Kenneth Vercammen & Associates Law Office helps people injured due to the negligence of others. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. The insurance companies will not help. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation if you are injured in an accident and suffer a Serious Injury.
AT THE ACCIDENT SCENE
1. Stop . . . do not leave the scene of the accident. CALL THE POLICE, tell them where the accident occurred and ask for medical help if needed.
2. Get names, addresses, and license numbers of all drivers involved.
3. Get description and registration number and insurance information of all cars involved. License Plate Number __ Registration # __ Make __ Year __ Damage __ Insurance Company __ Insurance Policy Number __
4. Get names and addresses of all witnesses Witnesses will be a tremendous help to you in any subsequent court action, if there is any question of liability involved. Get the names and addresses of as many witnesses as possible. If they refuse to identify themselves, jot down the license plate numbers of their automobiles. Do not discuss the accident with the witnesses. Do not give the witnesses names to anyone but the police, your attorney or your insurance company.
5. While waiting for police, write down- Accident Information Date __ Time __ Location __ No. of vehicles involved __ Weather __ Road conditions __ Damage __ Speed of the other car __
6. Summary of accident __
7. Diagram of accident
8. Call an ambulance. If you have any reason to suspect you were injured in the accident, go to a hospital immediately or see a physician promptly. You'll want it on record that you sought treatment right away -not in a week or so.
9. Name of Police Officers, Department and Badge Number
10. Do not assign or accept blame for the accident. - The scene of the accident is not the place to determine fault. Discuss the accident only with the police, your attorney and with representatives of your insurance company. Give the other party only your drivers license number, registration number and insurance information. - Be cooperative with the police.
11. Seek hospital/ medical attention.
12. Take photos of damage to car, location of your seat belt and air bag. Also take photos of scrapes or black and blue marks on your body caused by your seat belt and air bag.
13. Call your insurance company to report the accident.
14. Call a personal injury attorney, not a real estate attorney: Call Kenneth A. Vercammen- Trial Attorney Attorney At Law (732) 572-0500 When you need help the most, we will be ready to help you.
15. Never give a signed statement to the claims adjuster representing the other driver's insurance company. The same goes for a phone recording. They may be used against you in court to deny your claim. Speak with your personal injury attorney first.
IF YOU HAVE BEEN INJURED IN A CAR ACCIDENT; WHILE YOUR PERSONAL INJURY CASE IS PENDING:
It is important that you -- 1. DO NOT discuss your case with anyone except your doctors and attorney. 2. DO NOT make any statements or give out any information. 3. DO NOT sign any statements, reports, forms or papers of any kinds. 4. DO NOT appear at police or other hearings without first consulting with your attorney. INFORM YOUR ATTORNEY PROMPTLY of any notice, request or summons to appear at any such hearings. 5. Refer to your attorney, anyone who asks you to sign anything or to make any statement or report or who seeks information concerning your case. 6. Direct your doctor and other treatment providers not to furnish or disclose any information concerning your case to any entity other than your insurance company without YOU AND YOUR ATTORNEY'S WRITTEN PERMISSION. 7. You may have insurance coverages such as liability, collision, accident, Blue Cross, Blue Shield or Major Medical which require prompt attention. However, be sure to have your treatment providers send bills immediately to all of your insurance companies. 8. Notify your attorney promptly of any new developments. Small things may be important. Keep your attorney informed. 9. Maintain accurate records of all information and data pertaining to your case. 10. If you or any witnesses should move, be sure to notify your attorney of the new address.
Financial Recovery for persons injured in car accidents
1. Kenneth Vercammen Helps Injured persons A person who is injured as a result of the negligence of another person is what we in the legal profession refer to as a personal injury claimant. In other words, they have been injured as a result of an accident, and now wish to prosecute a claim against an opposing party. Kenneth Vercammen's office handles cases against negligent drivers and their insurance companies for injury. We do not handle products liability cases. Therefore, I request that all clients do as much as possible to cooperate and help in every way. The purpose of this article is to describe the procedure that we may follow and give you sufficient instructions to enable you to assist us in this undertaking. Needless to say, helping us is just another way of helping yourself. If you have been injured, but not in a car accident, most of this brochure is still applicable to an accident case, whether it is a fall down, dog bite or other injury.
2. Clients should provide my office with the following 1. Any bills 2. All Hospital or doctor records in your possession 3. Car Insurance Declaration Sheet 4. Car Insurance Policy 5. Photos of damage to your car and property 6. Photos of accident site 7. Major Med Card 8. Paystub if lost time from work
3. Attorney- Client Confidential Relationship First, I want to thank our clients for giving me the opportunity to assist them in their case. I am a legal professional and I have great pride and confidence in the legal services that I perform for clients during our relationship as attorney-client. If you have concerns about your case, please call my office at (732) 572-0500. We feel that this case is extremely important-not only to you, but to this office as well. This is not simply a matter of obtaining just compensation for you, although that is very important. We take professional pride in guiding our clients carefully through difficult times to a satisfactory conclusion of their cases.
4. Submission of Bills to (1) Car Insurance and (2) Major Medical You should submit your medical bills to your own car insurance company first. Your car insurance is required by New Jersey law to provide PIP (Personal Injury Protection) benefits under the No Fault Law. This means your car insurance company, not the careless driver, pay the majority of medical bills. Please provide insurance information to each doctor, MRI facility and treatment provider. Please request they submit bills and attending physician reports to your car insurance company. There is now minimum deductibles under the PIP Law. There is an initial $250.00 deductible, and thereafter your car insurance company pays 80% of medical bills under a medical fee schedule established by the State Dept. of Insurance. Your primary treating doctor must also follow "Care Path". Submit portions of bills the car insurance does not pay to your major medical carrier (ex- Blue Cross, Connecticut General). The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide a more detailed brochure explaining how car insurance works.
5. Diary We want you to keep a diary of your experiences since your accident. In addition to this daily record, we also ask you to start describing a single day in the course of your life. In other words, describe what you do when you get up in the morning, the first thing you do after you go to work, what type of work and effort you put into your employment, what activities you engage in after work, etc. In other words, we need you to describe the changes in your working life, your playing life, your life as a husband or wife or child or parent. In your written description of your day, we would appreciate your explanation in the greatest detail possible and in your own words how the accident and subsequent injuries have affected your life, your personality, and your outlook. And remember that suffering does not entail mere physical pain; suffering can be emotional and can be transmitted to your family, friends, and co-workers. When you have completed this description, please return it to this office in the enclosed envelope. Keep a diary of all matters concerning this accident-no matter how trivial you think it may be. You should include notes on the treatments you receive, therapy, casts, appliances, hospitalization, change of doctors, change of medication, symptoms, recurrence, setbacks, disabilities and inconveniences. If you have any doubt about the propriety of including some particular information, please call the office and let us assist you.
6. Record expenses You can also begin to set up a system for recording the expenses incurred in conjunction with your claim in minute detail. Medical and legal expenses are a strong part of the value of your lawsuit, so good records of these expenses must be kept at all times. From time to time, however, there will be expenses incurred that you must keep track of yourself. We ask you to make every effort to avoid any possible error or inaccuracy as jurors have a relentless reverence for the truth. Keep your canceled checks and your list of expenses together, for we will need them at a later date. Your attorney will keep track of your legal expenses, which may include costs of filing, service of process, investigation, reports, depositions, witness fees, jury fees, etc.
7. Investigation and Filing of Complaint Procedurally, the following events occur in most personal injury cases. First, your attorney must complete our investigation and file. This will involve the collection of information from your physician, your employer, and our investigator. We will need your Doctors to provide us with copies of all bills, medical records and possibly a medical report. When we feel that we have sufficient information to form an opinion as to the financial extent of your damages, we will commence negotiations with the opposition for a settlement. If the insurance company will not make an adequate offer, then a Complaint and Case Information Statement is prepared by your attorney. It is filed in the Superior Court, Law Division. Your attorney then will prepare a summons and have the defendants personally served with the Summons and Complaint. The defendant, through their insurance company, must file an "Answer" within 35 days. Kenneth Vercammen's office generally does not file a Complaint until the treating doctor signs an "Affidavit of Merit" setting forth why the injury is permanent and the diagnostic tests upon which the permanent injury is based. You will need to speak with your doctor to ask if you have a permanent injury.
8. Interrogatory Questions and Discovery The Answer is followed by a request for written interrogatories. These are questions that must be answered by each party. The Superior Court has set up certain "Form" Interrogatories which are contained in the Rules of Court. Generally, written interrogatories are followed by the taking of depositions, which is recorded testimony given under oath by any person the opposition wishes to question. The deposition is just as important as the trial itself. In the event you are deposed during the course of this action, you will receive detailed instructions as to the procedure and will be requested to watch a videotape. After taking depositions, the case will be set down for an Arbitration. If the parties do not settle after the Arbitration, the case will be given a trial call date. Altogether, these procedures may take from six months to several years, and your patience may be sorely tried during this time. However, it has been our experience that clients who are forewarned have a much higher tolerance level for the slowly turning wheels of justice.
9. Doctor/ Treatment It will help your case to tell us and your doctors about any injury or medical problems before or after your accident. Good cases can be lost by the injured person's concealing or forgetting an earlier or later injury or medical problem. Insurance companies keep a record of any and all claims against any insurance company. The insurance company is sure to find out if you have ever made a previous claim. Tell your doctors all of your complaints. The doctor's records can only be as complete as what you have given. Keep track of all prescriptions and medicines taken accompanied by the bills. Also save all bottles or containers of medicine. 10. Bills Retain all bills which relate to your damages, including medical expenses, hospital expenses, drugs and medicines, therapy, appliances, and anything needed to assist you in your recovery. If possible, pay these bills by check or money order, so that a complete record may be kept. If this is not possible, be certain to obtain a complete receipt with the bill heading on it, to indicate where the receipt came from and the party issuing it. 11. Evidence Be certain to keep anything that comes into your possession which might be used as evidence in your case, such as shoes, clothing, glasses, photographs, defective machinery, defective parts, foreign substances which may have been a factor in your accident, etc. Be sure to let the office know that you have these items in your possession. 12. Photographs Take photographs of all motor vehicles, accident site, etc., that may be connected directly or indirectly with your accident. Again, be sure to let the office know that you have such photographs.
The value of a case depends on the Permanent Injury, medical treatment and doctor's reports Undoubtedly, you have questions as to how much your case is worth. We are going to be frank: The fact of the matter is there can be no answer to this question until we have completed the investigation in your case. Once we complete our investigation, of course, we can make a determination as to the amount of the defendant's liability, if any, and even at that we will only be at a starting point. After that, we must obtain all necessary information concerning your lost wages, your disability, your partial disability, your life changes, and your prognosis. You may rest assured of one thing, however, and that is the fact that your case will not be settled below its true value, that is the fair compensation for the injuries you have received. You may also rest assured that no settlement agreement will be entered into without your consent.
Conclusion We appreciate that this is a great deal of information to absorb. We also appreciate that our requests for client's assistance have been numerous. However, we are certain that our clients appreciate having this information from the outset. Each request and bit of information given here represents an important part in recovering full value for your injury. Therefore, we respectfully request your full cooperation. If you have questions or concerns regarding these instructions, we encourage you to feel free to contact the office at any time.
CALL KENNETH A. VERCAMMEN, ESQ. 732-572-0500 for an appointment
About Kenneth Vercammen:
Kenneth Vercammen is a Litigation Attorney in Edison, NJ, approximately 17 miles north of Princeton. He often lectures for the New Jersey State Bar Association on personal injury, criminal / municipal court law and drunk driving. He has published 125 articles in national and New Jersey publications on municipal court and litigation topics. He has served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in seven different cities and towns in New Jersey and also successfully defended hundreds of individuals facing Municipal Court and Criminal Court charges. In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He has appeared in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Municipal Court trials, hearings and contested administrative law hearings.
Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court), with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Dept as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Affirmative defenses 2C:2-5
Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
Affirmative defenses 2C:2-5. Defenses generally Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;
(2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense;
(3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or
(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.
c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he
(a) Solicits such other person to commit it;
(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or
(2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(1) He is a victim of that offense;
(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence.
f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-7. Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations. If the law governing the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;
(2) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation.
b. As used in this section:
(1) "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;
(2) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation;
(3) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation.
c. In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the terms of subsection a. (1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.
d. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual by reason of his being an agent of the corporation.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-8. Intoxication
a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.
d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;
(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1, eff. Aug. 26, 1983.
2C:2-9. Duress a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
b. The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter.
c. It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section. The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-10. Consent a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if:
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or
(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.
c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or
(3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-11. De minimis infractions
The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:
a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
b. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any such dismissal.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-12. Entrapment a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:3-1. Justification an affirmative defense; civil remedies unaffected a. In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under this chapter, justification is an affirmative defense.
b. The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:3-2. Necessity and other justifications in general a. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
b. Other justifications in general. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of any defense of justification provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:
a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.
