Kenneth Vercammen is a Middlesex County Trial Attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on Criminal Law, Probate, Estate and litigation topics.

He was awarded the NJ State State Bar Municipal Court Practitioner of the Year.

He lectures and handles criminal cases, Municipal Court, DWI, traffic and other litigation matters.

To schedule a confidential consultation, call us or New clients email us evenings and weekends via contact box www.njlaws.com.

Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C,

2053 Woodbridge Avenue,

Edison, NJ 08817,

(732) 572-0500

Monday, July 29, 2019

Jail Credit in Municipal Court


Jail credit in Municipal Court
      Rule 3:21-8 states that “[the defendant shall receive credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence.” These credits for pre-sentence custody are referred to as “jail credits.” State v. Rawls, 219 N.J. 185, 192 (2014). “When the Rule preconditions for the application of jail credits are satisfied, the award of such credits is mandatory, not discretionary.” State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011), 208 N.J. at 37.
In Hernandez the Court departed from the traditional attribution analysis for determining the correct application of jail credit. The court clarified that defendants are entitled to precisely what the Rule provides: credits against all sentences for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence on each case. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 28 (quoting R. 3:21-8).
The court applied credits to the Hernandez defendants in a manner that maximized the effect of the credits on their aggregate imprisonment terms and parole ineligibility periods. Id. at 46-49.2 [As interpreted by Hernandez, Rule 3:21-8 requires that a defendant receive jail credit even though the charges are not directly responsible for his or her incarceration. Rawls, supra, 219 N.J. at 194. The court reasoned that such an application of jail credit best comports with the policy goals of facilitating fundamental fairness, discouraging gamesmanship by prosecutors and defendants, and promoting uniformity in sentencing. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 46-49.
In Hernandez, the court also discussed the previous holdings in Black and Carreker. Id. at 42-45. The court held that the facts of those cases were distinguishable because they concerned matters in which the defendants were seeking jail credit while already serving custodial sentences. Id. at 45.  

 “Jail credits are ‘day-for-day credits.’” Ibid. (quoting Buncie v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 214, 217 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 606 (2006)). Jail credits apply to the “‘front end’ of a defendant's sentence.
The NJ Supreme Court recognizes that jail credits “serve important policy goals.” Rawls, supra, 219 N.J. at 193. Specifically, jail credits further equal protection and fundamental fairness considerations by preventing the “double punishment” of defendants who spend time in custody prior to sentencing. Ibid. (quoting Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 36). Jail credits thereby prevent indigent defendants who cannot afford to post bail from serving greater time in custody than wealthier defendants. Ibid. In addition, jail credits discourage prosecutors from manipulating trial dates and promote uniformity in sentencing. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 48-49.
 In Hernandez, supra, the Court held that, under Rule 3:21-8, defendants are entitled to jail credit “against all sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each case.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting R. 3:21-8). “Therefore, as interpreted by Hernandez, Rule 3:21-8 requires that a defendant receive jail credit even though the charges are not directly responsible for his or her incarceration.” Rawls, supra, 219 N.J. at 194.

Wednesday, July 24, 2019

Summer 2019 Law Clerks with Kenneth Vercammen: Thomas Livecchi- Rutgers Law, Alaric Azeez- Villanova Law, Shah Hussain- University of Arizona Law, Rochelle Podolsky- James Madison University, Maia Camilien- Ramapo College, Christopher Kay- Boston University Law, Michelle Huertas- Rutgers University, Kenneth Vercammen, Alexa Stiles- Providence College, Sophia Park- Rutgers University, and Marina Dal Agnol- Pace Law


Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Bhramary Nandy- Rutgers University- Class of 2019


Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Michelle Huertas- Rutgers University- Class of 2020


Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Shah Hussain- University of Arizona Law- Class of 2020


Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Alexa Stiles- Providence College- Class of 2020


Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Thomas Livecchi- Rutgers Law- Class of 2021


Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Christopher Kay- Boston University Law- Class of 2021


Conviction Reversed Where Court Excluded Character Evidence

Conviction Reversed Where Court Excluded Character Evidence




Conviction reversed where court excluded character evidence
State v Mahoney
___ NJ Super. ___ 868 A. 2d 1171
(App. Div., A-3364-02T2 decide March 17, 2005).





Defendant is an attorney who was tried before a jury and convicted of third-degree theft by failure to make required disposition of property; third-degree misapplication of entrusted property; and two counts of third-degree forgery. The conviction for theft was based on defendant's delay in disbursing to his clients proceeds from a settlement of a wrongful-death case. With respect to the forgery conviction, the state presented evidence that defendant endorsed and deposited the three-party settlement check without his clients' authorization. The prosecutor denied defendant's application to enter pretrial intervention (PTI) and, on appeal from the prosecutor's denial, the trial court affirmed. Relying on PTI Guideline 3(i), as codified in Rule 3:28, the prosecutor concluded that, as a licensed attorney, defendant was presumptively ineligible to participate in PTI because he was charged with committing crimes that involved a breach of the public trust.

The Appellate Division reversed the convictions. They concluded that the trial court improperly excluded substantial portions of proffered testimony by defendant's character witnesses. The trial court erroneously prevented these witnesses from testifying abut defendant's character traits as an attorney, and improperly barred them from testifying about the specific experiences they had with defendant that formed the basis for their opinions. The trial court also improperly submitted to the jury the full test of Rule 1:21-6. The error here involved the court's failure to provide instructions to the jury on how to consider and apply the rule's directives to the facts of this criminal case. The court also reversed based on the prosecutor's improper remarks during summation.

