹s Human Resource Department but was told that no changes could be made. Maw did not sign the non-compete agreement, prompting her termination by ACCI in March 2001 for failing to comply with company policy. The private nature of plaintiff¹s dispute notwithstanding, her CEPA claim must fail because our State¹s public policy respecting noncompete agreements is not set forth in a ³clear mandate,² and does not ³concern[] the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.² N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c(3). Over a generation ago, our Court sketched the broad parameters for determining whether a noncompete agreement was unenforceable. Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25 (1971); Solari Indus. Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571 (1970). In Solari, The Court canvassed, much as has the dissent, the historical treatment of noncompete agreements, and acknowledged the previously held negative view of such agreements. 55 N.J. at 575-84. The Court cited academic writings on the topic that elaborated in greater detail on the relation of such agreements to Anglo-American commercial practices. See, e.g., Solari, supra, 55 N.J. at 574-77 (citing Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1960)). But Solari was a turning point, for The Court held then ³that the time is well due for the abandonment of New Jersey¹s void per se rule in favor of the rule which permits the total or partial enforcement of noncompetitive agreements to the extent reasonable under the circumstances.² 55 N.J. at 585. In Whitmyer, supra, The Court expanded on Solari, establishing what is now known as the Solari/Whitmyer test for determining whether a noncompete agreement is unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. Under the Solari/Whitmyer test, a noncompete agreement is enforceable ³if it Å’simply protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee and is not injurious to the public.¹² Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609, 628 (1988) (quoting Whitmyer, supra, 58 N.J. at 32-33). The first two prongs of the test require a balancing of the employer¹s interests in protecting proprietary and confidential information and the asserted hardship on the employee. Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 110 N.J. at 634-35. The third requires the reviewing court to analyze the public¹s broad concern in fostering competition, creativity, and ingenuity. Id. at 639. Solari/Whitmyer has now become an accepted part of the common law, not only in New Jersey but also in other jurisdictions around the country. Id. at 630-34. Although our dissenting colleagues may contend that do-not-compete provisions are, or should be, per se illegal, in point of fact, they are not illegal per se. It is not accurate to describe our current caselaw, which allows enforcement of reasonable non-compete agreements, as a ³clear mandate² that disfavors such agreements. The Solari/Whitmyer test is a multi-part, fact-intensive inquiry. Not only must multiple interests of differing parties and entities be identified, but also, those interests must be gauged for reasonableness and legitimacy. The application of that test here, and as a general matter, simply does not evoke the type of a ³clear mandate of public policy² that was contemplated by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c(3). The Court are informed by the amici that non-compete agreements are a common part of commercial employment. The Court do not accept as a premise that employers, in large numbers, are engaging in a practice that is ³indisputably dangerous to the public health, safety or welfare.² Dzwonar, supra, 177 N.J. at 464. It is more appropriate to characterize the business community as having adapted to the Solari/Whitmyer approach that recognizes that noncompete agreements can serve a useful purpose so long as the agreement is not unreasonable. The Court conclude that plaintiff¹s private dispute over the terms of the do-not-compete provision in her employment agreement does not implicate violation of a clear mandate of public policy as contemplated by Section 3c(3) of CEPA. As previously noted, plaintiff did have options available to her. If she could not negotiate terms that were to her liking, she was free to dispute the reasonableness of those terms if and when her employer attempted to enforce the agreement. The burden then would be on the employer to hire counsel and initiate enforcement litigation, Solari, supra, 55 N.J. at 574, and nothing would preclude an employee-defendant in such an action from asserting any and all affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Ingersoll- Rand, supra, 110 N.J. at 621-22 Recently, a State Appellate Division case recognized the importance of confidential information owned by a business. The case of Lamorte Burns v. Walters held employees have a duty of trust and cannot interfere with their employers economic advantage. HIRE the law office of Kenneth Vercammen & Associates to prepare Restrictive Covenants to deter employees from taking your business. Call 732-906-2180 for a confidential consultation. The following are some of the provisions we included in 2005 in employment agreements with restrictive covenants. We have revised our employment agreements to include provisions recommended in recent cases. 1. Employment. 