3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.
4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing.
5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.
6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty.
7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty.
8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3
9. You could be put on Probation.
10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30.
11. You may be required to do Community Service.
12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty.
13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction.
14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation.
15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1
16. You may lose your right to vote.
The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense.
Jail for Crimes and Disorderly Conduct:
If someone pleads Guilty or is found Guilty of a criminal offense, the following is the statutory Prison/Jail terms.
NJSA 2C: 43-8 (1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
2C:43-3 Fines have been increased recently! 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed:
a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree;
(2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree;
b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree;
(2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree;
c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense;
d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense;
If facing any criminal charge, retain an experienced attorney immediately to determine you rights and obligations to the court. Current criminal charge researched by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. 732-572-0500
Affirmative defenses 2C:2-5. Defenses generally Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;
(2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense;
(3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or
(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.
c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he
(a) Solicits such other person to commit it;
(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or
(2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(1) He is a victim of that offense;
(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence.
f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-7. Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations. If the law governing the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;
(2) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation.
b. As used in this section:
(1) "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;
(2) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation;
(3) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation.
c. In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the terms of subsection a. (1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.
d. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual by reason of his being an agent of the corporation.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-8. Intoxication
a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.
d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;
(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1, eff. Aug. 26, 1983.
2C:2-9. Duress a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
b. The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter.
c. It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section. The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-10. Consent a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if:
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or
(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.
c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or
(3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-11. De minimis infractions
The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:
a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
b. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any such dismissal.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-12. Entrapment a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:3-1. Justification an affirmative defense; civil remedies unaffected a. In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under this chapter, justification is an affirmative defense.
b. The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:3-2. Necessity and other justifications in general a. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
b. Other justifications in general. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of any defense of justification provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea
1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)
2. Do you understand that if you plead guilty:
a. You will have a criminal record
b. You may go to Jail or Prison.
c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.
3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.
4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing.
5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.
6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty.
7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty.
8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3
9. You could be put on Probation.
10. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years. You must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30.
11. You may be required to do Community Service.
12. You must pay a minimum Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty.
13. You must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction.
14. If you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation.
15. You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-1
16. You may lose your right to vote.
The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense.
Jail for Crimes and Disorderly Conduct:
If someone pleads Guilty or is found Guilty of a criminal offense, the following is the statutory Prison/Jail terms.
NJSA 2C: 43-8 (1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between three years and five years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
2C:43-3 Fines have been increased recently! 2C:43-3. Fines and Restitutions. A person who has been convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make restitution, or both, such fine not to exceed:
a. (1) $200,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the first degree;
(2) $150,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the second degree;
b. (1) $15,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the third degree;
(2) $10,000.00 when the conviction is of a crime of the fourth degree;
c. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense;
d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty disorderly persons offense;
If facing any criminal charge, retain an experienced attorney immediately to determine you rights and obligations to the court. Current criminal charge researched by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. 732-572-0500
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES, PROBATE AND DECEDENTS- Law in New Jersey
3B:10-6. Acts of administrator before notice of will Lawful acts performed in good faith by an administrator before notice of a will and purchases or transfers made by him in good faith before notice shall remain valid and shall not be impeached or altered by an executor upon probate of the will.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve the administrator of any liability to the executor under the will for property unadministered or maladministered.
3B:10-7. Ancillary administration on estate of nonresident intestate Where a nonresident dies intestate seized of real property or possessed of personal property in this State, or where the evidence of his personal property shall be in the hands of any resident of this State, the surrogate's court of the county wherein any of the real or personal property or evidence thereof, is situate, or the Superior Court, shall, in an action upon satisfactory proof of intestacy, issue letters of administration upon the estate of the nonresident to the administrator of his estate or, on notice to the administrator as the court shall require, to any person who would be entitled to administration if the intestate had been a resident at his death.
3B:10-8. Administration by creditor of nonresident decedent If a personal representative of a nonresident decedent fails to apply in this State for letters testamentary or of administration within 60 days next after the death of the decedent and there is real or personal property of the decedent within this State, or the evidence thereof in the hands of a resident of this State, the surrogate's court of a county wherein the real property, or personal property or evidence, is situate, or the Superior Court, may, in an action by any person resident or nonresident, alleging himself to have a debt or legal claim against the decedent which by the law of this State survives against his representatives, issue letters of administration, with the will annexed or otherwise as the case may require, to some fit person to be designated by the court.
Prior to an appointment pursuant to this section, notice shall be given the foreign personal representative as the court shall prescribe.
3B:10-9. Record of appointment of personal representative; evidentiary effect If any person shall desire to have the appointment of a personal representative appointed in another state recorded in this State for the purpose of manifesting the authority of the personal representative to release or discharge real estate in this State from any mortgage, judgment, other lien or encumbrance which was held by his decedent the surrogate of the county wherein the real estate is situate, or the clerk of the Superior Court, may, upon the presentation to him of an exemplified copy of the record of the appointment of the personal representative, record and file the exemplified copy in his office, and the record or certified copies thereof shall be received as evidence in all courts of this State.
3B:10-10. Executor de son tort Whereas it is sometimes practiced to the defrauding of creditors, that persons who are entitled to the administration of the estate of an intestate will not accept administration, but suffer or procure the administration to be granted to others of indigent circumstances, from whom they, or others, by their means, by deeds of gifts, or by letters of attorney, obtain the estate of the intestate into their hands, and are not subject to the payment of the debts of the intestate, and so the creditors cannot have or recover their just debts and demands; therefore, if any person shall obtain, receive and have, any property or debts of an intestate, or a release or other discharge of any debt or duty due the intestate, upon any fraud as herein provided, without valuable consideration as shall amount to the value of the property or debts, or near thereabouts except it be in or towards satisfaction of some just debt, of the value of the same property or debts, to him owing by the intestate at the time of his decease, the person shall be charged and chargeable as executor of his own wrong so far only, as all the property and debts coming to his hands, or whereof he is released or discharged by the administrator, will satisfy. However he shall not be charged for those just debts, contracted without fraud and upon a good consideration, which are owing to him by the intestate at the time of his decease, nor for payments made by him which lawful executors or administrators ought to pay.
3B:10-11. Administration ad prosequendum on death by wrongful act The surrogate's court of the county wherein an intestate resided at his death, or, if the intestate resided outside the State, the surrogate's court of the county wherein the accident resulting in death occurred, or the Superior Court, may grant letters of administration ad prosequendum to the person entitled by law to general administration. An administrator ad prosequendum shall not be required to give bond.
3B:10-12. Temporary administration The Superior Court may grant administration ad litem, temporary administration, administration pendente lite, or any form of limited administration.
3B:10-13. Duty to apply in this State for original letters of administration When an intestate is resident in any county of New Jersey at his death, it shall be the duty of the heir or any other person desiring original letters of administration upon his estate to make application therefor to the surrogate of that county or to the Superior Court of this State.
Any person having knowledge of the grant in a foreign jurisdiction of original letters of administration upon the estate of a person dying resident in any county of New Jersey, shall give information thereof to the Superior Court.
The court may direct the clerk of the court to issue and have served subpoenas or an order to show cause requiring the appearance before it, at a specified time, of any persons having any interest in the estate, and commanding them to abide the order of the court. The matter of the grant of letters of administration shall be wholly within the jurisdiction of the court.
3B:10-14. Appointment of debtor as executor; debt not discharged The appointment of a debtor as executor shall not, unless otherwise expressed in the will, be construed to discharge the executor from payment of the debt, but the debt shall be considered an asset in the hands of the executor and shall be accounted for in the same manner as any other part of the decedent's estate.
3B:10-15. Appointment of substituted administrators When a sole or sole surviving or remaining executor or administrator, with or without the will annexed, dies or is removed or discharged by the court after qualifying and entering upon the duties of his office but before the completion thereof, the vacancy so created shall, except as hereinafter provided, be filled by the appointment of a fit person to exercise the vacated office. The person so appointed shall be nominated substituted administrator with the will annexed or substituted administrator, as the case may be.
3B:10-16. Decedent's will to be observed Where administration is granted with the will annexed, the will of the decedent therein expressed shall be observed and performed.
3B:10-17. Manner in which appointment shall be made The appointment shall be made by the issuance of letters of substitutionary administration, with or without the will annexed as the case may be, by the surrogate's court or the Superior Court in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed for granting letters of administration to the first administrators in other cases.
3B:10-18. When appointment unnecessary The appointment of a substituted administrator shall not be required if the unadministered assets of the intestate or testator consist of money on deposit in a bank, trust company or savings and loan association not exceeding $1,000.00, in which event it shall be lawful for the Superior Court, in an action brought by any party in interest, to authorize the bank, trust company or savings and loan association to distribute to the persons entitled by law to receive the assets. Payments made pursuant to the authority of this section shall release the bank, trust company or savings and loan association from any claim of, or liability to, any person interested in the estate.
3B:10-19. Commencement of duties and powers of a personal representative The duties and powers of a personal representative commence upon his appointment. The powers of a personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are beneficial to the estate occurring prior to appointment the same effect as those occurring thereafter.
3B:10-20. Ratification of prior acts A personal representative may ratify and accept acts on behalf of the estate done by others where the acts would have been proper for a personal representative.
3B:10-21. Carrying out decedent's written funeral instructions Prior to appointment, a person named executor in a will may carry out written instructions of the decedent relating to his body, funeral and burial arrangements.
3B:10-22. Priority among letters A person to whom general letters of appointment are issued first has exclusive authority under the letters until his appointment is terminated or modified. If, through error, general letters of appointment are afterwards issued to another, the first appointed personal representative may recover any property of the estate in the hands of the personal representative subsequently appointed, but the acts of the latter done in good faith before notice of the first letters are not void for want of validity of appointment.
3B:10-23. Duty of personal representative to settle and distribute estate A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and applicable law, and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by law, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he is a party for the best interests of successors to the estate.
3B:10-24. Liability for acts of administration or distribution A personal representative shall not be surcharged for acts of administration or distribution if the conduct in question was authorized at the time. Subject to other obligations of administration, a probated will is authority to administer and distribute the estate according to its terms. An order of appointment of a personal representative is authority to distribute apparently intestate assets to the heirs of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the personal representative is not aware of a pending proceeding to probate a will or to determine heirs, a proceeding to vacate an order entered in an earlier proceeding to probate a will, a formal proceeding questioning his appointment or fitness to continue. Nothing in this section affects the duty of the personal representative to administer and distribute the estate in accordance with the rights of claimants and others interested in the estate.
3B:10-25. Standing to sue and be sued Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this State at his death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this State and the courts of any other jurisdiction as his decedent had immediately prior to death.
3B:10-26. Standards of care to be observed Except as otherwise provided by the terms of a decedent's will, the personal representative shall observe the standards in dealing with the estate assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another, and if the personal representative has special skills or is named personal representative on the basis of representations of special skills or expertise, he is under a duty to use those skills.
3B:10-27. Right to possession of property transferred in fraud of creditors The right to possession of property transferred in fraud of creditors recovered for the benefit of creditors is exclusively in the personal representative.
3B:10-28. Expeditious settlement and distribution A personal representative shall proceed expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a decedent's estate and do so without adjudication, order, or direction of a court, but he may invoke the jurisdiction of a court, in proceedings authorized by law to resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration.
3B:10-29. Possession and control of estate Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent's property, except that any tangible personal property may be left with or surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the personal representative, possession of the property by him will be necessary for purposes of administration. The request by a personal representative for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir or devisee for possession thereof, that the possession of the property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration. The personal representative shall pay taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for the management, protection and preservation of, the estate in his possession. He may maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the title thereto.
3B:10-30. Power over title to property Until termination of his appointment a personal representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.
3B:10-31. Powers and duties of successor representative A successor personal representative has the same power and duty as the original personal representative to complete the administration and distribution of the estate, as expeditiously as possible, but he shall not exercise any power expressly made personal to the executor named in the will.
3B:10-32. Powers of surviving co-personal representative Unless the terms of the will otherwise provide, every power exercisable by co-personal representatives may be exercised by the one or more remaining after the appointment of one or more is terminated, and if one of two or more nominated as co-personal representatives is not appointed, those appointed may exercise all the powers incident to the office.
3B:11-1. Creator's reserved interest in trust alienable subject to creditors' claims The right of any creator of a trust to receive either the income or the principal of the trust or any part of either thereof, presently or in the future, shall be freely alienable and shall be subject to the claims of his creditors, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the terms of the trust.
