Subscription Form NJ Municipal Court Law Review

Kenneth Vercammen began publishing the NJ Municipal Court Law Review for Municipal Court Judges and police chiefs in 1993 as the Cranbury Municipal Court Prosecutor. Based on the overwhelming response, we made the NJ Municipal Court Law Review available to all municipalities for an annual subscription of only $20.00 per year. Prosecutors, police, Attorneys, Courts, Judges, municipalities, mayors, law enforcement, and individuals involved in the Municipal Courts and Criminal Courts in New Jersey should read this newsletter. To receive this quarterly newsletter reporting how changes in New Jersey law or court decisions could affect the prosecution or handling of Municipal Court matters, please subscribe today using this subscription form, or sending a municipal voucher. You will receive quarterly updates on selected revised motor vehicle laws and articles on Municipal Court practice. Already over 400 New Jersey police departments, prosecutors, and towns have subscribed. Please give me a call if you have any questions. I look forward to hearing from you. Name: ______________________________________ (or staple business card here) Address: ______________________________________ ______________________________________ Return to: Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq., ________________ Editor- NJ Municipal Court Law Review 2053 Woodbridge Ave., Edison NJ 08817 For information call: (732) 572-0500 We also have a free email newsletter on wills, probate & elder law To subscribe for the email newsletter, mail or fax us your email ad

Proposed DWI law to require car interlock device but permit driving scheduled for vote on February 5, 2015

Proposed DWI law to require car interlock device but permit driving scheduled for vote on February 5, 2015

SENATE, No. 385

with committee amendments

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

The Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee reports favorably, Senate Bill No. 385 (SCS), with committee amendments.

As amended, this bill revises the penalty provisions for various drunk driving offenses, particularly making changes concerning the use of, and applicable time periods covering, driver’s license suspensions and installations of ignition interlock devices on motor vehicles owned or operated by these drivers.

Drunk Driving

Concerning the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (R.S.39:50-4), the bill revises the relevant penalty provisions as follows:

For a first offense, if that offense involved a person’s blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10%, or otherwise operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, for three months, unless the court was clearly convinced, based on a series of aggravating factors outweighing mitigating ones as set forth in the bill, to instead order a license suspension of three months (the three month suspension would also apply instead of device installation if the person did not own or lease a motor vehicle and there was no motor vehicle the person principally operated).

The aggravating and mitigating factors for consideration by the court to order a license suspension instead of device installation would include, but not be limited to: the nature and circumstances of the person’s conduct, including whether such conduct posed a high risk of danger to the public; the person’s driving record; whether the character and attitude of the person indicate that the person would be likely or unlikely to commit another violation; and the need for personal or general deterrence.

If the court did order the installation of the ignition interlock device, the person’s driver’s license would only be reinstated within the 10-day suspension/device installation period by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and the commission would imprint a notation concerning driving with the device on the person’s driver’s license.

Additionally, for a person with an ignition interlock device installed, the three-month installation period would be subject to possible extension for an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period, for attempting to operate the affected motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher during the last one-third of the installation period, or for failing to present the affected vehicle for device servicing at any time during the installation period. This extension would occur without need of further court order, following notification of the event to the court by the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission, which notification would be supported by a certification from the ignition interlock device manufacturer, installer, or other party set forth in regulation responsible for the servicing or monitoring of the device.

If the first offense involved a person’s blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or higher but less than 0.15%, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, for not less than seven months or more than one year, unless the court was clearly convinced, based on the series of aggravating factors outweighing the mitigating ones as described above, to instead order a license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year (the seven month to one year suspension would also apply instead of device installation if the person did not own or lease a motor vehicle and there was no motor vehicle the person principally operated). As above, if the person was ordered to install an ignition interlock device, the person could only reinstate the person’s driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described.

If the first offense involved a person’s blood alcohol concentration of 0.15% or higher, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, and maintain installation of the device during a period of license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year and after license suspension for an additional period of not less than seven months or more than one year, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.