The Appellate Division court affirmed, the trial court's denial of defendant's PTI application. Although defendant's status as a lawyer does not operate as a per se impediment for consideration for enrollment into PTI, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly determined that defendant failed to show that the prosecutor's application of the presumption of ineligibility articulated in Guideline 3(i)(4) constituted a patent abuse of discretion.




Hire a Trial Attorney To Represent You If Charged With a Criminal Or Serious Motor Vehicle Matter Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office also helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets including drivers charged with Driving While Intoxicated, Refusal and Driving While Suspended. Criminal and Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You may have to pay high fines in court or receive points on your drivers license. An accumulation of too many points, or certain moving violations may require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. DMV/MVC [Motor Vehicle Commission] or have your license suspended. Don't give up!

The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal and motor vehicle violations. When your job or driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV/MVC surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Schedule a free in-office consultation if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter.

Our website KennethVercammen.com provides information on traffic offenses we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for traffic violations and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations. Call the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen at 732-572-0500 to schedule a free in-office consultation to hire a trial attorney for Criminal/ DWI/ Municipal Court Traffic/ Drug offenses.


                                                            https://njlaws.com/svmahoney-charevid.html?id=929&a=

Conviction Affirmed on Eluding; Bassem M. Abdolrazek

Conviction Affirmed on Eluding; Bassem M. Abdolrazek

Conviction affirmed on eluding BASSEM M. ABDOLRAZEK,

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BASSEM M. ABDOLRAZEK,
Defendant-Appellant. NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO.  A->3244-03T4
_________________________________________________
 