3B:11-2. Letters of trusteeship under a will A testamentary trustee or substituted testamentary trustee, before exercising the authority vested in him by virtue of any will admitted to probate by the Superior Court, or any surrogate's court of this State, shall obtain letters of trusteeship from that court.
3B:11-3. Trustees construed to be joint tenants All estates heretofore or hereafter granted or devised to trustees shall be construed to have vested and to vest an estate of joint tenancy in the trustees.
When a trustee is removed a conveyance or devise from the removed trustee to the old and new trustees or to the new trustees shall vest in the old and new trustees or the new trustees an estate in joint tenancy, notwithstanding any want of unity.
When a trustee dies or resigns or his office becomes vacant for any cause, and a new trustee is appointed, the surviving trustees, if any there be, and the new trustees shall hold the trust estate as joint tenants, and a conveyance of a right and interest in the trust estate from the surviving trustees, to the new trustee shall vest in all the trustees an estate in joint tenancy, notwithstanding any want of unity.
When a new, additional or substituted trustee is appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction or becomes such by operation of the terms of a will or other instrument or by operation of law, title to the trust assets shall forthwith vest in all the trustees in office including the new, additional or substituted trustee as joint tenants.
3B:11-4. Effect to be given consent by holders of general powers of appointment upon beneficiaries For the purpose of granting consent or approval with regard to the acts or accounts of a fiduciary or trustee, including relief from liability or penalty for failure to post bond, or to perform other duties, and for purposes of consenting to modification or termination of a trust or to deviation from its terms, the sole holder or all coholders of a presently exercisable general power of appointment, including one in the form of a power of amendment or revocation, are deemed to act for beneficiaries to the extent that the interests of the beneficiaries as objects, takers in default, or otherwise are subject to the power. As used in this section, a presently exercisable general power of appointment is one which enables the power holder to presently draw absolute ownership to himself.
3B:11-4.1. Limitations on powers of trustees; applicability; "interested party" defined 1. a. The following powers conferred by a governing instrument upon a trustee in his or her capacity as a trustee shall not be exercised by that trustee:
(1) The power to make discretionary distributions of either principal or income to or for the benefit of the trustee, the trustee's estate, or the creditors of either, unless either:
(a) limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the trustee's health, education, support or maintenance, within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041 and 2514; or
(b) exercisable by the trustee only in conjunction with another person having a substantial interest in the property subject to the power which is adverse to the interest of the trustee within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041(b) (1) (C) (ii);
If a trustee is prohibited by paragraph (1) of this subsection from exercising a power conferred upon the trustee, the trustee nevertheless may exercise that power but shall be limited to distributions for the trustee's health, education, support or maintenance to the extent otherwise permitted by the terms of the trust.
(2) The power to make discretionary distributions of either principal or income to satisfy any of the trustee's personal legal obligations for support or other purposes;
(3) The power to make discretionary allocations in the trustee's personal favor of receipts or expenses as between income and principal, unless such trustee has no power to enlarge or shift any beneficial interest except as an incidental consequence of the discharge of such trustee's fiduciary duties;
(4) The power to exercise any of the powers proscribed in this subsection with regard to an individual other than the trustee to the extent that such individual could exercise a similar prohibited power in connection with a trust that benefits the trustee.
b. Unless otherwise prohibited by the provisions of subsection a. of this section, a trustee may exercise a power described in that subsection in favor of someone other than the trustee, the trustee's estate, or the creditors of either.
c. If a governing instrument contains a power proscribed under subsection a. of this section the following shall apply:
(1) If the power is conferred on two or more trustees, it may be exercised by the trustee or trustees who are not so prohibited as if they were the only trustee or trustees; or
(2) If there is no trustee in office who can exercise such power upon application of any interested party, a court of competent jurisdiction shall appoint a trustee to exercise such power or, except as provided in subsection d. of this section, a successor trustee who would not be disqualified shall be appointed to exercise the power that the other trustees cannot exercise in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument as if the office of trustee were vacant.
d. No beneficiary of a trust, in an individual, trustee or other capacity, may appoint, or remove and appoint, a trustee who is related or subordinate to the beneficiary within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 672 (c) unless:
(1) the trustee's discretionary power to make distributions to or for such beneficiary is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the beneficiary's health, education, support or maintenance as set forth in subsection a. of this section;
(2) the trustee's discretionary power may not be exercised to satisfy any of such beneficiary's legal obligations for support or other purposes; and
(3) the trustee's discretionary power may not be exercised to grant to such beneficiary a general power to appoint property of the trust to the beneficiary, the beneficiary's estate or the creditors thereof within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041.
This subsection d. shall not apply if the appointment of the trustee by the beneficiary may be made only in conjunction with another person having a substantial interest in the property of the trust, subject to the power, which is adverse to the exercise of the power in favor of the beneficiary within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041(b) (1) (C) (ii).
e. The provisions of this section shall not apply during the time that a trust remains revocable or amendable by the grantor.
f. This section applies to:
(1) Any trust created under a governing instrument executed 90 days or more after the effective date of this act, unless the governing instrument expressly provides that this act does not apply; and
(2) Any trust created under a governing instrument executed before 90 days after the effective date of this act, unless all interested parties affirmatively elect on or before three years after the effective date by a written declaration signed by or on behalf of each interested party and delivered to the trustee, not to be subject to the application of this act. In the case of a testamentary trust, such declarations shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the will was admitted to probate.
g. In this section the term "interested party" means:
(1) Each trustee then serving; and
(2) Each person having an interest in income or principal whom it would be necessary to join as a party in a proceeding for the judicial settlement of a trustee's account or, if such a person has not attained majority or is otherwise incapacitated, the person's legal representative under applicable law or the person's agent under a durable power of attorney that is sufficient to grant such authority.
L.1996, c.41.
3B:11-5. Trustee's death or failure to act; appointment of new trustee by court; powers When a trustee appointed by a will probated in the surrogate's court of any county or a trustee appointed under a trust inter vivos as to real or personal property situate in any county fails or refuses to act or dies before the execution or completion of the trust committed to him, or absconds or removes from this State, is adjudicated a mental incompetent or becomes in any manner legally incapable of executing the trust, the Superior Court may remove the trustee, if he be alive, and appoint a suitable person or persons to execute the trust, and the trustee or trustees so appointed shall be entitled to the trust estate as fully and in the same manner as the original trustee was and shall have all the power and discretion of the original trustee.
3B:11-6. Vacancy in trusteeship upon discharge or removal When a trustee is removed or discharged by the Superior Court before the completion of the trust, the court may appoint a fit person or persons to fill the vacated office.
3B:11-7. Powers of new, substituted or additional trustees A duly appointed new, substituted or additional trustee shall have the same power and discretion with respect to the investment, management, conversion, sale or other disposition of the trust estate, whether real or personal, as was given to or vested in the original trustee or trustees named in or appointed by the will or other instrument creating or continuing the trust, notwithstanding the power or discretion may be directed by the will or other instrument to be exercised at the discretion of the original trustee or trustees unless the power or discretion of the original trustee or trustees is expressly prohibited by the will or other instrument to any new, substituted or additional trustee.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve the administrator of any liability to the executor under the will for property unadministered or maladministered.
3B:10-7. Ancillary administration on estate of nonresident intestate Where a nonresident dies intestate seized of real property or possessed of personal property in this State, or where the evidence of his personal property shall be in the hands of any resident of this State, the surrogate's court of the county wherein any of the real or personal property or evidence thereof, is situate, or the Superior Court, shall, in an action upon satisfactory proof of intestacy, issue letters of administration upon the estate of the nonresident to the administrator of his estate or, on notice to the administrator as the court shall require, to any person who would be entitled to administration if the intestate had been a resident at his death.
3B:10-8. Administration by creditor of nonresident decedent If a personal representative of a nonresident decedent fails to apply in this State for letters testamentary or of administration within 60 days next after the death of the decedent and there is real or personal property of the decedent within this State, or the evidence thereof in the hands of a resident of this State, the surrogate's court of a county wherein the real property, or personal property or evidence, is situate, or the Superior Court, may, in an action by any person resident or nonresident, alleging himself to have a debt or legal claim against the decedent which by the law of this State survives against his representatives, issue letters of administration, with the will annexed or otherwise as the case may require, to some fit person to be designated by the court.
Prior to an appointment pursuant to this section, notice shall be given the foreign personal representative as the court shall prescribe.
3B:10-9. Record of appointment of personal representative; evidentiary effect If any person shall desire to have the appointment of a personal representative appointed in another state recorded in this State for the purpose of manifesting the authority of the personal representative to release or discharge real estate in this State from any mortgage, judgment, other lien or encumbrance which was held by his decedent the surrogate of the county wherein the real estate is situate, or the clerk of the Superior Court, may, upon the presentation to him of an exemplified copy of the record of the appointment of the personal representative, record and file the exemplified copy in his office, and the record or certified copies thereof shall be received as evidence in all courts of this State.
3B:10-10. Executor de son tort Whereas it is sometimes practiced to the defrauding of creditors, that persons who are entitled to the administration of the estate of an intestate will not accept administration, but suffer or procure the administration to be granted to others of indigent circumstances, from whom they, or others, by their means, by deeds of gifts, or by letters of attorney, obtain the estate of the intestate into their hands, and are not subject to the payment of the debts of the intestate, and so the creditors cannot have or recover their just debts and demands; therefore, if any person shall obtain, receive and have, any property or debts of an intestate, or a release or other discharge of any debt or duty due the intestate, upon any fraud as herein provided, without valuable consideration as shall amount to the value of the property or debts, or near thereabouts except it be in or towards satisfaction of some just debt, of the value of the same property or debts, to him owing by the intestate at the time of his decease, the person shall be charged and chargeable as executor of his own wrong so far only, as all the property and debts coming to his hands, or whereof he is released or discharged by the administrator, will satisfy. However he shall not be charged for those just debts, contracted without fraud and upon a good consideration, which are owing to him by the intestate at the time of his decease, nor for payments made by him which lawful executors or administrators ought to pay.
3B:10-11. Administration ad prosequendum on death by wrongful act The surrogate's court of the county wherein an intestate resided at his death, or, if the intestate resided outside the State, the surrogate's court of the county wherein the accident resulting in death occurred, or the Superior Court, may grant letters of administration ad prosequendum to the person entitled by law to general administration. An administrator ad prosequendum shall not be required to give bond.
3B:10-12. Temporary administration The Superior Court may grant administration ad litem, temporary administration, administration pendente lite, or any form of limited administration.
3B:10-13. Duty to apply in this State for original letters of administration When an intestate is resident in any county of New Jersey at his death, it shall be the duty of the heir or any other person desiring original letters of administration upon his estate to make application therefor to the surrogate of that county or to the Superior Court of this State.
Any person having knowledge of the grant in a foreign jurisdiction of original letters of administration upon the estate of a person dying resident in any county of New Jersey, shall give information thereof to the Superior Court.
The court may direct the clerk of the court to issue and have served subpoenas or an order to show cause requiring the appearance before it, at a specified time, of any persons having any interest in the estate, and commanding them to abide the order of the court. The matter of the grant of letters of administration shall be wholly within the jurisdiction of the court.
3B:10-14. Appointment of debtor as executor; debt not discharged The appointment of a debtor as executor shall not, unless otherwise expressed in the will, be construed to discharge the executor from payment of the debt, but the debt shall be considered an asset in the hands of the executor and shall be accounted for in the same manner as any other part of the decedent's estate.
3B:10-15. Appointment of substituted administrators When a sole or sole surviving or remaining executor or administrator, with or without the will annexed, dies or is removed or discharged by the court after qualifying and entering upon the duties of his office but before the completion thereof, the vacancy so created shall, except as hereinafter provided, be filled by the appointment of a fit person to exercise the vacated office. The person so appointed shall be nominated substituted administrator with the will annexed or substituted administrator, as the case may be.
3B:10-16. Decedent's will to be observed Where administration is granted with the will annexed, the will of the decedent therein expressed shall be observed and performed.
3B:10-17. Manner in which appointment shall be made The appointment shall be made by the issuance of letters of substitutionary administration, with or without the will annexed as the case may be, by the surrogate's court or the Superior Court in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed for granting letters of administration to the first administrators in other cases.
3B:10-18. When appointment unnecessary The appointment of a substituted administrator shall not be required if the unadministered assets of the intestate or testator consist of money on deposit in a bank, trust company or savings and loan association not exceeding $1,000.00, in which event it shall be lawful for the Superior Court, in an action brought by any party in interest, to authorize the bank, trust company or savings and loan association to distribute to the persons entitled by law to receive the assets. Payments made pursuant to the authority of this section shall release the bank, trust company or savings and loan association from any claim of, or liability to, any person interested in the estate.