With respect to the license suspension of a person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15% or higher, the person would have the opportunity, beginning 90 days after the start of the suspension, to petition the court to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the initially ordered suspension period, subject to the person maintaining the installation of the ignition interlock device in the person’s motor vehicle both for the remainder of the initially ordered suspension period and afterward for the additional seven- month to one-year period. Additionally, a person whose driving privileges were suspended for an additional period because the person does not own or lease a motor vehicle and there is no motor vehicle the person principally operates, may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or principally operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the initial and additional suspension period, subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle. As above, a person ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described.

If the offense involved a “drugged” driver (i.e., operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit- producing drug), the court would order a license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year, with no option to instead operate a motor vehicle with an ignition interlock device installed.

For any such first offense of drunk or “drugged” driving occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other first offenses.

For a second offense, the bill increases, for all drunk and “drugged” drivers, the period of license suspension from the current law’s two years to instead a period of not less than two years or more than four years. The court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the two to four year suspension period, and to remain installed afterward for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.

With respect to a second offender’s license suspension, a person who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial two to four year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle.

As above for any first offender, a person who is a second offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for a first offender.

For a second offense occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other second offenses.

For a third or subsequent offense, the bill increases, for all drunk and “drugged” drivers, the period of license suspension from the current law’s 10 years to instead a period of not less than 10 years or more than 20 years. The court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the 10 to 20 year suspension period, and to remain installed afterwards for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.

With respect to a third or subsequent offender’s license suspension, a person who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial 10 to 20 year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle.

As above for both first and second offenders, a person who is a third or subsequent offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for first and second offenders.

For a third or subsequent offense occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other third or subsequent offenses.

Refusing a Breath Test

Concerning the offense of refusing to submit to a breath test (section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a)), the bill revises the relevant penalty provisions as follows:

For a first offense, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, for not less than seven months or more than one year, unless the court was clearly convinced, based on the series of aggravating factors outweighing the mitigating ones as described above for drunk driving offenses, to instead order a license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year (the seven month to one year suspension would also apply instead of device installation if the person did not own or lease a motor vehicle and there was no motor vehicle the person principally operated). As above with respect to drunk driving offenses, if the person was ordered to install an ignition interlock device, the person could only reinstate the person’s driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described.

For any first offense of refusing a breath test occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other first offenses.

For a second offense, the bill increases the period of license suspension from the current two years to instead a period of not less than two years or more than four years. The court would order a 10- day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the two to four year suspension period and remain installed afterward for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.

A person who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial two to four year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle.

As above with respect to any drunk driving offense, a person who is a second offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one- third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for a drunk driving offense.

For a second offense of refusing a breath test occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other second offenses.

For a third or subsequent offense, the bill increases the period of license suspension from the current 10 years to instead a period of not less than 10 years or more than 20 years. The court would order a 10- day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the 10 to 20 year suspension period, and to remain installed afterwards for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.

A third or subsequent offender who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial 10 to 20 year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle.

As above with respect to any drunk driving offense, a person who is a third or subsequent offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for a drunk driving offense.

For a third or subsequent offense of refusing a breath test occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other third or subsequent offenses.

Ignition Interlock Device Installation – License Reinstatement

With respect to all cases for which a person has been ordered to install one or more ignition interlock devices, the court would notify the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission. The commission would thereafter require that the one or more devices be installed before the reinstatement of the person’s driver’s license, whether after a 10-day suspension period or some longer period as applicable to the specific offense. The commission would imprint a notation on the reinstated driver’s license stating that the person could not operate a motor vehicle unless it is equipped with an ignition interlock device, and would enter this requirement in the person's driving record.