1 2. Term of Contract. 1 3. Compensation. 1 4. Adjusted Compensation. 1 5. Extent of Services. 2 6. Vacations. 2 7. Disability. 2 8. Termination. 2 9. Termination Upon Sale of Business. 2 0. Death During Employment. 3 11. Restrictive Covenant. 3 12. Arbitration. 3 13. Notice. 3 14. Waiver of Breach. 3 15. Assignment. 3 16. Entire Agreement. 3 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT Employer e1 Employee e2 Location of business e3 AGREEMENT, made this ______ day of __________ 20__, between e1. a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, having its principal office at e3, New Jersey (hereinafter referred to as "Employer") and e2, residing at ____________________________ (hereinafter referred to as "Employee"). .c.1. Employment.; The Employer hereby employs Employee as ________ of the Employers business at e3, and in that capacity to perform all services necessary to the operation of the business, including retail sales of merchandise and such other related capacities as shall be determined by the Employer., .c.2. Term of Contract. ; Employment pursuant to this contract shall commence on ___ .c.3. Compensation. ; The Employer agrees to pay the Employee as compensation for his services the sum of $_____ during the first year of this Agreement; which sum shall be payable in weekly installments of $____ each. During the succeeding years, the Employees compensation shall be determined as hereinafter set forth. .c.4. Adjusted Compensation. ; During the second and each succeeding year of this Agreement, if the Employee performs services for Employer in accordance with this contract, Employee shall be compensated in the following manner: (a) Employees salary as specified in Paragraph 3 above shall be increased by 10%, or if the maximum permitted by law is less than 10%, then the percent of increase shall be said maximum lawful increase which shall be payable in approximately equal weekly installments; and (b) This contract between e1 and e2 is based on two years of satisfactory work performance. .c.5. Extent of Services.; The Employee shall devote all his time, attention and best efforts to the business of the Employer, and shall not during the term of this Agreement be engaged directly or indirectly in any other business activity, whether or not such business activity is pursued for gain, profit or other pecuniary advantage; but this shall not be construed as preventing the Employee from investing his assets in such form and manner as will not require any services on the part of the Employee in the operation of the affairs of the companies in which such investments are made. .c.6. Vacations.; The Employee shall be entitled each year to a vacation of ________ weeks which shall be taken consecutively anytime between June 1 and August 31. During the vacation period, weekly compensation shall be paid pursuant to Paragraph 4(a) above. .c. 7. Confidential Information; Employee shall not disclose to any person any information concerning the business operation, or internal structure of employer, or the customers or clients of employer. Further, upon leaving the employ of employer for any reason whatsoever, employee shall not take with them, without the prior written consent of employer, any written, graphic of recorded information relating or pertaining to employer or its customers In the event of breach of this agreement or paragraph, employer shall be entitled to an injunction restraining Employee from violating such provision. .c.8. Termination.; This Agreement shall not be terminated during its term except for just cause upon written notice pursuant to Paragraph 13 infra or with the consent of the Employee. A termination either because of a continuous absence of more 5 days or because of sale of business pursuant to Paragraph 9(a) and (b) shall be considered just cause. Any rights which the Employee may have as a result of his ownership of any shares of the corporation shall not be affected by the termination of his employment. .c.9. Termination Upon Sale of Business. (a) Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, the Employer may terminate this Agreement upon ten days notice to the Employee pursuant to Paragraph 13 prior to the occurrence of any of the following events: (1) The sale by the Employer of substantially all of its assets to a single purchaser or to a group of associated purchasers; (2) the sale, or exchange or other disposition, in one transaction, of two-thirds of the outstanding corporate shares of the Employer; (3) the merger or consolidation of the Employer in a transaction in which the shareholders of the Employer receive less than 50% of the outstanding voting shares of the new or continuing corporation. (b) Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, the Employer may also terminate this Agreement by giving notice in the manner provided in Paragraph 13 ten days after making a bona fide lawful decision to terminate its business and liquidate its assets. 