3B:10-19. Commencement of duties and powers of a personal representative The duties and powers of a personal representative commence upon his appointment. The powers of a personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are beneficial to the estate occurring prior to appointment the same effect as those occurring thereafter.
3B:10-20. Ratification of prior acts A personal representative may ratify and accept acts on behalf of the estate done by others where the acts would have been proper for a personal representative.
3B:10-21. Carrying out decedent's written funeral instructions Prior to appointment, a person named executor in a will may carry out written instructions of the decedent relating to his body, funeral and burial arrangements.
3B:10-22. Priority among letters A person to whom general letters of appointment are issued first has exclusive authority under the letters until his appointment is terminated or modified. If, through error, general letters of appointment are afterwards issued to another, the first appointed personal representative may recover any property of the estate in the hands of the personal representative subsequently appointed, but the acts of the latter done in good faith before notice of the first letters are not void for want of validity of appointment.
3B:10-23. Duty of personal representative to settle and distribute estate A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and applicable law, and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by law, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he is a party for the best interests of successors to the estate.
3B:10-24. Liability for acts of administration or distribution A personal representative shall not be surcharged for acts of administration or distribution if the conduct in question was authorized at the time. Subject to other obligations of administration, a probated will is authority to administer and distribute the estate according to its terms. An order of appointment of a personal representative is authority to distribute apparently intestate assets to the heirs of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the personal representative is not aware of a pending proceeding to probate a will or to determine heirs, a proceeding to vacate an order entered in an earlier proceeding to probate a will, a formal proceeding questioning his appointment or fitness to continue. Nothing in this section affects the duty of the personal representative to administer and distribute the estate in accordance with the rights of claimants and others interested in the estate.
3B:10-25. Standing to sue and be sued Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this State at his death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this State and the courts of any other jurisdiction as his decedent had immediately prior to death.
3B:10-26. Standards of care to be observed Except as otherwise provided by the terms of a decedent's will, the personal representative shall observe the standards in dealing with the estate assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another, and if the personal representative has special skills or is named personal representative on the basis of representations of special skills or expertise, he is under a duty to use those skills.
3B:10-27. Right to possession of property transferred in fraud of creditors The right to possession of property transferred in fraud of creditors recovered for the benefit of creditors is exclusively in the personal representative.
3B:10-28. Expeditious settlement and distribution A personal representative shall proceed expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a decedent's estate and do so without adjudication, order, or direction of a court, but he may invoke the jurisdiction of a court, in proceedings authorized by law to resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration.
3B:10-29. Possession and control of estate Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent's property, except that any tangible personal property may be left with or surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the personal representative, possession of the property by him will be necessary for purposes of administration. The request by a personal representative for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir or devisee for possession thereof, that the possession of the property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration. The personal representative shall pay taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for the management, protection and preservation of, the estate in his possession. He may maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the title thereto.
3B:10-30. Power over title to property Until termination of his appointment a personal representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.
3B:10-31. Powers and duties of successor representative A successor personal representative has the same power and duty as the original personal representative to complete the administration and distribution of the estate, as expeditiously as possible, but he shall not exercise any power expressly made personal to the executor named in the will.
3B:10-32. Powers of surviving co-personal representative Unless the terms of the will otherwise provide, every power exercisable by co-personal representatives may be exercised by the one or more remaining after the appointment of one or more is terminated, and if one of two or more nominated as co-personal representatives is not appointed, those appointed may exercise all the powers incident to the office.
3B:11-1. Creator's reserved interest in trust alienable subject to creditors' claims The right of any creator of a trust to receive either the income or the principal of the trust or any part of either thereof, presently or in the future, shall be freely alienable and shall be subject to the claims of his creditors, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the terms of the trust.
3B:11-2. Letters of trusteeship under a will A testamentary trustee or substituted testamentary trustee, before exercising the authority vested in him by virtue of any will admitted to probate by the Superior Court, or any surrogate's court of this State, shall obtain letters of trusteeship from that court.
3B:11-3. Trustees construed to be joint tenants All estates heretofore or hereafter granted or devised to trustees shall be construed to have vested and to vest an estate of joint tenancy in the trustees.
When a trustee is removed a conveyance or devise from the removed trustee to the old and new trustees or to the new trustees shall vest in the old and new trustees or the new trustees an estate in joint tenancy, notwithstanding any want of unity.
When a trustee dies or resigns or his office becomes vacant for any cause, and a new trustee is appointed, the surviving trustees, if any there be, and the new trustees shall hold the trust estate as joint tenants, and a conveyance of a right and interest in the trust estate from the surviving trustees, to the new trustee shall vest in all the trustees an estate in joint tenancy, notwithstanding any want of unity.
When a new, additional or substituted trustee is appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction or becomes such by operation of the terms of a will or other instrument or by operation of law, title to the trust assets shall forthwith vest in all the trustees in office including the new, additional or substituted trustee as joint tenants.
3B:11-4. Effect to be given consent by holders of general powers of appointment upon beneficiaries For the purpose of granting consent or approval with regard to the acts or accounts of a fiduciary or trustee, including relief from liability or penalty for failure to post bond, or to perform other duties, and for purposes of consenting to modification or termination of a trust or to deviation from its terms, the sole holder or all coholders of a presently exercisable general power of appointment, including one in the form of a power of amendment or revocation, are deemed to act for beneficiaries to the extent that the interests of the beneficiaries as objects, takers in default, or otherwise are subject to the power. As used in this section, a presently exercisable general power of appointment is one which enables the power holder to presently draw absolute ownership to himself.
3B:11-4.1. Limitations on powers of trustees; applicability; "interested party" defined 1. a. The following powers conferred by a governing instrument upon a trustee in his or her capacity as a trustee shall not be exercised by that trustee:
(1) The power to make discretionary distributions of either principal or income to or for the benefit of the trustee, the trustee's estate, or the creditors of either, unless either:
(a) limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the trustee's health, education, support or maintenance, within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041 and 2514; or
(b) exercisable by the trustee only in conjunction with another person having a substantial interest in the property subject to the power which is adverse to the interest of the trustee within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041(b) (1) (C) (ii);
If a trustee is prohibited by paragraph (1) of this subsection from exercising a power conferred upon the trustee, the trustee nevertheless may exercise that power but shall be limited to distributions for the trustee's health, education, support or maintenance to the extent otherwise permitted by the terms of the trust.
(2) The power to make discretionary distributions of either principal or income to satisfy any of the trustee's personal legal obligations for support or other purposes;
(3) The power to make discretionary allocations in the trustee's personal favor of receipts or expenses as between income and principal, unless such trustee has no power to enlarge or shift any beneficial interest except as an incidental consequence of the discharge of such trustee's fiduciary duties;
(4) The power to exercise any of the powers proscribed in this subsection with regard to an individual other than the trustee to the extent that such individual could exercise a similar prohibited power in connection with a trust that benefits the trustee.
b. Unless otherwise prohibited by the provisions of subsection a. of this section, a trustee may exercise a power described in that subsection in favor of someone other than the trustee, the trustee's estate, or the creditors of either.
c. If a governing instrument contains a power proscribed under subsection a. of this section the following shall apply:
(1) If the power is conferred on two or more trustees, it may be exercised by the trustee or trustees who are not so prohibited as if they were the only trustee or trustees; or
(2) If there is no trustee in office who can exercise such power upon application of any interested party, a court of competent jurisdiction shall appoint a trustee to exercise such power or, except as provided in subsection d. of this section, a successor trustee who would not be disqualified shall be appointed to exercise the power that the other trustees cannot exercise in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument as if the office of trustee were vacant.
d. No beneficiary of a trust, in an individual, trustee or other capacity, may appoint, or remove and appoint, a trustee who is related or subordinate to the beneficiary within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 672 (c) unless:
(1) the trustee's discretionary power to make distributions to or for such beneficiary is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the beneficiary's health, education, support or maintenance as set forth in subsection a. of this section;
(2) the trustee's discretionary power may not be exercised to satisfy any of such beneficiary's legal obligations for support or other purposes; and
(3) the trustee's discretionary power may not be exercised to grant to such beneficiary a general power to appoint property of the trust to the beneficiary, the beneficiary's estate or the creditors thereof within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041.
This subsection d. shall not apply if the appointment of the trustee by the beneficiary may be made only in conjunction with another person having a substantial interest in the property of the trust, subject to the power, which is adverse to the exercise of the power in favor of the beneficiary within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2041(b) (1) (C) (ii).
e. The provisions of this section shall not apply during the time that a trust remains revocable or amendable by the grantor.
f. This section applies to:
(1) Any trust created under a governing instrument executed 90 days or more after the effective date of this act, unless the governing instrument expressly provides that this act does not apply; and
(2) Any trust created under a governing instrument executed before 90 days after the effective date of this act, unless all interested parties affirmatively elect on or before three years after the effective date by a written declaration signed by or on behalf of each interested party and delivered to the trustee, not to be subject to the application of this act. In the case of a testamentary trust, such declarations shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the will was admitted to probate.
g. In this section the term "interested party" means:
(1) Each trustee then serving; and
(2) Each person having an interest in income or principal whom it would be necessary to join as a party in a proceeding for the judicial settlement of a trustee's account or, if such a person has not attained majority or is otherwise incapacitated, the person's legal representative under applicable law or the person's agent under a durable power of attorney that is sufficient to grant such authority.
L.1996, c.41.
3B:11-5. Trustee's death or failure to act; appointment of new trustee by court; powers When a trustee appointed by a will probated in the surrogate's court of any county or a trustee appointed under a trust inter vivos as to real or personal property situate in any county fails or refuses to act or dies before the execution or completion of the trust committed to him, or absconds or removes from this State, is adjudicated a mental incompetent or becomes in any manner legally incapable of executing the trust, the Superior Court may remove the trustee, if he be alive, and appoint a suitable person or persons to execute the trust, and the trustee or trustees so appointed shall be entitled to the trust estate as fully and in the same manner as the original trustee was and shall have all the power and discretion of the original trustee.
3B:11-6. Vacancy in trusteeship upon discharge or removal When a trustee is removed or discharged by the Superior Court before the completion of the trust, the court may appoint a fit person or persons to fill the vacated office.
3B:11-7. Powers of new, substituted or additional trustees A duly appointed new, substituted or additional trustee shall have the same power and discretion with respect to the investment, management, conversion, sale or other disposition of the trust estate, whether real or personal, as was given to or vested in the original trustee or trustees named in or appointed by the will or other instrument creating or continuing the trust, notwithstanding the power or discretion may be directed by the will or other instrument to be exercised at the discretion of the original trustee or trustees unless the power or discretion of the original trustee or trustees is expressly prohibited by the will or other instrument to any new, substituted or additional trustee.
Private Adoption
Private Adoption
The most common example is a step father adopting his wife's child from a prior relationship. In these cases, a Complaint must be filed in the Superior Court by the person (plaintiff) who wishes to adopt the child.
The New Jersey Court Rules and Adoption Statute has specific requirements for adoptions. The Complaint should set forth the following:
1. The name, age, address of adoptive father. Adoptive father is a citizen of the United States and not related to the child.
2. The child's name, place of birth, date of birth, and age.
3. Name and ages of any children of the proposed adoptive parent and the child's parent.
4. Where and when the plaintiffs began to take care of the child to be adopted from the natural mother.
5. The date from which the child has been under the continuous care of the plaintiff.
6. The name and address of the natural father and natural mother, if known to the plaintiffs. The natural parents were not married.
7. Whether the child to be adopted has any property.
8. The name by which the child to be adopted shall be known.
9. Place and type of employment and that both plaintiff and mother are able to support the child to be adopted.
10. Attach a typed affidavit of the consent of the natural mother.
11. Plaintiffs demand a judgment of adoption as to the child and that his name be changed.
In addition, the consent of the available natural father should be obtained. The affidavit to be prepared by the attorney which will contain some of the following information:
Consent of Mother/Father - To be signed in front of a Notary
1. The name and age of natural parent, declaration that he/she is the natural parent, city and county of child's birth.
2. Signed consent of natural parent to adoption of child by plaintiffs, relinquishment of all right and claim to child, and agreement that, from the date of the decree of adoption of child, that the child will, to all legal intents and purposes, be the child of the persons adopting the child.
3. (Optional) Consent of natural parent to child being raised in a particular religion.
Hearing Order An order fixing the day for hearing and publication must be prepared by your attorney. It must be submitted to the Court and signed by the Court. The Court Orders will set forth that:
1. The child sought to be adopted is to be a ward of the court;
2. Date and place of the hearing; 3. The Complaint for Adoption, together with the Order for hearing, and
Notice in the form required by N.J.S.A. 9:3-45, shall be published in The Home News and Tribune or another newspaper of general circulation.