 
November 3, 2005

Submitted October 6, 2005 - Decided
Before Judges Weissbard and Winkelstein.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Ocean County, 01-10-1342.
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Natalie A. Schmid Drummond, Deputy
Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Bassem M. Abdolrazek appeals from his conviction following a three-day jury trial on both counts of an indictment charging second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2b (count one) and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2a (count two).On November 14, 2003, defendant was sentenced on count one to nine years in prison with three-years parole ineligibility and a concurrent eighteen-month prison term on count two.  Appropriate penalties were imposed.
On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THE JUDGES COMMENTS TO THE JURY, AS A PART OF THE JURY CHARGE, WHICH PRAISED THE POLICE OFFICER AND UNDERSCORED HIS "DUTY TO STOP" DEFENDANT, IMPROPERLY SERVED TO LET THE JURY KNOW THAT THE JUDGE PERSONALLY BELIEVED AND ADMIRED THE POLICE OFFICER, IN GROSS VIOLATION OF DEFENDANTS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)
POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS SECOND-DEGREE ELUDING CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGES CHARGE RELIEVED THE STATE OF ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THE MATERIAL ELEMENT OF KNOWINGLY CREATING A RISK OF DEATH OR INJURY.  (Not Raised Below)
A.  N.J.S.A.  2C:2-2c(1) Requires The Knowing Mental State Be Applied To The Result-Of-Conduct Element Of Second-Degree Eluding Because The Mental State Is Defined As Knowingly For The Other Material Elements Of Second Degree Eluding And It Does Not "Plainly Appear" That The Legislature Intended To Make Second Degree Eluding A Strict Liability Offense.
B.  State v. Dixon , 346 N.J. Super.  126 (App. Div. 2001,certif. denied , 172 N.J.  181 (2002), Was Wrongly Decided Because The Panel Failed To Interpret The Second-Degree Eluding Statute In Accordance WithN.J.S.A.  2C:2-2c(1) And The Principle That Penal Statutes Must Be Strictly Construed.
C.  The Erroneous Jury Instructions, Objected To By Defense Counsel Below, Relieved The State Of Its Burden Of Proof And Thus Defendants Conviction For Second-Degree Eluding Must Be Reversed.
POINT III
THE SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A.  Absence Of Finding Of Mental-Illness Mitigating Factor And The Resulting Balance Of Factors.
B.  The Apprendi/Blakely  Error.
We conclude that none of the arguments warrants reversal of defendants conviction, but his sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new sentencing in light of State v. Natale , 184 N.J.  458 (2005).
Based on the guilty verdict, we set out the facts in the light most favorable to the State. On August 15, 2001, at 6:42 p.m., Officer Theodore Kucowski, of the Jackson Township Police Department, was on patrol in a marked police vehicle. Kucowski was sitting in his vehicle on Steuben Lane, observing traffic.  The weather and road conditions were clear and dry.
As Kucowski monitored traffic, he observed a black Ford Probe, driven by defendant, exit a shopping center onto Steuben Lane at a high rate of speed.Kucowski continued to observe defendants vehicle travel to the intersection of Steuben Lane and South New Prospect Road, which was controlled by a stop sign, and make a right onto South New Prospect Road without stopping.  Upon observing this violation, Kucowski decided to conduct a motor vehicle stop of defendants vehicle. He followed defendants vehicle, traveling on South New Prospect Road towards West County Line Road. Defendant approached the intersection of South New Prospect Road and West County Line Road, which was controlled by a traffic light that was signaling red. Defendant drove through the intersection without stopping at the red light, almost colliding with an oncoming vehicle, and then turned left onto West County Line Road. At that time, Kucowski was approximately seven to ten car lengths behind defendants vehicle.
Kucowski activated the lights and siren on his patrol vehicle and proceeded through the intersection behind defendants car. Kucowski continued to follow defendants vehicle on West County Line Road, a four-lane highway with two lanes in both directions of travel.  Other vehicles were traveling eastbound in both lanes at that time. Kucowski observed defendants car exit the roadway and travel onto the grass area of a golf course located next to the road. As defendant drove on the grass, he passed another vehicle on the right and then drove back into the roadway, nearly striking the vehicle he had passed. The driver of the other vehicle slammed on the brakes and pulled to the right as defendant reentered the roadway.  At that time, Kucowski was still seven to ten car lengths behind defendants car.
Other vehicles traveling ahead of Kucowski heeded his vehicles lights and siren and pulled over out of his way.  Kucowski saw defendant turn his head over his right shoulder and look out the back window at the police car.
Defendant then approached the intersection of West County Line Road, Hope Chapel Road, and Cathedral Drive with Kucowski still in pursuit. The intersection was controlled by a traffic light, which was signaling red. Traffic was stopped at the red light in both eastbound lanes of travel.  Defendant drove into the westbound, opposing lane of travel, traveled around the stopped vehicles, proceeded through the red light into oncoming traffic, and then made a left turn onto Cathedral Drive.
Kucowski continued to pursue defendant with his lights and siren still activated. Other vehicles that were stopped at the intersection pulled out of the way to allow Kucowskis vehicle to proceed. The officer made a left turn onto Cathedral Drive, following defendants car. Defendants automobile was within the officers sight this entire time.
Kucowski continued to follow defendants vehicle eastbound on Cathedral Drive, a residential street ending in a cul-de-sac, at a distance of ten car lengths.As defendants vehicle approached the cul-de-sac, Kucowski observed the brakes lock and the car lurch forward.  At that point, smoke was coming from the tires of the car as it veered towards the driveway of a residence. Defendant opened the drivers side door and was preparing to jump from the car, but as the vehicle entered the driveway, he fell out of the vehicle and held onto the drivers side door. The vehicle continued traveling forward, with defendant hanging from the door until it struck the house.  Kucowski pulled his vehicle into the driveway behind defendants car.
After his vehicle came to a stop, defendant proceeded to run towards the backyard of the house.  Kucowski chased after defendant on foot, yelling, "Police stop, police stop."  Defendant completely ignored the officer and continued running.
In the backyard of the residence, defendant reached an embankment with a fifteen-foot drop to the bottom.  Defendant jumped off the edge of the embankment.  When Kucowski reached the edge, he saw defendant lying face down at the bottom of the embankment. As Kucowski proceeded down the embankment, defendant got up and ran into a heavily wooded area behind the residence.  Kucowski lost defendant in the heavy woods and brush.
Kucowski communicated a description of defendant to other officers on his police radio, describing defendant as a black male with dreadlocks, wearing a white tank top and camouflage pants.
Officer Raymond Hallock, of the Lakewood Township Police Department, heard the description of defendant on his police radio and proceeded to the wooded area to look for defendant.  Hallock found defendant hiding in a crawl space in an abandoned residence, located across the street from the residence struck by defendants car. The officer took defendant into custody and escorted him back to the scene of the crash.  Kucowski was at the residence, and, upon seeing defendant, stated, "Thats him," acknowledging that this was the same subject he saw driving the vehicle during the pursuit.  Kucowski noticed that defendant had abrasions on the front of his body, which had been sustained while defendant was hanging from the vehicle. The officer further observed that defendant had numerous scratches on his body from running through the woods and brush.
While defendant was incarcerated at the Ocean County Jail, a phone call was monitored in which defendant called his girlfriend, telling her that he did not stop for the police officer during the pursuit because he had bags of "something" in the vehicle that he di d not want the police to find.
Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial.According to defendant, on the day of the incident, he had taken methadone and was hearing voices in his head. He acknowledged that when he was driving that day, he saw the police officer and a stop sign, but supposedly did not stop because female voices in his head told him not to. Defendant indicated that the voices told him to make a left at the red light, although defendant admitted that he knew a right turn was safer. According to defendant, he thought the police were behind him, but when he looked in the rear-view mirror, he saw a bright flash or star. Defendant claimed the voices continued telling him what was happening.
Defendant testified that at the end of the pursuit, the voices told him to jump out of the vehicle, even though he did not want to do so. Defendant acknowledged that the vehicle struck a house. He testified that the voices in his head were telling him that people inside the house were going to "lynch" him. Defendant acknowledged that as he was running, he looked behind him and saw a police officer. He further testified that as he ran, the bushes were moving and looked like "the Tasmanian Devil."
Defendant admitted making a phone call to his girlfriend from the Ocean County Jail on August 23, 2001. According to defendant, he told her that he fled from the police officer because he had bags of "something" in the vehicle that he did not want the police to find. Defendant claimed he gave this explanation because he wanted to appear "normal" or "average" to his girlfriend.
Defendants first argument focuses on certain comments made by the judge at the conclusion of his instructions to the jury on eluding, and just before the charge on resisting arrest.  The challenged remarks were as follows:
Also, with regard to the conduct of the officer in this case, theres absolutely no evidence in this case that this officer in pursuit did anything wrong or inappropriate, or failed to do what he should do.
A police officer does have a duty to stop people who violate the motor vehicle laws by going through stop lights or through red lights.  And its his duty to stop those people and, if they dont stop, to pursue them reasonably in an effort to get them to stop; otherwise, I guess we could all feel free to do what we wanted to do if the officer couldnt pursue us and stop us.
Defendant argues that,

[t]his instruction has no place in a criminal trial because it serves to inform the jury that the judge believes the purs[u]ing officers account of what happened and admires the work done by that officer and all officers in such situations, thereby improperly tipping the scale of justice in favor of the States case.Consequently, defendants rights to due process and a fair trial under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the State Constitution were violated, and the defendants convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.