1.c.0. Death During Employment.; If the Employee dies during the term of this contract or any renewal thereof, the Employer shall pay to the estate of the Employee the compensation which would otherwise be payable to the Employee up to the end of the month in which the death occurs. .c.11. Restrictive Covenant. ; For a period of two years after the termination of his employment for any reason, Employee will not, within Middlesex County or any municipality contiguous thereto directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, conduct, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any manner with the ownership, management, operation or conduct of any business similar to the type of business being conducted by the employer at the time of the termination of this Agreement. By Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Most businesses spend thousands of dollars developing client lists, training staff and promoting and advertising their businesses. After investing substantial time and money in good will, an owner wants to protect the business from employees attempting to leave and take away accounts. Without a restrictive covenant, an employee can open up a competing business on the same street! An employer does not want to pay an employee to build relationships and develop a business, only for that employee to leave, take the fruits of the employers investment, and compete directly against the employer. Restrictive covenants are very useful for businesses to prevent an employee from taking your clients and your business. Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc 179 N.J. 439, 846 A.2d 1222. (2004) Karol Maw began working for Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc. (ACCI) as a graphic designer on November 1, 1997. ACCI provides marketing and educational services for the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries. Maw had been hired to design written materials used by ACCI in its marketing and educational programs. Maw was promoted to Senior Graphic Designer in January 2001. Thereafter, pursuant to a new company policy, ACCI required all of its employees at or above the level of ³coordinator² to sign a non-compete agreement as a condition of continuing employment. The agreement precluded, among other things, Maw from becoming employed by any competitor or customer of ACCI for a period of two years following the termination of her employment. Maw was informed that she could seek legal advice concerning the employment agreement. Maw consulted her father, an attorney, who suggested changes. Maw presented those revisions to ACCI¹s Human Resource Department but was told that no changes could be made. Maw did not sign the non-compete agreement, prompting her termination by ACCI in March 2001 for failing to comply with company policy. The private nature of plaintiff¹s dispute notwithstanding, her CEPA claim must fail because our State¹s public policy respecting noncompete agreements is not set forth in a ³clear mandate,² and does not ³concern[] the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.² N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c(3). Over a generation ago, our Court sketched the broad parameters for determining whether a noncompete agreement was unenforceable. Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25 (1971); Solari Indus. Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571 (1970). In Solari, The Court canvassed, much as has the dissent, the historical treatment of noncompete agreements, and acknowledged the previously held negative view of such agreements. 55 N.J. at 575-84. The Court cited academic writings on the topic that elaborated in greater detail on the relation of such agreements to Anglo-American commercial practices. See, e.g., Solari, supra, 55 N.J. at 574-77 (citing Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1960)). But Solari was a turning point, for The Court held then ³that the time is well due for the abandonment of New Jersey¹s void per se rule in favor of the rule which permits the total or partial enforcement of noncompetitive agreements to the extent reasonable under the circumstances.² 55 N.J. at 585. In Whitmyer, supra, The Court expanded on Solari, establishing what is now known as the Solari/Whitmyer test for determining whether a noncompete agreement is unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. Under the Solari/Whitmyer test, a noncompete agreement is enforceable ³if it Å’simply protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee and is not injurious to the public.¹² Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609, 628 (1988) (quoting Whitmyer, supra, 58 N.J. at 32-33). The first two prongs of the test require a balancing of the employer¹s interests in protecting proprietary and confidential information and the asserted hardship on the employee. Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 110 N.J. at 634-35. The third requires the reviewing court to analyze the public¹s broad concern in fostering competition, creativity, and ingenuity. Id. at 639. Solari/Whitmyer has now become an accepted part of the common law, not only in New Jersey but also in other jurisdictions around the country. Id. at 630-34. Although our dissenting colleagues may contend that do-not-compete provisions are, or should be, per se illegal, in point of fact, they are not illegal per se. It is not accurate to describe our current caselaw, which allows enforcement of reasonable non-compete agreements, as a ³clear mandate² that disfavors such agreements. The Solari/Whitmyer test is a multi-part, fact-intensive inquiry. Not only must multiple interests of differing parties and entities be identified, but also, those interests must be gauged for reasonableness and legitimacy. The application of that test here, and as a general matter, simply does not evoke the type of a ³clear mandate of public policy² that was contemplated by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c(3). The Court are informed by the amici that non-compete agreements are a common part of commercial employment. The Court do not accept as a premise that employers, in large numbers, are engaging in a practice that is ³indisputably dangerous to the public health, safety or welfare.