4. Who should be served notice by personal service or certified mail.
Adoption Hearing
The adoptive father, natural mother and child should appear at the hearing. The Supreme Court Judge will conduct the questioning in the Judge's Chambers. Your attorney will help you prepare.
Final Judgment of Adoption
A Final Judgment of Adoption by the court will set forth some of the following information:
1. That by virtue of the Complaint that Plaintiff desires to adopt the minor child, and a preliminary hearing having been held, and it further appearing that the best interest of the child would be promoted by such adoption, and it further appearing through notice by Publication of these proceedings set forth in The Home News & Tribune that the natural father of the child, has not contested the proceedings;
2. It is ordered and adjudged:
A. The above named child be adopted by the plaintiff. B. The name of the child shall be changed to _____. C. Upon entry of this Judgment of Adoption, the relationship heretofore existing between the child and the natural father of the child, be in all respects at an end;
D. The entry of this Judgment shall not affect or terminate any rights, duties, privileges, and relationships existing between the child and his natural mother, nor his right of inheritance from or through her, nor the rights of inheritance under the intestate laws of this State through the natural father.
E. The entry of this Judgment shall establish the same relationship between the child and the adopting parent as if such child were born to such adopting parent in lawful wedlock, including the rights of inheritance.
Post Adoption Hearing Procedures
Your attorney should fill out paperwork to obtain a new birth certificate. An adoption is a final proceeding. Even a divorce does not revoke an adoption. For additional information on adoption, contact a New Jersey attorney.
Selected statutes dealing with Adoption:
9:3-42. Jurisdiction in Chancery, venue 6. An action for adoption shall be instituted in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part of the county in which the prospective parent resides, or in the county where the child resided immediately prior to placement for adoption, or if the child is less than three months of age, the county in which the child was born; except that whenever the child to be adopted has been received into the home of a prospective parent from an approved agency, the action may be instituted in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part of any county in which the approved agency has an office.
L.1977,c.367,s.6; amended 1991,c.91,s.193; 1993,c.345,s.5.
9:3-43. Instituting adoption actions; qualifications 7. a. Any person may institute an action for adoption except that a married person may do so only with the written consent of his spouse or jointly with his spouse in the same action or if living separate and apart from his spouse.
b. A plaintiff, at the time of the institution of the action, shall have attained the age of 18 years and shall be at least 10 years older than the child to be adopted, except that the court for good cause may waive either requirement, which waiver shall be recited in any judgment of adoption thereafter entered.
L.1977,c.367,s.7; amended 1993,c.345,s.6.
9:3-44. Filing of complaint 8. Whenever a person receives a child into his home for the purpose of adoption other than from an approved agency, a complaint for adoption shall be filed within 45 days after receipt of the child. If the person receiving the child has been approved previously for placement for adoption in accordance with the provisions of section 18 of P.L.1993, c.345 (C.9:3-39.1), the person shall, immediately upon receiving the child, notify the approved agency which granted such approval of the receipt of the child, and that agency shall undertake immediate supervision of the child in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of the Division of Youth and Family Services. The cost of such supervision shall be paid by the person receiving the child. If the agency, in the course of supervision shall determine that the child is at risk of harm or that the best interests of the child are not served by the child remaining in the home, the agency may apply to a court for removal of the child from the home. Whenever a person receives a child into his home for purposes other than adoption and it is later determined that an adoption shall be sought, a complaint for adoption shall be instituted with reasonable promptness following the determination. Failure to file the complaint in a timely manner shall not be a sole basis for refusal of the adoption but the failure shall require the filing, with the complaint, of an affidavit setting forth the reasons for the delay.
L.1977,c.367,s.8; amended 1993,c.345,s.7. 9:3-45 Notice of complaint to parents.
9. a. In an adoption proceeding pursuant to P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-37 et seq.), notice of the complaint may not be waived and a notice of hearing shall be served in accordance with the Rules of Court on each parent of the child to be adopted. The notice shall inform each parent of the purpose of the action and of the parent's right to file written objections to the adoption within 20 days after notice is given in the case of a resident and 35 days in the case of a nonresident. For purposes of this section, "parent" means (1) the husband of the mother of a child born or conceived during the marriage or (2) a putative or alleged biological mother or father of a child.
b.Notice pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall not be served on a parent:
(1)Who has executed a valid surrender to an approved agency pursuant to section 5 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-41) or P.L.1955, c.232 (C.9:2-13 et seq.);
(2)Whose parental rights have been terminated in a separate judicial proceeding by court order;
(3)Who has, prior to the placement of the child for adoption, received notice of the intention to place the child, which notice shall inform the parent of the purpose of the placement, that failure to respond to the notice will prevent the person receiving the notice from objecting to any future adoption of the child, and that the parent has a right to file with the surrogate in the county in which venue is anticipated to lie, the address of which surrogate shall be included in the notice, written objections to the proposed placement within 20 days after notice is given, in the case of a resident, and 35 days in the case of a nonresident; and who has either failed to file written objections or denied paternity or maternity of the child. Failure to respond to this notice and object to the placement of the child for adoption shall constitute a waiver of all notice of any subsequent proceedings with regard to the child including proceedings for adoption or termination of parental rights;
(4)Who has given the child for adoption to the adopting parent, and the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, after a hearing at which the surrendering parent was heard as to the voluntariness of the surrender, has determined that the surrender was voluntary and proper;
(5)Whose child has been made available for adoption in a foreign state or country if the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service has determined that the child has been approved for adoptive placement. The finding of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service shall be presumed valid and no notice shall be served ; or
(6)Who is presumed to be the biological father of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceeding pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection a. of section 6 of P.L.1983, c.17 (C.9:17-43) but who, within 120 days of the birth of the child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, has not acknowledged paternity by amending the original birth certificate record filed with the local registrar's office in the municipality of birth of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceeding in accordance with birth record amendment procedures, or has not filed an action for paternity in court.
c.If personal service of the notice cannot be effected because the whereabouts of a birth parent of the child to be adopted are unknown, the court shall determine that an adequate effort has been made to serve notice upon the parent if the plaintiff immediately prior to or during the placement and not more than nine months prior to the filing of a complaint has:
(1)Sent the notice by regular mail and by certified mail return receipt requested, to the parent's last known address;
(2)Made a discreet inquiry as to the whereabouts of the missing parent among any known relations, friends and current or former employers of the parent;
(3)Unless otherwise restricted by law, made direct inquiries, using the party's name and last known or suspected address, to the local post office, the Division of Motor Vehicles, county welfare agency, the municipal police department, the Division of State Police, the county probation office, the Department of Corrections, and any social service and law enforcement agencies known to have had contact with the party, or the equivalents in other states, territories or countries. Failure to receive a response to the inquiries within 45 days shall be a negative response.
d.In any case where, within 120 days of the birth of the child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, the identity of a birth parent cannot be determined or where the known parent of a child is unable or refuses to identify the other parent, and the court is unable from other information before the court to identify the other parent, service on that parent shall be waived by the court.
e.In conducting the hearing required by paragraph (4) of subsection b. of this section, the court shall determine that the surrender is voluntary and that the birth parent knows (1) that the hearing is to surrender birth rights; (2) that the hearing is to permanently end the relationship and all contact between parent and child; (3) that such action is a relinquishment and termination of parental rights and consent on the part of the birth parent to the adoption; and (4) that no further notice of the adoption proceedings shall be provided to the birth parent if the surrender is accepted by the court.
L.1977,c.367,s.9; amended 1982, c.105, s.1; 1993, c.345, s.8; 1998, c.20, s.1.
9:3-45.1 Rules, regulations.
6.The Department of Human Services, in consultation with the Department of Health and Senior Services, pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.), shall adopt rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this act and to publicize throughout the State the necessity for a father, within 120 days of the birth of a child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, to acknowledge paternity by amending the original birth certificate record with the local registrar's office in the municipality of birth of the child who is the subject of the adoption or by filing a paternity action in court in order to be entitled to notice of an adoption pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45).
L.1998, c.20, s.6.
9:3-45.2 Foster parent notice, opportunity to be heard.
3.In any case in which the Division of Youth and Family Services accepts a child in its care or custody, the child's foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child, as applicable, shall receive written notice of and an opportunity to be heard at any review or hearing held with respect to the child, but the foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative shall not be made a party to the review or hearing solely on the basis of the notice and opportunity to be heard.
L.1999,c.53,s.3. 9:3-46 Objection to adoption.
10. a. A person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45) shall have the right to object to the adoption of his child within 20 days after the filing of the complaint for adoption for a State resident and 35 days after the filing in the case of a nonresident. Failure to object within that time period constitutes a waiver of the right to object.
In a contest between a person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45) objecting to the adoption and the prospective adoptive parent, the standard shall be the best interest of the child. The best interest of a child requires that a parent affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. In determining whether a parent has affirmatively assumed the duties of a parent, the court shall consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the fulfillment of financial obligations for the birth and care of the child, demonstration of continued interest in the child, demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and demonstration of the establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in the child's life.
A judgment of adoption shall be entered over an objection of a person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45) communicated to the court by personal appearance or by letter if the court finds, during the six-month period prior to the placement of the child for adoption or within 120 days after the birth of a child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, in the case of a child placed for adoption as a newborn infant:
(1)that the parent has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so, or
(2)that the parent is unable to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child and that the parent's inability to perform those functions is unlikely to change in the immediate future.
The regular and expected functions of care and support of a child shall include the following:
(a)the maintenance of a relationship with the child such that the child perceives the person as his parent;
(b)communicating with the child or person having legal custody of the child and parenting time rights, or unless prevented from so doing by the custodial parent or other custodian of the child or a social service agency over the birth parent's objection; or
(c)providing financial support for the child unless prevented from doing so by the custodial parent or other custodian of the child or a social service agency.
A parent shall be presumed to have failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child if the court finds that the situation set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) has occurred during the six-month period prior to the placement of the child for adoption, or within 120 days after the birth of a child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, in the case of a child placed for adoption as a newborn infant.
In the case where the objecting parent is incarcerated during the six-month period prior to placement of the child for adoption, relevant factors to be considered in determining whether that incarcerated parent has failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions or is unable to perform the regular and expected parental functions pursuant to this subsection, shall include the extent of the relationship which existed between the parent and child prior to incarceration, including financial support; the efforts made to continue a relationship during the incarceration; the ability to communicate and visit with the child during incarceration; and the effect of the communication and visitation on the child's development in terms of providing nurturing and emotional support.
b.The guardian of a child to be adopted who has not executed a surrender pursuant to section 5 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-41) and any other person who has provided primary care and supervision in his home for the child for a period of six months or one half of the life of the child, whichever is less, in the two years prior to the complaint shall be given notice of the action and in accordance with the Rules of Court shall have standing to object to the adoption, which objection shall be given due consideration by the court in determining whether the best interests of the child would be promoted by the adoption.
L.1977,c.367,s.10; amended 1993, c.345, s.9; 1997, c.299, s.10; 1998, c.20, s.2.
The most common example is a step father adopting his wife's child from a prior relationship. In these cases, a Complaint must be filed in the Superior Court by the person (plaintiff) who wishes to adopt the child.
The New Jersey Court Rules and Adoption Statute has specific requirements for adoptions. The Complaint should set forth the following:
1. The name, age, address of adoptive father. Adoptive father is a citizen of the United States and not related to the child.
2. The child's name, place of birth, date of birth, and age.
3. Name and ages of any children of the proposed adoptive parent and the child's parent.
4. Where and when the plaintiffs began to take care of the child to be adopted from the natural mother.
5. The date from which the child has been under the continuous care of the plaintiff.
6. The name and address of the natural father and natural mother, if known to the plaintiffs. The natural parents were not married.
7. Whether the child to be adopted has any property.
8. The name by which the child to be adopted shall be known.
9. Place and type of employment and that both plaintiff and mother are able to support the child to be adopted.
10. Attach a typed affidavit of the consent of the natural mother.
11. Plaintiffs demand a judgment of adoption as to the child and that his name be changed.
In addition, the consent of the available natural father should be obtained. The affidavit to be prepared by the attorney which will contain some of the following information:
Consent of Mother/Father - To be signed in front of a Notary
1. The name and age of natural parent, declaration that he/she is the natural parent, city and county of child's birth.
2. Signed consent of natural parent to adoption of child by plaintiffs, relinquishment of all right and claim to child, and agreement that, from the date of the decree of adoption of child, that the child will, to all legal intents and purposes, be the child of the persons adopting the child.
3. (Optional) Consent of natural parent to child being raised in a particular religion.
Hearing Order An order fixing the day for hearing and publication must be prepared by your attorney. It must be submitted to the Court and signed by the Court. The Court Orders will set forth that:
1. The child sought to be adopted is to be a ward of the court;
2. Date and place of the hearing; 3. The Complaint for Adoption, together with the Order for hearing, and
Notice in the form required by N.J.S.A. 9:3-45, shall be published in The Home News and Tribune or another newspaper of general circulation.