We agree that these comments were entirely inappropriate and served to bolster the credibility of the police officer and to thereby enhance the States case.  The fact that defense counsel also acknowledged in summation that the officer "was doing his job that day," does not excuse the judges statement.  It is one thing for counsel to make a concession on some subsidiary issue in an effort to persuade the jury on the larger issue of defendants innocence.  It is quite a different matter for the judge to make remarks which may, as a result of his imposing position in the trial, serve to tip the balance in favor of the State.  It is no defense to respond, as the State does, that the judges remarks constituted a correct statement of the law.The validity of the officers actions in chasing defendant were not the issue; rather, it was defendants actions in eluding the officer which the jury had to judge.
While the judges comments were inappropriate, we conclude that they were harmless in that they did not have the capacity to sway the jury on the central issue in the case.  State v. Pillar , 359 N.J. Super.  249, 278-79 (App. Div.), certif. denied , 177 N.J.  572 (2003).  As posited by the defense, that central issue was defendants intent.  Despite the possibility that the improper remarks may have enhanced Kucowskis credibility, his credibility was not critical to the defense.  Indeed, both Kucowski and Hollock provided testimony helpful to the defense by stating that defendant was not acting normally but appeared under the influence of "something."  Of course, the defense relied primarily on defendants own testimony which called on the jury to assess his credibility.
Although defense counsel did not object to the remarks in question, thereby arguably demanding a plain error analysis, R.  2:10-2, we choose to decide the issue on the basis of harmless error which invokes essentially the same standard. Compare  R.  2:10-2 with R.  1:7-5; see also  State v. Macon , 57 N.J.  325, 340-41 (1971).  While the error does not require reversal in this case, we caution that a different result would likely obtain if the case turned on the officers credibility.
Defendant argues that the judge committed plain error in failing to charge an appropriate mental state with respect to that portion of the eluding statute which raises the offense from third degree to second degree "if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person."  Although the argument is not without merit, and is well-briefed on both sides, we are not persuaded.
As defendant concedes, we rejected the same argument in State v. Dixon , 346 N.J. Super.  126, 135-36 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied , 172 N.J.  181 (2002).Here, as in Dixon , defendant contends that the Model Jury Charge is defective in this respect and that Dixon was wrongly decided.  We evaluate defendants argument in light of several accepted principles.N.J.S.A.  2C:2-2c provides in pertinent part:
(1) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is >sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.


. . . .
(3) Construction of statutes not stating culpability requirement. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state.A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with the culpability defined in paragraph b.(2) of this section. This provision applies to offenses defined both within and outside of this code.
The reference to "the culpability defined in paragraph b.2" refers to "knowingly."  As the leading commentator states, "the failure of the legislature to prescribe a particular type of culpability to an element of an offense should not be read as imposing strict liability unless a clear legislative intent to do so is apparent."  John M. Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated , comment 7 on N.J.S.A.  2C:2-2 at 138 (2005).
The eluding statute at issue here states in pertinent part:
b. Any person, while operating a motor vehicle on any street or highway in this State . . . who knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police or law enforcement officer after having received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle to a full stop commits a crime of the third degree; except that, a person is guilty of a crime of the second degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to >any person.  For purposes of this subsection, there shall be a permissive inference that the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person if the persons conduct involves a violation of chapter 4 of Title 39 or chapter 7 of Title 12 of the Revised Statutes.  In addition to the penalty prescribed under this subsection or any other section of law, the court shall order the suspension of that persons drivers license, or privilege to operate a vessel, whichever is appropriate, for a period of not less than six months or more than two years.