² Dzwonar, supra, 177 N.J. at 464. It is more appropriate to characterize the business community as having adapted to the Solari/Whitmyer approach that recognizes that noncompete agreements can serve a useful purpose so long as the agreement is not unreasonable. The Court conclude that plaintiff¹s private dispute over the terms of the do-not-compete provision in her employment agreement does not implicate violation of a clear mandate of public policy as contemplated by Section 3c(3) of CEPA. As previously noted, plaintiff did have options available to her. If she could not negotiate terms that were to her liking, she was free to dispute the reasonableness of those terms if and when her employer attempted to enforce the agreement. The burden then would be on the employer to hire counsel and initiate enforcement litigation, Solari, supra, 55 N.J. at 574, and nothing would preclude an employee-defendant in such an action from asserting any and all affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Ingersoll- Rand, supra, 110 N.J. at 621-22 Recently, a State Appellate Division case recognized the importance of confidential information owned by a business. The case of Lamorte Burns v. Walters held employees have a duty of trust and cannot interfere with their employers economic advantage. HIRE the law office of Kenneth Vercammen & Associates to prepare Restrictive Covenants to deter employees from taking your business. Call 732-906-2180 for a confidential consultation. The following are some of the provisions we included in 2005 in employment agreements with restrictive covenants. We have revised our employment agreements to include provisions recommended in recent cases. 1. Employment. 1 2. Term of Contract. 1 3. Compensation. 1 4. Adjusted Compensation. 1 5. Extent of Services. 2 6. Vacations. 2 7. Disability. 2 8. Termination. 2 9. Termination Upon Sale of Business. 2 0. Death During Employment. 3 11. Restrictive Covenant. 3 12. Arbitration. 3 13. Notice. 3 14. Waiver of Breach. 3 15. Assignment. 3 16. Entire Agreement. 3 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT Employer e1 Employee e2 Location of business e3 AGREEMENT, made this ______ day of __________ 20__, between e1. a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, having its principal office at e3, New Jersey (hereinafter referred to as "Employer") and e2, residing at ____________________________ (hereinafter referred to as "Employee"). .c.1. Employment.; The Employer hereby employs Employee as ________ of the Employers business at e3, and in that capacity to perform all services necessary to the operation of the business, including retail sales of merchandise and such other related capacities as shall be determined by the Employer., .c.2. Term of Contract. ; Employment pursuant to this contract shall commence on ___ .c.3. Compensation. ; The Employer agrees to pay the Employee as compensation for his services the sum of $_____ during the first year of this Agreement; which sum shall be payable in weekly installments of $____ each. During the succeeding years, the Employees compensation shall be determined as hereinafter set forth. .c.4. Adjusted Compensation. ; During the second and each succeeding year of this Agreement, if the Employee performs services for Employer in accordance with this contract, Employee shall be compensated in the following manner: (a) Employees salary as specified in Paragraph 3 above shall be increased by 10%, or if the maximum permitted by law is less than 10%, then the percent of increase shall be said maximum lawful increase which shall be payable in approximately equal weekly installments; and (b) This contract between e1 and e2 is based on two years of satisfactory work performance. .c.5. Extent of Services.; The Employee shall devote all his time, attention and best efforts to the business of the Employer, and shall not during the term of this Agreement be engaged directly or indirectly in any other business activity, whether or not such business activity is pursued for gain, profit or other pecuniary advantage; but this shall not be construed as preventing the Employee from investing his assets in such form and manner as will not require any services on the part of the Employee in the operation of the affairs of the companies in which such investments are made. .c.6. Vacations.; The Employee shall be entitled each year to a vacation of ________ weeks which shall be taken consecutively anytime between June 1 and August 31. During the vacation period, weekly compensation shall be paid pursuant to Paragraph 4(a) above. .c. 7. Confidential Information; Employee shall not disclose to any person any information concerning the business operation, or internal structure of employer, or the customers or clients of employer. Further, upon leaving the employ of employer