4. Who should be served notice by personal service or certified mail.
Adoption Hearing
The adoptive father, natural mother and child should appear at the hearing. The Supreme Court Judge will conduct the questioning in the Judge's Chambers. Your attorney will help you prepare.
Final Judgment of Adoption
A Final Judgment of Adoption by the court will set forth some of the following information:
1. That by virtue of the Complaint that Plaintiff desires to adopt the minor child, and a preliminary hearing having been held, and it further appearing that the best interest of the child would be promoted by such adoption, and it further appearing through notice by Publication of these proceedings set forth in The Home News & Tribune that the natural father of the child, has not contested the proceedings;
2. It is ordered and adjudged:
A. The above named child be adopted by the plaintiff. B. The name of the child shall be changed to _____. C. Upon entry of this Judgment of Adoption, the relationship heretofore existing between the child and the natural father of the child, be in all respects at an end;
D. The entry of this Judgment shall not affect or terminate any rights, duties, privileges, and relationships existing between the child and his natural mother, nor his right of inheritance from or through her, nor the rights of inheritance under the intestate laws of this State through the natural father.
E. The entry of this Judgment shall establish the same relationship between the child and the adopting parent as if such child were born to such adopting parent in lawful wedlock, including the rights of inheritance.
Post Adoption Hearing Procedures
Your attorney should fill out paperwork to obtain a new birth certificate. An adoption is a final proceeding. Even a divorce does not revoke an adoption. For additional information on adoption, contact a New Jersey attorney.
Selected statutes dealing with Adoption:
9:3-42. Jurisdiction in Chancery, venue 6. An action for adoption shall be instituted in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part of the county in which the prospective parent resides, or in the county where the child resided immediately prior to placement for adoption, or if the child is less than three months of age, the county in which the child was born; except that whenever the child to be adopted has been received into the home of a prospective parent from an approved agency, the action may be instituted in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part of any county in which the approved agency has an office.
L.1977,c.367,s.6; amended 1991,c.91,s.193; 1993,c.345,s.5.
9:3-43. Instituting adoption actions; qualifications 7. a. Any person may institute an action for adoption except that a married person may do so only with the written consent of his spouse or jointly with his spouse in the same action or if living separate and apart from his spouse.
b. A plaintiff, at the time of the institution of the action, shall have attained the age of 18 years and shall be at least 10 years older than the child to be adopted, except that the court for good cause may waive either requirement, which waiver shall be recited in any judgment of adoption thereafter entered.
L.1977,c.367,s.7; amended 1993,c.345,s.6.
9:3-44. Filing of complaint 8. Whenever a person receives a child into his home for the purpose of adoption other than from an approved agency, a complaint for adoption shall be filed within 45 days after receipt of the child. If the person receiving the child has been approved previously for placement for adoption in accordance with the provisions of section 18 of P.L.1993, c.345 (C.9:3-39.1), the person shall, immediately upon receiving the child, notify the approved agency which granted such approval of the receipt of the child, and that agency shall undertake immediate supervision of the child in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of the Division of Youth and Family Services. The cost of such supervision shall be paid by the person receiving the child. If the agency, in the course of supervision shall determine that the child is at risk of harm or that the best interests of the child are not served by the child remaining in the home, the agency may apply to a court for removal of the child from the home. Whenever a person receives a child into his home for purposes other than adoption and it is later determined that an adoption shall be sought, a complaint for adoption shall be instituted with reasonable promptness following the determination. Failure to file the complaint in a timely manner shall not be a sole basis for refusal of the adoption but the failure shall require the filing, with the complaint, of an affidavit setting forth the reasons for the delay.
L.1977,c.367,s.8; amended 1993,c.345,s.7. 9:3-45 Notice of complaint to parents.
9. a. In an adoption proceeding pursuant to P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-37 et seq.), notice of the complaint may not be waived and a notice of hearing shall be served in accordance with the Rules of Court on each parent of the child to be adopted. The notice shall inform each parent of the purpose of the action and of the parent's right to file written objections to the adoption within 20 days after notice is given in the case of a resident and 35 days in the case of a nonresident. For purposes of this section, "parent" means (1) the husband of the mother of a child born or conceived during the marriage or (2) a putative or alleged biological mother or father of a child.
b.Notice pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall not be served on a parent:
(1)Who has executed a valid surrender to an approved agency pursuant to section 5 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-41) or P.L.1955, c.232 (C.9:2-13 et seq.);
(2)Whose parental rights have been terminated in a separate judicial proceeding by court order;
(3)Who has, prior to the placement of the child for adoption, received notice of the intention to place the child, which notice shall inform the parent of the purpose of the placement, that failure to respond to the notice will prevent the person receiving the notice from objecting to any future adoption of the child, and that the parent has a right to file with the surrogate in the county in which venue is anticipated to lie, the address of which surrogate shall be included in the notice, written objections to the proposed placement within 20 days after notice is given, in the case of a resident, and 35 days in the case of a nonresident; and who has either failed to file written objections or denied paternity or maternity of the child. Failure to respond to this notice and object to the placement of the child for adoption shall constitute a waiver of all notice of any subsequent proceedings with regard to the child including proceedings for adoption or termination of parental rights;
(4)Who has given the child for adoption to the adopting parent, and the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, after a hearing at which the surrendering parent was heard as to the voluntariness of the surrender, has determined that the surrender was voluntary and proper;
(5)Whose child has been made available for adoption in a foreign state or country if the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service has determined that the child has been approved for adoptive placement. The finding of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service shall be presumed valid and no notice shall be served ; or
(6)Who is presumed to be the biological father of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceeding pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection a. of section 6 of P.L.1983, c.17 (C.9:17-43) but who, within 120 days of the birth of the child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, has not acknowledged paternity by amending the original birth certificate record filed with the local registrar's office in the municipality of birth of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceeding in accordance with birth record amendment procedures, or has not filed an action for paternity in court.
c.If personal service of the notice cannot be effected because the whereabouts of a birth parent of the child to be adopted are unknown, the court shall determine that an adequate effort has been made to serve notice upon the parent if the plaintiff immediately prior to or during the placement and not more than nine months prior to the filing of a complaint has:
(1)Sent the notice by regular mail and by certified mail return receipt requested, to the parent's last known address;
(2)Made a discreet inquiry as to the whereabouts of the missing parent among any known relations, friends and current or former employers of the parent;
(3)Unless otherwise restricted by law, made direct inquiries, using the party's name and last known or suspected address, to the local post office, the Division of Motor Vehicles, county welfare agency, the municipal police department, the Division of State Police, the county probation office, the Department of Corrections, and any social service and law enforcement agencies known to have had contact with the party, or the equivalents in other states, territories or countries. Failure to receive a response to the inquiries within 45 days shall be a negative response.
d.In any case where, within 120 days of the birth of the child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, the identity of a birth parent cannot be determined or where the known parent of a child is unable or refuses to identify the other parent, and the court is unable from other information before the court to identify the other parent, service on that parent shall be waived by the court.
e.In conducting the hearing required by paragraph (4) of subsection b. of this section, the court shall determine that the surrender is voluntary and that the birth parent knows (1) that the hearing is to surrender birth rights; (2) that the hearing is to permanently end the relationship and all contact between parent and child; (3) that such action is a relinquishment and termination of parental rights and consent on the part of the birth parent to the adoption; and (4) that no further notice of the adoption proceedings shall be provided to the birth parent if the surrender is accepted by the court.
L.1977,c.367,s.9; amended 1982, c.105, s.1; 1993, c.345, s.8; 1998, c.20, s.1.
9:3-45.1 Rules, regulations.
6.The Department of Human Services, in consultation with the Department of Health and Senior Services, pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.), shall adopt rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this act and to publicize throughout the State the necessity for a father, within 120 days of the birth of a child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, to acknowledge paternity by amending the original birth certificate record with the local registrar's office in the municipality of birth of the child who is the subject of the adoption or by filing a paternity action in court in order to be entitled to notice of an adoption pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45).
L.1998, c.20, s.6.
9:3-45.2 Foster parent notice, opportunity to be heard.
3.In any case in which the Division of Youth and Family Services accepts a child in its care or custody, the child's foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child, as applicable, shall receive written notice of and an opportunity to be heard at any review or hearing held with respect to the child, but the foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative shall not be made a party to the review or hearing solely on the basis of the notice and opportunity to be heard.
L.1999,c.53,s.3. 9:3-46 Objection to adoption.
10. a. A person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45) shall have the right to object to the adoption of his child within 20 days after the filing of the complaint for adoption for a State resident and 35 days after the filing in the case of a nonresident. Failure to object within that time period constitutes a waiver of the right to object.
In a contest between a person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45) objecting to the adoption and the prospective adoptive parent, the standard shall be the best interest of the child. The best interest of a child requires that a parent affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. In determining whether a parent has affirmatively assumed the duties of a parent, the court shall consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the fulfillment of financial obligations for the birth and care of the child, demonstration of continued interest in the child, demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and demonstration of the establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in the child's life.
A judgment of adoption shall be entered over an objection of a person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-45) communicated to the court by personal appearance or by letter if the court finds, during the six-month period prior to the placement of the child for adoption or within 120 days after the birth of a child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, in the case of a child placed for adoption as a newborn infant:
(1)that the parent has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so, or
(2)that the parent is unable to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child and that the parent's inability to perform those functions is unlikely to change in the immediate future.
The regular and expected functions of care and support of a child shall include the following:
(a)the maintenance of a relationship with the child such that the child perceives the person as his parent;
(b)communicating with the child or person having legal custody of the child and parenting time rights, or unless prevented from so doing by the custodial parent or other custodian of the child or a social service agency over the birth parent's objection; or
(c)providing financial support for the child unless prevented from doing so by the custodial parent or other custodian of the child or a social service agency.
A parent shall be presumed to have failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child if the court finds that the situation set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) has occurred during the six-month period prior to the placement of the child for adoption, or within 120 days after the birth of a child or prior to the date of the preliminary hearing, whichever occurs first, in the case of a child placed for adoption as a newborn infant.
In the case where the objecting parent is incarcerated during the six-month period prior to placement of the child for adoption, relevant factors to be considered in determining whether that incarcerated parent has failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions or is unable to perform the regular and expected parental functions pursuant to this subsection, shall include the extent of the relationship which existed between the parent and child prior to incarceration, including financial support; the efforts made to continue a relationship during the incarceration; the ability to communicate and visit with the child during incarceration; and the effect of the communication and visitation on the child's development in terms of providing nurturing and emotional support.
b.The guardian of a child to be adopted who has not executed a surrender pursuant to section 5 of P.L.1977, c.367 (C.9:3-41) and any other person who has provided primary care and supervision in his home for the child for a period of six months or one half of the life of the child, whichever is less, in the two years prior to the complaint shall be given notice of the action and in accordance with the Rules of Court shall have standing to object to the adoption, which objection shall be given due consideration by the court in determining whether the best interests of the child would be promoted by the adoption.
L.1977,c.367,s.10; amended 1993, c.345, s.9; 1997, c.299, s.10; 1998, c.20, s.2.
2C:2-6 Accomplice Liability
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime when, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, he does one of several things. He either solicits the other person to commit the crime, and/or aids, agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime. State v JACKMON 305 N.J. Super. 274. (App. Div. 1997)
2C:2-6.Liability for conduct of another;complicitya. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.?b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.?c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.?e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (1) He is a victim of that offense; (2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence.f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
2C:2-6.Liability for conduct of another;complicitya. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.?b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.?c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.?e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (1) He is a victim of that offense; (2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence.f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
What to do in an Accident
What to do in an Accident
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates Law Office helps people injured due to the negligence of others. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. The insurance companies will not help. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation if you are injured.
We sincerely hope that you and your family will enjoy safe motoring, free from accident. If however you do have an accident, to protect your legal rights, the following suggestions may be helpful:
At The Accident Scene -
1. Stop . . . do not leave the scene of the accident
(a) DIRECT OTHER TRAFFIC around the accident.
(b) HELP THE INJURED but don't move them unless absolutely necessary.
(c) CALL THE POLICE, tell them where the accident occurred and ask for medical help if needed.
2. Get names, addresses, and license numbers of all drivers involved.
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
3. Get description and registration number and insurance information of all cars involved.
_____________________________________
License Plate Number
____________________________________
Registration #
Make ___________ Year _________
____________________________________
Damage
______________________________________________________
Insurance Company
____________________________________
Insurance Policy Number
4. Get names and addresses of all witnesses (other than passengers)
_________________________________________________
Name
_______________________________________________
Address
_________________________________________________
Phone
______________________________________________________
Name
_______________________________________________
Address
_________________________________________________
Phone
5. Police Officers
__________________________________________________
Department
________________________________________________
Officer.