[N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2b.]
This statute does not present a situation where there is no culpability requirement stated and resort must be had to the "gap filler" provisions of N.J.S.A.  2C:2-2c(3), quoted above.  Here, the statute contains the culpability requirement of "knowingly."  And that culpability requirement applies not only to the "attendant circumstances" of being signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer, but to the "forbidden conduct" of fleeing or attempting to elude as well.State v. Mendez , 345 N.J. Super.  498, 507 (App. Div. 2001), affd , 175 N.J.  201 (2002).  Mendez  was concerned only with third-degree eluding which does not include any "result of conduct" element.  Ibid. Second-degree eluding does contain such a conduct element in that the flight or attempt to elude must create "a risk of death or injury to any person."N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2b. "[W]hether considered a sentence enhancer or element of the second-degree crime," the risk of death or injury must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Dixon , supra , 346 N.J. Super.  at 136.  The question then narrows itself to whether the "risk of death or injury" clause is an element to which the knowing culpability state applies or whether it is a strict liability requirement, standing alone without a scienter requirement.
Dixon  held that:
the term "knowingly" does not relate to the risk which aggravates the eluding and makes it a second-degree crime.  The relevant clauses in N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2b are separated by a semi-colon, and there is no culpability requirement independent of the third-degree crime. . . .  [T]he structure of N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2b, and a reasonable reading of its provisions, results in a construction that a defendant need not knowingly create the risk so long as the defendant, as in this case, is found to have committed third degree eluding with the requisite knowing culpability.
[Dixon , supra , 346 N.J. Super.  at 135-36.]
In support of its argument that Dixon  reached the correct result, the State points to that portion of the eluding statute immediately following the "risk of death or injury" clause creating "a permissive inference that the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person if the persons conduct involves" a violation of one or more motor vehicle statutes during the chase.  See  State v. Wallace , 158 N.J.  552, 558-60 (1999) (quoting N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2b); Dixon , supra , 346 N.J. Super.  at 135.  Indeed, in this case, the judge did instruct the jury on this permissive inference.  As the State points out, the use of this permissive inference relieves the State of the burden of proving that any person was actually placed at risk of death or injury.  That is, since the motor vehicle violations do not contain a culpability requirement, and the risk of death or injury can be proven through such violations, it follows that the legislature was thereby plainly expressing "a contrary purpose," N.J.S.A.  2C:2-2c(1), to the normal requirement attaching a culpability state to all elements of the offense.
Further, the argument for strict liability with respect to the risk of death or injury element is supported byN.J.S.A.  2C:11-4(2) which includes within manslaughter "caus[ing] the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of" N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2b, and goes on to provide:
Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2 which resulted in the death of another person.
Similarly, N.J.S.A.  2C:12-1b(6) renders one guilty of aggravated assault if the person:
Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this subsection upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.A.  2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person.
While it certainly would have been helpful if the eluding statute also spoke in terms of strict liability, we do not view that omission as fatal to the States argument and our conclusion.  Rather, based on these related statutes, as well as the structure of the eluding statute itself, we reject defendants argument that the legislature failed to evidence a clear intent to make the risk of death or injury a strict liability element, with no culpability requirement, and that the separation of that clause from the third degree portion of the statute by a semi-colon does not provide such clear evidence of legislative intent.  As a result, although the issue is a close one, we agree with the conclusion reached inDixon .
We comment briefly on State v. Worthy , 329 N.J. Super.  109 (App. Div. 2000), relied upon by defendant.  That case involved construction of the criminal restraint statute which provides in pertinent part that a person commits a third-degree crime "if he knowingly:  a. restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing the other to risk of serious bodily injury."  N.J.S.A.  2C:13-2.  We held that the mental state of knowingly applied to the "risk of serious bodily injury" to the victim element of the offense.  We found support for that conclusion in the fact that (1) "knowingly" introduces the entire statute, (2) the legislative history, making clear that the actor must be aware of the risk to the victim, and (3)N.J.S.A.  2C:2-2, and particularly its gap filler provision, N.J.S.A.  2C:2-2c(3).  Worthy , supra , 329N.J. Super.  at 114-16.  While the gap filler provision is particularly helpful when it is unclear whether the stated culpability requirement "applies to all elements of the offense or only to the element that is immediately introduced," id.  at 116 (quoting The New Jersey Penal Code:  Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission , supra , at 46), we find no such ambiguity here.  Thus, we have no need to resort to the "established rule of construction" that penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the State.Id.  at  116.  We do not find sufficient ambiguity here to invoke that rule.
The charge as given accorded with the construction of the statute in Dixon , with which we concur.Accordingly, defendants eluding conviction is affirmed.
Finally, defendant contends that his sentence was "manifestly excessive and unconstitutional."Specifically, he argues that the judge failed to consider and weigh his mental illness as a mitigating factor.  In sentencing defendant, the judge addressed defendants mental illness contention as follows:
This Court has had an extensive number of proceedings with regard to the matter involving medical testimony.  Ive made factual findings in that regard on the record that will be incorporated, of course, with the record of trial in this matter.
I have been and still am satisfied that you were more than competent to stand trial, to assist your counsel in the defense of this matter, and that you have no mental illness, disease or defect which would rise to the level of a justifiable defense.
Your counsel talks about not being on your medication, but it appears to the Court, from your extensive criminal history, that your primary medication would be drugs and alcohol.
As the judge made clear, he had conducted proceedings dealing with defendants competency to stand trial and was, as a result, quite familiar with the medical evidence concerning defendants mental health.  However, neither the fact that defendant was found competent to stand trial nor that his alleged mental illness did not "rise to the level of a justifiable defense" ruled out consideration of mental illness as a mitigating factor under N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1b(2), (3), (4) or (8).  In making his earlier determinations the judge may have concluded that defendant had no mental illness at all.  If so, then he was justified in rejecting it as a mitigating factor.  His remarks at sentencing do not make this entirely clear.  In any event, we need not resolve the issue since the matter will be remanded for resentencing at which time the issue can be raised again and resolved by the judge.
Defendant was sentenced to a prison term in excess of the presumptive term based on the judges finding of aggravating factors, N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1a(3), (6) and (9).To some extent at least, these factors were not based on criminal history alone.  As a result, Natale , supra , requires a new sentencing hearing.
Conviction affirmed; remanded for a new sentencing.
 https://njlaws.com/abdolrazek.html?id=2553&a=

Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Marina Dal Agnol- Pace Law- Class of 2021


Controlled by supports search warrant. State v. Keyes 184 NJ 541 (App. Div. 2005).

Controlled by supports search warrant. State v. Keyes 184 NJ 541 (App. Div. 2005).