for any reason whatsoever, employee shall not take with them, without the prior written consent of employer, any written, graphic of recorded information relating or pertaining to employer or its customers In the event of breach of this agreement or paragraph, employer shall be entitled to an injunction restraining Employee from violating such provision. .c.8. Termination.; This Agreement shall not be terminated during its term except for just cause upon written notice pursuant to Paragraph 13 infra or with the consent of the Employee. A termination either because of a continuous absence of more 5 days or because of sale of business pursuant to Paragraph 9(a) and (b) shall be considered just cause. Any rights which the Employee may have as a result of his ownership of any shares of the corporation shall not be affected by the termination of his employment. .c.9. Termination Upon Sale of Business. (a) Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, the Employer may terminate this Agreement upon ten days notice to the Employee pursuant to Paragraph 13 prior to the occurrence of any of the following events: (1) The sale by the Employer of substantially all of its assets to a single purchaser or to a group of associated purchasers; (2) the sale, or exchange or other disposition, in one transaction, of two-thirds of the outstanding corporate shares of the Employer; (3) the merger or consolidation of the Employer in a transaction in which the shareholders of the Employer receive less than 50% of the outstanding voting shares of the new or continuing corporation. (b) Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, the Employer may also terminate this Agreement by giving notice in the manner provided in Paragraph 13 ten days after making a bona fide lawful decision to terminate its business and liquidate its assets. 1.c.0. Death During Employment.; If the Employee dies during the term of this contract or any renewal thereof, the Employer shall pay to the estate of the Employee the compensation which would otherwise be payable to the Employee up to the end of the month in which the death occurs. .c.11. Restrictive Covenant. ; For a period of two years after the termination of his employment for any reason, Employee will not, within Middlesex County or any municipality contiguous thereto directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, conduct, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any manner with the ownership, management, operation or conduct of any business similar to the type of business being conducted by the employer at the time of the termination of this Agreement. |
https://www.njlaws.com/non-compete_covenants_in_employee_agreements.html?id=1263&a=
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF TAMPERING 2C:17-3a(2) model jury charge
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF TAMPERING 2C:17-3a(2) model jury charge |
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF TAMPERING SO AS TO ENDANGER
PERSON OR PROPERTY
N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a(2)model jury charge
Countof the indictment charges defendant with committing the offense of criminal mischief by tampering with the tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property.In pertinent part, the indictment alleges that:
(Read material part of Countto jury)
Defendant is charged with violating a provision of our law that provides that a person is guilty of criminal mischief ifhe/shepurposely, knowingly or recklessly tampers with the property of another so as to endanger person or property.To convict defendant of this offense, you must find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following four elements:
1.That defendant tampered with tangible property;
2.That the property tampered with was the property of another person;
3.That defendant acted purposely, knowingly or recklessly whenhe/shetampered with the property; and
4.That the person or property of another was endangered by defendants conduct.
The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant tampered with tangible property.To tamper with means to interfere with another persons property with the purpose of causing harm or the risk of harm, regardless of whether the property interfered with was actually damaged.[1]Tangible property means real or personal property that is visible and corporeal,i.e., something that can be seen and touched.[2]
The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the property tampered with was the property of another person.Property of another person means that defendant is not the owner of the property tampered with.[3]In this case, the State alleges that the property tampered with was(description)of(name).
The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant acted purposely, knowingly or recklessly whenhe/shetampered with the property.A person acts purposely with respect to the nature ofhis/herconduct or a result thereof if it ishis/herconscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.A defendant acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances ifhe/sheis aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.[4]In other words, for you to find that defendant acted purposely, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it washis/herpurpose or conscious object to tamper with another persons tangible property.