Ignition Interlock Device – Failure to Install, Tampering

Lastly, a person who fails to install an ignition interlock device as ordered by a court, or who drives a device-equipped vehicle after being started by means other than the person blowing into the device, or who drives an unequipped vehicle, would be guilty of a disorderly persons offense. A disorderly persons offense is ordinarily punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to six months, a fine of up to $1,000, or both. Furthermore, the court would suspend the person’ s driver’ s license for the period of time associated with a drunk driving offense under R.S.39:4-50, except that the applicable period applied by the court would be the period for a second offense (not less than two years or more than four years) if the underlying act was committed by a first offender drunk driver/breath test refusal, and would be the period for a third or subsequent offense (not less than 10 years or more than 20 years) if the underlying act was committed by a second offender drunk driver/breath test refusal; the suspension period for a third or subsequent offender drunk driver/breath test refusal would not be enhanced (remaining not less than 10 years or more than 20 years).

This bill, as amended and reported, is identical to Assembly Bill No. 1368 (ACS/1R), also reported by the committee today. Please note the bills are considered identical even though the Assembly bill was not amended to incorporate provisions of the relevant drunk driving statute, R.S.39:4-50, updated by the enactment of P.L.2014, c.54 on September 10, 2014 (which in relevant part increases a drunk driving offense surcharge to, in part, help fund the installation of mobile video recording systems on municipal police vehicles); only this bill, being amended to match the Assembly bill, incorporated the update. Such a statutory update alone is considered technical in nature and absent any further substantive amendments to the Assembly bill by the Legislature, at which point this technical update would be incorporated, the update can occur after the Legislature’s passage of that bill pursuant to the authority of the Office of Legislative Services’ Legislative Counsel to make such corrections, as concurred to by the Attorney General. See R.S.1:3-1.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS:
The committee amendments to the bill:

- provide, for all of the relevant drunk driving and breath test refusal offenses described above, a 10-day license suspension period, during which an offender would have to install an ignition interlock device in the one or more motor vehicles required by the bill’s provisions;

- clarify the device installation requirements for repeat offenders, so that an ignition interlock device would have to be installed in all motor vehicles operated by such offenders (along with all vehicles owned or leased), not just those vehicles “principally” operated by such offenders;

- add provisions to further explain the available penalties for offenders who are required to install ignition interlock devices versus those offenders who face license suspension because they do not have a motor vehicle in which a device would be installed, as detailed above;

- update the existing law concerning the procedure to be followed by drunk driving and breath test refusal offenders who are seeking the reinstatement of their driver’s licenses through the Motor Vehicle Commission;

- update provisions of the relevant drunk driving statute, R.S.39:4- 50, to account for the enactment of P.L.2014, c.54 on September 10, 2014, providing a $25 increase to the surcharge assessed against drunk driving violators ($100 to $125) in order to, in part, help fund the installation of mobile video recording systems on municipal police vehicles as required by that act;

- reinsert provisions concerning the currently operating supervised visitation program for convicted offenders, providing visits to hospitals which receive drunk driving victims, facilities caring for advanced alcoholics or drug abusers, and public morgues or county medical examiner offices holding deceased victims; the provisions were inadvertently marked for deletion by the underlying bill (see R.S.39:4-50, subsection (h)); and

- reinsert the penalty provisions for offenders who fail to install ignition interlock devices, tamper with devices, or operate unequipped vehicles, as detailed above, which were included in the bill as introduced but inadvertently left out of the underlying bill.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

(Phone) 732-572-0500

(Fax)    732-572-0030

website: www.njlaws.com

Liability of Seacourt Pavilion Toms River for fall down on Snow and Ice and injury claim

Liability of  Seacourt Pavilion Toms River for fall down on Snow and Ice and injury claim

The NJ law imposes upon the owner of commercial or business property the duty to use reasonable care to see to it that the sidewalks abutting the property are reasonably safe for members of the public who are using them. In other words, the law says that the owner of commercial property must exercise reasonable care to see to it that the condition of the abutting sidewalk is reasonably safe and does not subject pedestrians to an unreasonable risk of harm. The concept of reasonable care requires the owner of commercial property to take action with regard to conditions within a reasonable period of time after the owner becomes aware of the dangerous condition or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have become aware of it.3 If, therefore, you find that there was a condition of this sidewalk that was dangerous in that it created an unreasonable risk of harm for pedestrians, and if you find that the owner knew of that condition or should have known of it but failed to take such reasonable action to correct or remedy the situation within a reasonable period of time thereafter as a reasonably prudent commercial or business owner would have done under the circumstances, then the owner is negligent.