     Based on the totality of the circumstances, the issuing court had a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to search the apartment. Given the other available police corroboration, the officers' inability to witness the informant enter the apartment does not alter the conclusion that police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant.


Hire a Trial Attorney To Represent You If Charged With a Criminal Or Serious Motor Vehicle Matter Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office also helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets including drivers charged with Driving While Intoxicated, Refusal and Driving While Suspended. Criminal and Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You may have to pay high fines in court or receive points on your drivers license. An accumulation of too many points, or certain moving violations may require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. DMV/MVC [Motor Vehicle Commission] or have your license suspended. Don't give up!

The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal and motor vehicle violations. When your job or driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV/MVC surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Schedule a free in-office consultation if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter.

Our website KennethVercammen.com provides information on traffic offenses we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for traffic violations and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations. Call the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen at 732-572-0500 to schedule a free in-office consultation to hire a trial attorney for Criminal/ DWI/ Municipal Court Traffic/ Drug offenses.


                                                                https://njlaws.com/svkeyeswarrant.html?id=925&a=


  
   

Contraband Not Admissible in Warrantless Search. State v. Holland, __ NJ __ A-150

Contraband Not Admissible in Warrantless Search. State v. Holland, __ NJ __ A-150


The contraband that was found after a warrantless entry into the defendant's home was not admissible under the independent source rule where the police officers could not prove by clear and convincing evidence that they would have secured a search warrant independent of the tainted knowledge or evidence that they had previously acquired or viewed. Source: 12 NJL 1071.


Hire a Trial Attorney To Represent You If Charged With a Criminal Or Serious Motor Vehicle Matter Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office also helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets including drivers charged with Driving While Intoxicated, Refusal and Driving While Suspended. Criminal and Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You may have to pay high fines in court or receive points on your drivers license. An accumulation of too many points, or certain moving violations may require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. DMV/MVC [Motor Vehicle Commission] or have your license suspended. Don't give up!

The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal and motor vehicle violations. When your job or driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV/MVC surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Schedule a free in-office consultation if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter.

Our website KennethVercammen.com provides information on traffic offenses we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for traffic violations and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations. Call the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen at 732-572-0500 to schedule a free in-office consultation to hire a trial attorney for Criminal/ DWI/ Municipal Court Traffic/ Drug offenses.
  

   https://njlaws.com/svhollandhomesearch.html?id=919&a=

Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Sophia Park- Rutgers University- Class of 2020


Kenneth Vercammen with summer law clerk Alaric Azeez- Villanova Law- Class of 2020


CONTRABAND 2C:29‑6b) model jury charge

CONTRABAND 2C:29‑6b) model jury charge


PROVIDING AN INMATE WITH CONTRABAND[1]
(N.J.S.A. 2C:29‑6b)model jury charge
Under the circumstances of this case, I charge you that you should also consider whether defendant has committed the offense of providing contraband to an inmate of an institution or a detention facility.
The relevant statute provides that A person commits a[n]...offense if he provides an inmate with any other thing [than a weapon, tool or other thing which may be useful for escape] which he knows or should know it is unlawful for the inmate to possess.
To obtain a conviction on this charge, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1)That defendant provided S1 to an inmate of an institution or a detention facility;
(2)That S1 is not a weapon, tool or other thing which may be useful for escape; and
(3)That defendant knew or should have known that it was unlawful for the inmate to possess S1.
I have already defined the relevant terms for you.If you find that the State has failed to prove any one or more of the elements of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then your verdict should be Not Guilty.On the other hand, if you find that the State has proven all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then your verdict should be Guilty.


[1]Note:This is a lesser included offense to the crime of providing an implement for escape to an inmate of an institution or a detention facility underN.J.S.A. 2C:29‑6a.The following is not meant to stand alone, but to serve as a supplement to the model charge entitledEscape Implements ‑ Introducing into Institution or Providing Inmate(N.J.S.A. 2C:29‑6a).
https://njlaws.com/contraband.html?id=5506&a=