_______________________________________________
Badge No.
______________________________________________________
Officer.
______________________________________________________
Badge No.
6. Accident Information
_________________ _________________
Date Time
______________________________________________________
Location _______________________________________________________
No. of vehicles involved
_____________________________________________________
Weather
______________________________________________________
Road conditions
________________________________________________________
Damage
______________________________________________________
Speed of the other car
6. Summary of accident
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
7. Diagram of accident
8. Make sure no one is injured. If anyone is injured call an ambulance. If you have any reason to suspect you were injured in the accident, see a physician promptly. You'll want it on record that you sought treatment right away - not in a week or so .
9. Witnesses will be a tremendous help to you in any subsequent court action, if there is any question of liability involved. Get the names and addresses of as many witnesses as possible. If they refuse to identify themselves, jot down the license plate numbers of the their automobiles. Do not discuss the accident with the witnesses. Do not give the witnesses to anyone but the police, your attorney or your insurance company.
10. Do not assign or accept blame for the accident.
- The scene of the accident is not the place to determine fault. Discuss the accident only with the police, your attorney and with representatives of your insurance company. Give the other party only your drivers license number, registration number and insurance information.
- Be cooperative with the police.
11. Seek hospital attention.
12. Speak with your Doctor or Chiropractor
13. Call your insurance company to report the accident.
14. Call: Kenneth A. Vercammen, Attorney At Law (732) 572-0500
When you need help the most, we will be ready to help you.
15. Never give a signed statement to the claims adjuster representing the other driver's insurance company. The same goes for a phone recording. They may be used against you in court.
16 . What you must always have in your car.....
a.- Drivers License
b.- Car Registration
c.- Insurance Card
d.- This Flyer on Accidents
e.- A Working Pen
f. - Quarters for Phone Calls
(Ambulance/First Aid and Police)
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates Law Office helps people injured due to the negligence of others. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. The insurance companies will not help. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation if you are injured.
We sincerely hope that you and your family will enjoy safe motoring, free from accident. If however you do have an accident, to protect your legal rights, the following suggestions may be helpful:
At The Accident Scene -
1. Stop . . . do not leave the scene of the accident
(a) DIRECT OTHER TRAFFIC around the accident.
(b) HELP THE INJURED but don't move them unless absolutely necessary.
(c) CALL THE POLICE, tell them where the accident occurred and ask for medical help if needed.
2. Get names, addresses, and license numbers of all drivers involved.
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
3. Get description and registration number and insurance information of all cars involved.
_____________________________________
License Plate Number
____________________________________
Registration #
Make ___________ Year _________
____________________________________
Damage
______________________________________________________
Insurance Company
____________________________________
Insurance Policy Number
4. Get names and addresses of all witnesses (other than passengers)
_________________________________________________
Name
_______________________________________________
Address
_________________________________________________
Phone
______________________________________________________
Name
_______________________________________________
Address
_________________________________________________
Phone
5. Police Officers
__________________________________________________
Department
________________________________________________
Officer.
_______________________________________________
Badge No.
______________________________________________________
Officer.
______________________________________________________
Badge No.
6. Accident Information
_________________ _________________
Date Time
______________________________________________________
Location _______________________________________________________
No. of vehicles involved
_____________________________________________________
Weather
______________________________________________________
Road conditions
________________________________________________________
Damage
______________________________________________________
Speed of the other car
6. Summary of accident
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
7. Diagram of accident
8. Make sure no one is injured. If anyone is injured call an ambulance. If you have any reason to suspect you were injured in the accident, see a physician promptly. You'll want it on record that you sought treatment right away - not in a week or so .
9. Witnesses will be a tremendous help to you in any subsequent court action, if there is any question of liability involved. Get the names and addresses of as many witnesses as possible. If they refuse to identify themselves, jot down the license plate numbers of the their automobiles. Do not discuss the accident with the witnesses. Do not give the witnesses to anyone but the police, your attorney or your insurance company.
10. Do not assign or accept blame for the accident.
- The scene of the accident is not the place to determine fault. Discuss the accident only with the police, your attorney and with representatives of your insurance company. Give the other party only your drivers license number, registration number and insurance information.
- Be cooperative with the police.
11. Seek hospital attention.
12. Speak with your Doctor or Chiropractor
13. Call your insurance company to report the accident.
14. Call: Kenneth A. Vercammen, Attorney At Law (732) 572-0500
When you need help the most, we will be ready to help you.
15. Never give a signed statement to the claims adjuster representing the other driver's insurance company. The same goes for a phone recording. They may be used against you in court.
16 . What you must always have in your car.....
a.- Drivers License
b.- Car Registration
c.- Insurance Card
d.- This Flyer on Accidents
e.- A Working Pen
f. - Quarters for Phone Calls
(Ambulance/First Aid and Police)
Accident Victim's Rights
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates Law Office helps people injured due to the negligence of others. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. The insurance companies will not help. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation if you are injured in an accident and suffer a Serious Injury.
ACCIDENT VICTIMS RIGHTS REQUIRING INSURANCE TO PAY FOR MEDICAL/ CHIROPRACTIC TREATMENT
If injured in a car accident, it is important to immediately seek hospital and medical or chiropractic treatment. Under the New Jersey No Fault Act, car insurance companies are supposed to make timely payment of medical bills for the driver and passengers injured in their cars or other non-commercial vehicles. Doctors should let their patients know there are now minimum deductibles under the NJ Car No Fault Law (PIP). The following is helpful information for injured people and their doctors to obtain payment for bills.
1 Bills should be submitted to PIP & also to Major Medical and to Patient The medical provider must first submit the unpaid bills to the patient's car insurance carrier Personal Injury Protection (PIP carrier), and/or any Blue Cross/Blue Shield or other related medical provider, and fill out any documents required by the insurance company.
2. Deductibles There is an initial $250.00 deductible, and thereafter the car insurance company pays 80% of medical bills under a medical fee schedule established by the State Dept. of Insurance. After $5,000 the car insurance company pays 100% under the fee schedule, unless an independent medical exam (IME) recommends no further treatment. We recommend doctors adequately notify patients that they are the primary responsible person for payment, not insurance companies. They are also called the PIP (Personal Injury Protection) benefits under the No Fault Law. For unpaid portions after 80% or under the deductible, the chiropractor and also patient should submit portions of bills the car insurance does not pay to their major medical carrier (ex- Blue Cross, Connecticut General). Patients must be told that if they have the lawsuit/ verbal threshold, they cannot even sue the negligent driver for their unpaid medical bills.
3. 21 day notification to PIP A State Law signed in January, 1996 requires automobile insurers to be notified by the claimant or medical provider in writing within 21 days following commencement of treatment of injuries sustained in an accident for which personal injury protection medical expense benefits are claimed. NJSA 39:6A-5(b) In addition, under this new law P.L. 1995, c 407, every bill for such treatment shall be submitted to the insurer and submitted by the medical provider if within 30 days of the date that treatment was rendered. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5E (a) If the treating doctor does not give proper notification, the insurer can reserve the right to deny payment of the claim, and the treatment provider is prohibited from seeking a payment directly from the insured NJSA 39:6A-5(d) New Jersey Auto Insurance Law p 157 (GANN 2000). It is highly recommended that all doctors, hospitals, MRI facilities and physical therapy centers also send complete copies of all bills to the patient. Unfortunately, too often doctors or MRI facilities fail to advise patients of high unpaid bills, then put the patient in collection after the case is over for the unpaid bill.
Patients should submit copies of all bills to your car insurance company even if they believe the doctor or medical providers may also have submitted the bill to PIP. The patient should later send the bill to major medical. If the doctor's office and injured person does not keep their attorney's office informed in writing of unpaid medical bills, the attorney will not have sufficient information to provide to the defendant's insurance company and the Court when trying to settle a case.
4. New Care paths in Car Accident Cases Starting in 1999, all medical providers must follow "care paths" and most non emergency treatment approved by the car insurance company. Please make sure all treatment and bills are pre- approved by the car insurance company. The treating doctor should also contact the car insurance company prior to MRI or extensive treatment.
5. Dispute Resolution to require Payment of Doctor and MRI Bills following a car accident The intent of the no fault statute is to require speedy payment of hospital and doctor bills and prevent delay by insurance companies. An aggrieved personal injury protection claimant is entitled to receive "prompt payment of medical expenses, lost wages, essential services, survivor benefits and funeral expenses... without having to wait the outcome of protracted litigation." Kubiak v. Allstate Insurance Co., 198 N.J. Super. 115, 119 (App. Div. 1984), cert. den. 101 N.J. 290; Hoqlin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.J. Super. 475, 479 (App. Div. 1976). This, together with the right to interest on overdue payments (then N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5(c)) and the ability under Rule 4:42 9(a)(6) to recover counsel fees if successful in the action should sufficiently guard against situations where an injured party is subjected to protracted aggravated consequences because of an insurer's failure to pay. Kubiak 198 N.J. Super. 119 120.
Disputes between the insurer and claimant as to whether or not benefits are due under the PIP statute may be resolved, at the election of either the claimant or the insurer, either by binding arbitration or by civil litigation. NJSA 39:6A-5(i) and NJSA 39:6A-5.1a, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law p 159 (GANN 2000) If the insurance company continues to delay and fails to pay medical benefits, the insured can either file suit in the Superior Court or file a demand for dispute resolution with American Arbitration Association. In New Jersey their office is located 1 Executive Drive, Somerset, New Jersey 08873. Filing fees are $325, paid by either the doctor/treatment provider or the patient. The check should be payable to the American Arbitration Association.
5a. NJSA 39:6A-5.1 sets forth in detail how AAA dispute resolution proceeds Dispute resolution proceedings shall include disputes arising regarding medical expense benefits provided under PIP law and disputes as to additional first party coverage benefits required to be offered. Disputes involving medical expense benefits may include, but not necessarily be limited to, matters concerning (1) interpretation of the insurance contract; (2) whether the treatment or health care service which is the subject of the dispute resolution proceeding is in accordance with the provisions pip law or the terms of the policy; (3) the eligibility of the treatment or service for compensation; (4) the eligibility of the provider performing the treatment or service to be compensated under the terms of the policy or under regulations promulgated by the commissioner, including whether the person is licensed or certified to perform such treatment; (5) whether the disputed medical treatment was actually performed; (6) whether diagnostic tests performed in connection with the treatment are those recognized by the commissioner; (7) the necessity or appropriateness of consultations by other health are providers; (8) disputes involving application of and adherence to fee schedules promulgated by the commissioner; and (9) whether the treatment performed is reasonable, necessary, and compatible with the protocols provided for pursuant to P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.).
The dispute resolution professionals may review the entire claims file of the insurer, subject to any confidentiality requirement established pursuant to State of federal law. All decisions of the dispute resolution professional shall be in writing, in a form prescribed by the commissioner, shall state the issues in dispute, the findings and conclusions on which the decision is based, and shall be signed by the dispute resolution professional. All decisions of a dispute resolution professional shall be binding. The dispute resolution organization shall provide for the retention of all documents used in dispute resolution proceedings under this section and section 25 of this amendatory and supplementary act, including the written decision for a period of at least five years, in a form provided by the commissioner, or such additional time as may be established by the commissioner. The written decisions of the dispute resolution professional shall be forwarded to the commissioner, who shall establish a record of the proceedings conducted under the dispute resolution procedure, which shall be accessible to the public and may be used as guidance in subsequent dispute resolution proceedings.
Under the pre-1999 no fault law, AAA arbitrations were heard by a single arbitrator chosen by AAA. The arbitrator would fix the time and place for each oral hearing. Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration are entitled to attend hearings. Parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material and shall produce such additional evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. The arbitrator may subpoena witnesses or documents on his own initiative or upon the request of any party. The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevancy and the materiality of the evidence offered, and conforming to legal Rules of Evidence is not necessary. An arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit, but it shall give it only such weight as the arbitrator deems it entitled to after consideration of any objections made to its admission.
According to the New Jersey No Fault Automobile Arbitration rules published by the American Arbitration Association "if the claimant prevails in the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator shall direct the insurer to pay all the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees.
5b. New Emergent- Relief Arbitration Under PIP Ordinarily, the minimum time for a regular arbitration is three months, including a 45 day initial waiting period and a 20 day notice of hearing. New Rule 3A of the American Arbitration Association's rules governing Personal Injury Protection Arbitration requires appointment of an arbitrator within one business day of the demand, the establishment of a schedule for consideration within two business days of the appointment and the granting of any relief within three additional days. 160 N.J.L.J. 373, NJ Law Journal May 1, 2000, p 5. The new rules were drafted by the state Department of Banking and Insurance. They went into effect April 1, 2000 and are posted on the AAA's Web site (www.adr.org/rules/state/nj no-fault rules.html).