       The owner of the Mall or shopping center also has duties. The snow removal and maintenance companies are also sometimes to blame.

            The following is the portion of the NJ Model Jury charge 5.20

   NOTE TO JUDGE

         Include the following where notice of the condition is an issue.

But, in this case, the property owner contends that he/she had no notice or knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for it. In that connection, I must make you aware of this rule: The owner of commercial or business property is chargeable with a duty of making reasonable observations of his/her property, including the abutting sidewalk, in order to discover any dangerous condition that might develop or occur. The owner must make observations of his/her property, including the sidewalk, with the  frequency that a reasonably prudent commercial property owner would in the circumstances. If you find that such a reasonable observation would have revealed the dangerous condition alleged in this case, then the property owner is chargeable with notice of the condition although he/she did not actually know about it; that is, he/she is as much responsible for the condition as if he/she had actual knowledge of its existence.

3If the unsafe condition is alleged to be snow and ice, N.J.S.A. 40:64-12 and any ordinance adopted by the municipality might be charged as a factor, the jury should consider the reasonableness of the time the defendant(s) has (have) waited to remove or reduce a snow or ice condition from the sidewalk.

        NOTE TO JUDGE

Include the following where the owner has taken some action with regard to the condition and the adequacy of the action is in question.

What actions must the owner of commercial property take with regard to defects/snow/ice accumulation/dangerous conditions? The action required by the law is action which a reasonably prudent person would take or should have taken in the circumstances present to correct the defect/snow/ice accumulation/ dangerous condition, to repair it/remove it or to take other actions to minimize the danger to pedestrians (for example, to give warning of it) within a reasonable period of time after notice thereof. The test is: did the commercial property owner take the action that a reasonably prudent person who knows or should have known of the condition would have taken in that circumstance? If he/she did, he/she is not negligent. If he/she did not, he/she is negligent.4

NOTE TO JUDGE

Where there is both a commercial and residential use of the property, the predominant use will determine the status of the property. Avalone v. Mortimer, 252 N.J. Super. 434 (App. Div. 1991), Wasserman v. W. R. Grace Co., 281 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 1995).

Hambright v. Yglesias, 200 N.J. Super. 392, 395 (App. Div. 1985), (two-family home utilized as apartment building in commercial property so as to impose duty upon owner to remove the ice from abutting sidewalk). Borges v. Hamad, 247 N.J. Super 353 (Law Div. 1990); aff’d, 247 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 1990) (owner-occupied three-family house in a residential zone, with two rental units occupied solely by family members, is residential property). There is no affirmative duty on a charitable or religious institution to maintain public sidewalks abutting their properties. Lombardi v. First United Methodist Church, 200 N.J. Super. 646 (App. Div. 1985). But see Brown v. St. Venatius School, 111 N.J. 325 (1998) (school deemed commercial); Restivo v. Church of St. Joseph, 306 N.J. Super. 456 (App. Div. 1997) (leasing apartments even at below fair market value deemed commercial); Gilhooly v. Zeta Psi Fraternity, 243 N.J. Super. 201 (Law Div. 1990) (fraternity deemed commercial property owner).

Owner of a vacant lot is not a commercial landowner for purposes of imposing sidewalk liability irrespective of the commercial status of the owner or the zoning. Briglia v. Mondrian Mortgage Corporation, 304 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1997); Abraham v. City of Perth Amboy, 281 N.J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 1995). 