Contempt of Court in New Jersey

Contempt of Court in New Jersey

Contempt of Court in New Jersey
The judge must follow the following Rules and Statutes before fining someone for contempt of court:
Rule 1:10-1. Summary Contempt in Presence of Court
A judge conducting a judicial proceeding may adjudicate contempt summarily without an order to show cause if:
(a) the conduct has obstructed, or if continued would obstruct, the proceeding;
(b) the conduct occurred in the actual presence of the judge, and was actually seen or heard by the judge;
(c) the character of the conduct or its continuation after an appropriate warning unmistakably demonstrates its willfulness;
(d) immediate adjudication is necessary to permit the proceeding to continue in an orderly and proper manner; and
(e) the judge has afforded the alleged contemnor an immediate opportunity to respond.
The order of contempt shall recite the facts and contain a certification by the judge that he or she saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that the contemnor was willfully contumacious. Punishment may be determined forthwith or deferred. Execution of sentence shall be stayed for five days following imposition and, if an appeal is taken, during the pendency of the appeal, provided, however, that the judge may require bail if reasonably necessary to assure the contemnor's appearance.
Rule 1:10-2. Summary Contempt Proceedings on Order to Show Cause or Order for Arrest
(a) Institution of Proceedings. Every summary proceeding to punish for contempt other than proceedings under R. 1:10-1 shall be on notice and instituted only by the court upon an order for arrest or an order to show cause specifying the acts or omissions alleged to have been contumacious. The proceedings shall be captioned "In the Matter of ______ Charged with Contempt of Court."
(b) Release Pending Hearings. A person charged with contempt under R. 1:10-2 shall be released on his or her own recognizance pending the hearing unless the judge determines that bail is reasonably necessary to assure appearance. The amount and sufficiency of bail shall be reviewable by a single judge of the Appellate Division.
(c) Prosecution and Trial. A proceeding under R. 1:10-2 may be prosecuted on behalf of the court only by the Attorney General, the County Prosecutor of the county or, where the court for good cause designates an attorney, then by the attorney so designated. The matter shall not be heard by the judge who instituted the prosecution if the appearance of objectivity requires trial by another judge. Unless there is a right to a trial by jury, the court in its discretion may try the matter without a jury. If there is an adjudication of contempt, the provisions of R. 1:10-1 as to stay of execution of sentence shall apply.
Rule 1:10-3. Relief to Litigant
Notwithstanding that an act or omission may also constitute a contempt of court, a litigant in any action may seek relief by application in the action. A judge shall not be disqualified because he or she signed the order sought to be enforced. If an order entered on such an application provides for commitment, it shall specify the terms of release provided, however, that no order for commitment shall be entered to enforce a judgment or order exclusively for the payment of money, except for orders and judgments based on a claim for equitable relief including orders and judgments of the Family Part and except if a judgment creditor demonstrates to the court that the judgment debtor has assets that have been secreted or otherwise placed beyond the reach of execution. The court in its discretion may make an allowance for counsel fees to be paid by any party to the action to a party accorded relief under this rule. In family actions, the court may also grant additional remedies as provided by R. 5:3-7. An application by a litigant may be tried with a proceeding under R. 1:10-2(a) only with the consent of all parties and subject to the provisions of R. 1:10-2(c).
The Supreme Court also issue a directive to Judges regarding the use of Rule 1:10-1 (Contempt in Presence of Court) Directive #8-99 In 1994, the Supreme Court amended Rule 1:10-1 to detail the basis for and procedures governing the use of the summary contempt power. The Rule, as amended, provides as follows: A judge conducting a judicial proceeding may adjudicate contempt summarily without an order to show cause if: (a) the conduct has obstructed, or if continued would obstruct the proceeding; (b) the conduct occurred in the actual presence of the judge, and was actually seen or heard by the judge; (c) the character of the conduct or its continuation after an appropriate warning unmistakably demonstrates its willfulness; (d) immediate adjudication is necessary to permit the proceeding to continue in an orderly and proper manner; and (e) the judge has afforded the alleged contemnor an immediate opportunity to respond. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and contain a certification by the judge that he or she saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that the contemnor was willfully contumacious. Punishment may be determined forthwith or deferred. Execution of sentence shall be stayed for five days following imposition and, if an appeal is taken, during the pendency of the appeal, provided, however, that the judge may require bail if reasonably necessary to assure the contemnor's appearance. All of the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (e) must be met before a judge uses the summary contempt power. In particular, you will note that the conduct must have obstructed the proceeding and have been Actually seen or heard by the judge. The Rule also provides for a warning and an opportunity for the party to respond, all of which contemplates that the offending party is actually in the presence of the judge when the conduct occurs. The significant changes to Rule 1:10-1 were the result of a report by a special Summary Contempt Subcommittee of the Civil Practice Committee. That Committee's recommendations to the Supreme Court and the Court's adoption of those recommendations make it abundantly clear that it is inappropriate for judges to use the summary contempt power when confronted by offensive comments written in letters, on checks, or on envelopes. If threatening language is used in a written communication, the court should follow the established policy contained in the 1988 Guidelines on:
Threats to Members of the Judiciary, (copy attached) rather than resorting to the use of Rule 1:10-1. (For a discussion of the Supreme Court's concerns that pre-dated the Committee's Report, see Matter of Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 60 (1990).) Courts and court staff are obliged to process written communications, including negotiable instruments, from litigants who gratuitously include profane and scurrilous comments. This does not mean that such submissions need always go unremarked. In an egregious case, a carefully measured written response may be made. The content of such a response cannot, however, implicate the powers provided under Rule 1:10-1.
CONTEMPT (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9) The following is the Jury charge on Criminal Contempt: The defendant is charged with committing the crime of contempt. The Statutes of New Jersey describe the crime of "contempt" as follows: A person is guilty of a crime . . . if he purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or hinders, obstructs or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing or controversy by a Court, administrative body or investigative entity. In order for the defendant to be found guilty of contempt, you must find each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: [The Judge will charge any or all of the following alternatives as appropriate.] Alternative 1: (Charge in the case of disobedience of an order.) 1. An Order of the Court had been entered. 2. That the defendant knew of the existence of the Order. 3. That the defendant purposely or knowingly disobeyed the Order. A person has disobeyed a judicial order when that person has, with knowledge of the existence of the order, purposely or knowingly refused or failed to comply with an order as entered by the Court which applies to (him/her). A court order may either be written or oral. In the case at hand the proofs indicate that the order which the defendant has been charged with disobeying was written/oral.
OR Alternative 2: Charge in the case of hindering, obstructing or impeding the effectuation of a judicial order. 1. An order of the Court had been entered. 2. That the defendant knew of the existence of the Order. 3. The defendant purposely or knowingly hindered, obstructed or impeded the fulfillment of the judicial order
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030
TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/ traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.
Mr. Vercammen served as the Prosecutor for the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County and was involved in trials on a weekly basis. He also argued all pre-trial motions and post-trial applications on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
He has also served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Berkeley Heights, Carteret, East Brunswick, Jamesburg, South Brunswick, South River and South Plainfield for conflict cases. Since 1989, he has personally handled hundreds of criminal and motor vehicle matters as a Prosecutor and now as defense counsel and has had substantial success.
Previously, Mr. Vercammen was Public Defender for the Township of Edison and Borough of Metuchen and a Designated Counsel for the Middlesex County Public Defender's Office. He represented indigent individuals facing consequences of magnitude. He was in Court trying cases and making motions in difficult criminal and DWI matters. Every case he personally handled and prepared.
His resume sets forth the numerous bar associations and activities which demonstrate his commitment to the legal profession and providing quality representation to clients.
Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court) with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Department as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:
a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.
3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.
4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing.
5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.
6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty.
7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty.
8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3
9. You could be put on Probation.
10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30.
11. You may be required to do Community Service.
12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty.
13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction.
14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation.
15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1
16. You may lose your right to vote.
The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense.
Jail for Crimes and Disorderly Conduct:
If someone pleads Guilty or is found Guilty of a criminal offense, the following is the statutory Prison/Jail terms.
NJSA 2C: 43-8 (1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
2C:43-3 Fines have been increased recently! 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed:
a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree;
(2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree;
b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree;
(2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree;
c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense;
d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense;
If facing any criminal charge, retain an experienced attorney immediately to determine you rights and obligations to the court. Current criminal charge researched by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. 732-572-0500
https://njlaws.com/contemptofcourt.html?id=122&a=