A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature ofhis/herconduct or the attendant circumstances ifhe/sheis aware thathis/herconduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, orhe/sheis aware of a high probability of their existence.A person acts knowingly with respect to a result ofhis/herconduct ifhe/sheis aware that it is practically certain thathis/herconduct will cause such a result.[5]Thus, for you to find that defendant acted knowingly, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew whathe/shewas doing, and that defendant was aware that the nature ofhis/herconduct and the attendant circumstances were such as to make it practically certain that defendants conduct would tamper with another persons tangible property.
A person acts recklessly whenhe/sheconsciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk.A conscious disregard requires that defendant actually be aware of the risk, but thathe/sheignores it anyway.The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of defendants conduct and the circumstances known tohim/her, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the same situation.[6]In other words, for you to find that defendant acted recklessly, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was aware of and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk thathis/herconduct would tamper with another persons tangible property.
You should understand that purpose, knowledge and recklessness are conditions of the mind.They cannot be seen.They can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts.Therefore, it is not necessary for the State to produce witnesses to testify that defendant stated, for example, thathe/sheacted purposely, knowingly or recklessly whenhe/shedid a particular thing.It is within your power to find that proof of purpose, knowledge or recklessness has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences which may arise from the nature of the acts and the surrounding circumstances.The place where the acts occurred and all that was done or said by defendant preceding, connected with, and immediately succeeding the events in question are among the circumstances to be considered.
The fourth element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the person or property of another was endangered by defendants conduct.To endanger means to expose to harm or peril.[7]
If you find that the State has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense, you must find defendant not guilty.But if you determine that the State has proved every element of criminal mischief beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find defendant guilty of that offense.
[GRADING]
If you find defendant guilty of criminal mischief, you must then go on to determine (1) defendants state of mind at the time that the offense was committed, and (2) the extent of the pecuniary loss that defendant caused.Regarding the state of mind requirement, the instruction that I supplied to you previously regarding purposely, knowingly and recklessly applies here as well.Regarding pecuniary loss, that means the financial or monetary loss suffered by the owner of the property tampered with.[8]The state of mind required and the extent of the pecuniary loss caused by defendant must both be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.[9]Regarding the grade of the offense, you must indicate in your verdict whether you find that:
(1)Defendant acted purposely or knowingly AND the extent of the pecuniary loss caused by defendant amounts to $2,000 or more; or
(2)Defendant acted purposely, knowingly or recklessly AND the extent of the pecuniary loss caused by defendant amounts to more than $500 but less than $2,000; or
(3)Defendant acted purposely, knowingly or recklessly AND the extent of the pecuniary loss caused by defendant amounts to $500 or less.
[2]SeeRegistrar and Transfer Co. v. Dir. Div. of Taxation, 157N.J. Super. 532, 549 (Ch. Div. 1978),revdo.g. 166N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1979),certif. den.81N.J. 63 (1979).Tangible property does not include intangibles such as contract rights or choses in action.Miller, 33N.J. Practice, Criminal Law, 13.6 at 332 (2001 ed.).
[3]Where appropriate, charge that property of another also includes property partly owned by the defendant in which any other person has an interest which the defendant is not privileged to infringe.SeeN.J.S.A. 2C:20-1h.
[8]In determining the extent of pecuniary loss, cost of repairs or other methods of proving damages in civil cases can be used.Cf.,State v. Burks, 188N.J. Super. 55, 60-61 (App. Div. 1983),certif. den.93N.J. 285 (1983).For proving the value of a damaged item, the standard is fair market value at the time of the offense.SeeN.J.S.A. 2C:1-14m.
[9]If the jury has a reasonable doubt regarding the amount of pecuniary loss incurred or cannot reach a unanimous verdict on that issue, a conviction for criminal mischief as a disorderly persons offense should be entered.Cf.,State v. Clarke, 198N.J. Super. 219, 226 (App. Div. 1985).