4See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981); Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390 (1983). (responsibility of commercial landowner for removal of snow or ice from public sidewalk). Stewart imposes liability on commercial landowners only.

See Christmas v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 393, 400 (App. Div. 1987) holding that Stewart, supra, establishes an absolute municipal immunity for deteriorated sidewalks; but, cf. Levin v. DeVoe, 221 N.J. Super. 61, at 64 n.1 (App. Div. 1987) disagreeing with the holding in Christmas. Shade Tree Commissions created by municipalities are granted absolute immunity pursuant to statute. Petrocelli v. Sayreville Shade Tree Commission, 297 N.J Super. 544 (App. Div. 1997). But see Learn v. City of Perth Amboy, 245 N.J Super. 577 (App. Div. 1991) where the Shade Tree Commission was merely advisory.

 

IF YOU FALL DOWN:

AT THE ACCIDENT SCENE

1. Stop . . . do not leave the scene of the accident. CALL THE AMBULANCE, tell them where the accident occurred and (ask for medical help as needed).

2. Notify the property manager or owner, if possible. Insist they observe where you fell. For example, if you fall on an icy sidewalk at the store/ business, notify the manager.

3. Get names and addresses of all witnesses- Witnesses will be a tremendous help to you in any subsequent court action if there is any question of liability involved. Get the names and addresses of as many witnesses as possible. If they refuse to identify themselves, jot down the license plate numbers of their automobiles. Do not discuss the accident with the witnesses. Do not give the witnesses' names to anyone but the police, your attorney or your insurance company.

4. You or friend/ family use cell phone to take photos of the scene and negligent condition.

While waiting for ambulance, write down- Accident Information Date __ Time __ Location __ Weather __ Road conditions __ Damage __

5. Summary of accident __

6. Diagram of accident location

7. Call an ambulance. If you have any reason to suspect you were injured in the accident, go to a hospital immediately or see a physician promptly. You'll want it on record that you sought treatment right away, not in a week or so.

8. Write down name of Police Officers, Department and Badge Number, Ambulance crew, etc.

9. Do not assign or accept blame for the accident. - The scene of the accident is not the place to determine fault. Discuss the accident only with the ambulance and medical personnel, your attorney and with representatives of your insurance company. Give the store your name and address. - Be cooperative with the police.

10. Have immediate photos taken of accident site if you don’t have cell phone or camera.

11. Call a personal injury attorney immediately, not a real estate attorney. Call Kenneth A. Vercammen- Trial Attorney   (732) 572-0500 When you need help the most, we will be ready to help you. 

12. Never give a signed statement to the claims adjuster representing the property owner's insurance company. The same goes for a phone recording. They may be used against you in court to deny your claim. Speak with your personal injury attorney first.

IF YOU HAVE BEEN INJURED BY SLIPPING ON SNOW OR ICE

It is important that you --

1. DO NOT discuss your case with anyone except your doctors and attorney. 

2. DO NOT make any statements or give out any information.

3. DO NOT sign any statements, reports, forms or papers of any kinds, .

4. DO NOT appear at police or other hearings without first consulting with your attorney. INFORM YOUR ATTORNEY PROMPTLY of any notice, request or summons to appear at any hearings.

5. Refer to your attorney anyone who asks you to sign anything or to make any statement or report or who seeks information concerning your case.

6. Direct your doctor and other treatment providers not to furnish or disclose any information concerning your case to any entity other than your insurance company without YOU AND YOUR ATTORNEY'S WRITTEN PERMISSION.

7. You may have insurance coverages such as Blue Cross, Blue Shield or Major Medical, which require prompt attention. However, be sure to have your treatment providers send bills immediately to all of your insurance companies.

8. Notify your attorney promptly of any new developments. Small things may be important. Keep your attorney informed.

9. Maintain accurate records of all information and data pertaining to your case.

10. If you or any witnesses should move, be sure to notify your attorney of the new address.