CONTEMPT (N.J.S.A. 2C:29‑9) model jury charge

CONTEMPT (N.J.S.A. 2C:29‑9) model jury charge


CONTEMPT
(N.J.S.A. 2C:29‑9)model jury charge
The defendant is charged with committing the crime of contempt.

The Statutes of New Jersey describe the crime of contempt as follows:

A person is guilty of a crime . . . if he purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or hinders, obstructs or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing or controversy by a Court, administrative body or investigative entity.
In order for the defendant to be found guilty of contempt, you must find each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
[Charge any or all of the following alternatives as appropriate.]
Alternative 1:(Charge in the case of disobedience of an order.)
1.An Order of theCourt had been entered.[1]
2.That the defendant knew of the existence of the Order.
3.That the defendant purposely or knowingly disobeyed the Order.
A person has disobeyed a judicial order when that person has, with knowledge of the existence of the order, purposely or knowingly refused or failed to comply with an order as entered by theCourt which applies tohim/her.A court order may either be written or oral.In the case at hand the proofs indicate that the order which the defendant has been charged with disobeying was written/oral.

OR

Alternative 2:Charge in the case of hindering, obstructing or impeding the effectuation of a judicial order.
1.An order of theCourt had been entered.[2]
2.That the defendant knew of the existence of the Order.
3.The defendant purposely or knowingly hindered, obstructed or impeded the fulfillment of the judicial order.

OR

Alternative 3:Charge in the case of hindering, obstructing or impeding the exercise of jurisdiction of a court, administrative body or investigative entity.
1.There had been an exercise of jurisdiction or an attempt to exercise jurisdiction by[insert name of Court, administrative body or investigative entity]over any person, thing or element in controversy.[3]
2.The defendant knew of the existence of this exercise of jurisdiction or attempted exercise of jurisdiction.
3.That the defendant byhis/herconduct hindered, obstructed or impeded, that is, byhis/heractions, prevented, deterred, delayed or inhibited byhis/herpurposeful and knowing actions the exercise of jurisdiction of[insert name of Court, administrative body or investigative entity].
A person has hindered, obstructed or impeded the fulfillment of [a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction] by a [court, administrative body or investigative entity] whenhe/shehas purposely or knowingly in any way made the accomplishment of the juridical order or exercise of jurisdiction more difficult.In this situation, it does not matter whether the order or the exercise of jurisdiction is directed to the Defendant.
[The following will be charged in all instances]
Before the defendant can be found guilty of contempt, you must decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has purposely or knowingly [disobeyed a judicial order or hindered a judicial order or exercise of jurisdiction] beyond a reasonable doubt.
A person acts purposely with respect to the nature ofhis/herconduct or a result thereof if it ishis/herconscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.A person acts purposely with respect to attendantcircumstances ifhe/sheis aware of the existence of such circumstances orhe/shebelieves or hopes that they exist.With purpose,designed, with design or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature ofhis/herconduct or the attendant circumstances ifhe/sheis aware thathis/herconduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, orhe/sheis aware of a high probability of their existence.A person acts knowingly with respect to a result ofhis/herconduct ifhe/sheis aware that it is practically certain thathis/herconduct will cause such a result.Knowing, with knowledge or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant purposely or knowingly [disobeyed a judicial order or hindered a judicial order or exercise of jurisdiction], then you must find defendant guilty of contempt.However, if you are not satisfied that the State has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty.


[1]The question as to whether there is an order or an exercise of jurisdiction is generally a determination of law to be made by the Court.
[2]The question as to whether there is an order or an exercise of jurisdiction is generally a determination of law to be made by the court.
[3]Ibid.
https://njlaws.com/contempt3.html?id=5509&a=