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CRIMINAL LAW FORMS Book New Book from the American Bar ABA
CRIMINAL LAW FORMS Book New Book from the American Bar ABA | ||
CRIMINAL LAW FORMS book
New book from the American Bar Association
Author: Kenneth Vercammen
Use Criminal Law Forms to help represent persons charged with criminal and traffic offenses. Detailed instruction and valuable insight is offered beginning with the initial contact with the client, to walking into the courthouse, and managing the steps that follow. Two hundred and ten modifiable forms help make criminal lawyers more efficient and productive, while also reducing the chance for mistakes. Criminal Law Forms helps lawyers face the challenges of:
Criminal defense
DWI cases
Juvenile offenses
Domestic violence
Traffic violations
Auto Accidents
And much more
Regular price $139.95, GP SOLO Member Price $129.95 To order contact ABA Customer Care, 1-800-285-2221 321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, IL 60653 or fax to 312-988-6030 (PC: 5150457)
http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/index.cfm?section=main&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=5150457
Kenneth Vercammen is an Edison, Middlesex County, NJ trial attorney where he handles Criminal, Municipal Court, Probate, Civil Litigation and Estate Administration matters. Ken is author of the American Bar Associations new book Criminal Law Forms and often lectures to trial lawyers of the American Bar Association, NJ State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association. As the Past Chair of the Municipal Court Section he has served on its board for 10 years.
Awarded the Municipal Court Attorney of the Year by both the NJSBA and Middlesex County Bar Association, he also received the NJSBA- YLD Service to the Bar Award and the General Practitioner Attorney of the Year, now Solo Attorney of the Year.
Ken Vercammen is a highly regarded lecturer on both Municipal Court/ DWI and Estate/ Probate Law issues for the NJICLE- New Jersey State Bar Association, American Bar Association, and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published by NJ Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, YLD Dictum, GP Gazette and New Jersey Lawyer magazine. He was a speaker at the 2013 ABA Annual meeting program Handling the Criminal Misdemeanor and Traffic Case and serves as is the Editor in Chief of the NJ Municipal Court Law Review.
For nine years he served as the Cranbury Township Prosecutor and also was a Special Acting Prosecutor in nine different towns. Ken has successfully handled over one thousand Municipal Court and Superior Court matters in the past 27 years.
His private practice has devoted a substantial portion of professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. Appearing in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on Criminal and Municipal Court trials, civil and contested Probate hearings. Ken also serves as the Editor of the popular legal website and mobile phone app www.njlaws.com and related blogs. In Law School he was a member of the Law Review, winner of the ATLA trial competition and top ten in class.
Throughout his career he has served the NJSBA in many leadership and volunteer positions. Ken has testified for the NJSBA before the Senate Judiciary Committee to support changes in the DWI law to permit restricted use driver license and interlock legislation. Ken also testified before the Assembly Judiciary Committee in favor of the first-time criminal offender Conditional Dismissal legislation which permits dismissal of some criminal charges. He is the voice of the Solo and Small firm attorneys who juggle active court practice with bar and community activities. Recently, the ABA Solo Division has selected Ken to write its new book on Marketing for the New and Small Firm Attorney. In his private life he has been a member of the NJ State champion Raritan Valley Road Runners masters team and is a 4th degree black belt.
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Nomination of Guardian for Estate and Person of a Minor Child
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Criminal Law Forms Available to Help Attorneys
Criminal Law FormsAvailable to Help Attorneys | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Service to educate and improve the Bar has been important to me over the past 25
years. I recently spoke as a volunteer at the NJ ICLE seminars Municipal Court
College, Handling Drug, DWI & Serious Motor Vehicle Violations in Municipal Court and Representing the Criminal Defendant. The speakers such as myself are all volunteers and devote many hours to preparing quality materials and forms on CD to be used by our members. I also make these forms and articles available to attorneys who need help criminal, traffic and motor vehicle cases. Its about helping others. Please email my office which form you need, up to 5 forms. Email VercammenLaw@njlaws.com
https://njlaws.com/forms-criminal.html?id=4891&a= |
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