6. SUIT IN SUPERIOR COURT INSTEAD OF ARBITRATION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FEES In Miskofsky v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 203 N.J. Super. 400 (Law Div. 1984) the court examined a Superior Court PIP suit and found medical benefits must be afforded. The court awarded attorneys fees, holding:
Counsel for plaintiff has submitted an affidavit of services based on an hourly rate of $100.00 which this court believes to be fair and reasonable. "I shall, therefore, award counsel fees against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $1,790.00 as well as costs representing actual disbursements in the amount of $123.12 or a total of $1,913.12" Miskofsky at 416 417.
All other reported cases indicate attorneys fees should be awarded to Plaintiff's counsel. Additionally, the court in Olewinsky v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 234 N.J. Super. 429 (Law Div. 1988) examined an application and request for attorney's fees for services rendered in connection with the personal injury claim. The plaintiff was pregnant at the time she was involved in an automobile accident. Defendant Aetna refused to pay certain medical expenses to the plaintiff and for her child. A claim was brought for medical payments. Both claims were settled at a conference in which the court participated. Upon motion of the plaintiff, the court in Olewinsky held: "based upon consideration of the underlying purpose of Rule [4:42 9(a)(6)] allowing attorney's fees as well as the nature of PIP claims and the realities of PIP settlements, this court concludes that attorney's fees should be allowed when a case is settled at anytime after the commencement of suit, for a sum which exceeds the original offer by the insured made prior to the institution of suit". Id. at 432. The court also noted in a footnote that attorney's fees are also allowed under the PIP statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5, where an insured claimant prevails in an arbitration proceeding for PIP benefits.
The court concluded: The intent of the Rule allowing attorney's fees is to charge the insurer with additional expenses necessitated by an insured who is forced to bring suit for his claim. But, the realities of PIP settlements are that the insured must pay his own attorney fees. This effectively undermines the intent of the Rule. In order to implement the intent of the Rule, the definition of a "successful claimant" must be given liberal interpretation so as to encompass not only judgments and last minute settlements, but settlements effectuated prior to trial as well. Clearly, a claimant who obtains a judgment for the full amount of his claim is a "successful claimant". Similarly, a claimant who obtains a judgment for less than the full amount he seeks is also a "successful claimant" under the law. Therefore, logic should dictate that a claimant who obtains either a settlement for the full amount of his claim prior to the trial date or who obtains a settlement for a sum less than the full amount of his claim, but for more than that which he was offered prior to the institution of suit, should similarly be categorized as a "successful claimant". He is, after all, getting more than that which he would have obtained in the first place. In this respect, therefore, he is successful.
Finally, it is simply unfair to burden an insured with attorneys fees in order to receive moneys to which, at least in part, he was entitled to in the first place. Olewinsky . at 433 434.
The court in Olewinsky held that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The court held that the sum of $4,500.00 plus expenses, was fair and reasonable for payment of attorney's fees. Today, the statute N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5(c) requires that if a claimant prevails at arbitration, the insurer shall pay all costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. Thus, the imposition of attorney's fees is mandatory.
In Van Houten v. New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Co., 159 N.J. Super. 208 (Cty. Ct. 1978), aff'd 170 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1979), an insured who brought a cause of action against an insurer for failure to provide personal injury protection coverage for his medical expenses was determined to be a successful claimant and as provided by the Rule permitting attorney's fees. The court noted that a party need not prevail in every claim in order to be successful. Id. at 211. The court in Van Houten found persuasive plaintiff's argument that an insured is already a weak party to an insurance contract, and to make him hire an attorney throughout the trial or motion would put him at an even greater disadvantage. It is incongruous to require plaintiff to bypass a settlement offer and to proceed to trial in order to "earn" counsel fees, especially when a settlement and trial would have substantially achieved the same result. Also compelling plaintiff to try the case under these circumstances would be contrary to the strong public policy and judicial commitment that justice be served by encouraging the settlement of claims thereby avoiding or terminating litigation. Id. at 212. (Citations omitted). The court in Van Houten, concluded that had the plaintiff proceeded to trial, there is no doubt that the judge could have awarded a counsel fee. The court in Van Houten noted certain facts: 1. After the accident there was a substantial and unreasonable delay by defendant in conducting its investigation and providing a measure of coverage under No Fault. Such delay is distinguishable from mere tardiness by an insurer in forwarding payment. 2. This unnecessary delay on defendant's part induced plaintiff to seek the services of an attorney to intercede on his behalf, with the necessity of bringing suit. 3. After the complaint was filed, defendant continued to resist coverage under a color of contention which in this case was inappropriate. 4. And finally, after a period of eight months following the accident, defendant, just prior to trial, only then agreed to pay plaintiff an amount closely approximate to the original claim for loss of income coverage sought by the insured. 159 N.J. Super. at 215.
A denial of counsel fees, would thwart the underlying public policy that insurers not raise groundless disclaimers, abandon their insured and induce costly and protracted litigation. Van Houten at 215. To require an insured to fully litigate his claim to a successful adjudication essentially because his accumulated counsel fees cannot otherwise be obtained is contrary to the principles of the rule and the spirit underlying the No Fault Act. Rather, it was the opinion of the Van Houten court that an award of counsel fees would more equitably serve the principals upon which No Fault is founded. Id. at 216. The court noted "upon review of the discovery section of the No Fault Act it is clear that the burden of investigating personal injury claims was primarily with the insurance carrier and not with the insured. N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13 et seq. Under the Act the injured person is essentially required to "...sign all forms, authorizations, releases for information ...which may be necessary to the discovery of the above facts, in order to reasonably prove the injured person's losses. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13(f)]. The Van Houten court was satisfied that the plaintiff substantially complied with these obligations. The carrier is entitled to substantial discovery from the claimant's doctor, hospital, clinic, etc. or from the carrier's own physician. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13(b) and (d). The court noted if defendant encountered difficulty with such discovery, then it ought to have sought the appropriate relief from plaintiff's doctor and/or employer. N.J.S.A. 39:6A -13(g). Van Houten. at 217.
It has been uniformly held by the courts that Rule 4:42 9(a)(6) permitting an award of counsel fees against an insured's personal insurance company was adopted in order to prevent or discourage groundless disclaimers by the insurance carrier. See e.g. Tooker v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 136 N.J. Super. 572, 576 (App. Div. 1975). Maros v. TransAmerica Insurance Co., 143 N.J. Super. 307 (Law Div. 1976); New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., 124 N.J. Super. 598 (Law Div. 1973). In each of the above cases the courts deemed that counsel fees be awarded with a view towards equity for the insured.
7. Interest on unpaid bills N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5 (g) provides “personal injury protection coverage benefits shall be overdue if not paid within 60 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and the amount of same. N.J.S.A 39:6A-5E (h) added that all overdue payments shall bear simple interest at the percentage of interest prescribed by the Court Rules. An insurer can avoid the payment of interest only where it "has reasonable proof to establish that the insurer is not responsible for the payment..." The allowance of interest is not, as defendant argues, dependent upon the presence or absence of good faith on the part of the insurer. Ortiz at 508-509 The court also affirmed the awarding of the counsel fee.
8. Statute of Limitations Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13.1 an action for payment of benefits must be commenced not later than 2 years after the expense, or when in the exercise of the reasonable diligence insured the should know the loss was caused by the accident, or not later than 4 years after the accident, whichever is earlier; provided, if benefits have been paid before then an action for further benefits may be commenced not later than 2 years after the last payment of benefits. In Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co., 98 N.J. 30 (1984), the Supreme Court adopted the principal that when an automobile liability insurance carrier has made payments of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits in connection with a compensable injury and is chargeable with knowledge at the time of its last payment that the injury will probably require additional treatment in the future, then the "two years after payment" provision of N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13.1 will not bar an action brought within a reasonable time after rejection of a prompt claim for payment of additional medical expenses for such treatment. Id. at 31 32. Our New Jersey Supreme Court has often rejected a limitations defense where the defendant has contributed to the delay. Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982)
CONCLUSION In conclusion, If the claimant is successful, case law, the statute and the AAA rules make counsel fees and interest available. Action must be taken to help the injured party have their medical bills paid prior to the expiration of any statute of limitation.
ACCIDENT VICTIMS RIGHTS REQUIRING INSURANCE TO PAY FOR MEDICAL/ CHIROPRACTIC TREATMENT
If injured in a car accident, it is important to immediately seek hospital and medical or chiropractic treatment. Under the New Jersey No Fault Act, car insurance companies are supposed to make timely payment of medical bills for the driver and passengers injured in their cars or other non-commercial vehicles. Doctors should let their patients know there are now minimum deductibles under the NJ Car No Fault Law (PIP). The following is helpful information for injured people and their doctors to obtain payment for bills.
1 Bills should be submitted to PIP & also to Major Medical and to Patient The medical provider must first submit the unpaid bills to the patient's car insurance carrier Personal Injury Protection (PIP carrier), and/or any Blue Cross/Blue Shield or other related medical provider, and fill out any documents required by the insurance company.
2. Deductibles There is an initial $250.00 deductible, and thereafter the car insurance company pays 80% of medical bills under a medical fee schedule established by the State Dept. of Insurance. After $5,000 the car insurance company pays 100% under the fee schedule, unless an independent medical exam (IME) recommends no further treatment. We recommend doctors adequately notify patients that they are the primary responsible person for payment, not insurance companies. They are also called the PIP (Personal Injury Protection) benefits under the No Fault Law. For unpaid portions after 80% or under the deductible, the chiropractor and also patient should submit portions of bills the car insurance does not pay to their major medical carrier (ex- Blue Cross, Connecticut General). Patients must be told that if they have the lawsuit/ verbal threshold, they cannot even sue the negligent driver for their unpaid medical bills.
3. 21 day notification to PIP A State Law signed in January, 1996 requires automobile insurers to be notified by the claimant or medical provider in writing within 21 days following commencement of treatment of injuries sustained in an accident for which personal injury protection medical expense benefits are claimed. NJSA 39:6A-5(b) In addition, under this new law P.L. 1995, c 407, every bill for such treatment shall be submitted to the insurer and submitted by the medical provider if within 30 days of the date that treatment was rendered. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5E (a) If the treating doctor does not give proper notification, the insurer can reserve the right to deny payment of the claim, and the treatment provider is prohibited from seeking a payment directly from the insured NJSA 39:6A-5(d) New Jersey Auto Insurance Law p 157 (GANN 2000). It is highly recommended that all doctors, hospitals, MRI facilities and physical therapy centers also send complete copies of all bills to the patient. Unfortunately, too often doctors or MRI facilities fail to advise patients of high unpaid bills, then put the patient in collection after the case is over for the unpaid bill.
Patients should submit copies of all bills to your car insurance company even if they believe the doctor or medical providers may also have submitted the bill to PIP. The patient should later send the bill to major medical. If the doctor's office and injured person does not keep their attorney's office informed in writing of unpaid medical bills, the attorney will not have sufficient information to provide to the defendant's insurance company and the Court when trying to settle a case.
4. New Care paths in Car Accident Cases Starting in 1999, all medical providers must follow "care paths" and most non emergency treatment approved by the car insurance company. Please make sure all treatment and bills are pre- approved by the car insurance company. The treating doctor should also contact the car insurance company prior to MRI or extensive treatment.
5. Dispute Resolution to require Payment of Doctor and MRI Bills following a car accident The intent of the no fault statute is to require speedy payment of hospital and doctor bills and prevent delay by insurance companies. An aggrieved personal injury protection claimant is entitled to receive "prompt payment of medical expenses, lost wages, essential services, survivor benefits and funeral expenses... without having to wait the outcome of protracted litigation." Kubiak v. Allstate Insurance Co., 198 N.J. Super. 115, 119 (App. Div. 1984), cert. den. 101 N.J. 290; Hoqlin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.J. Super. 475, 479 (App. Div. 1976). This, together with the right to interest on overdue payments (then N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5(c)) and the ability under Rule 4:42 9(a)(6) to recover counsel fees if successful in the action should sufficiently guard against situations where an injured party is subjected to protracted aggravated consequences because of an insurer's failure to pay. Kubiak 198 N.J. Super. 119 120.
Disputes between the insurer and claimant as to whether or not benefits are due under the PIP statute may be resolved, at the election of either the claimant or the insurer, either by binding arbitration or by civil litigation. NJSA 39:6A-5(i) and NJSA 39:6A-5.1a, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law p 159 (GANN 2000) If the insurance company continues to delay and fails to pay medical benefits, the insured can either file suit in the Superior Court or file a demand for dispute resolution with American Arbitration Association. In New Jersey their office is located 1 Executive Drive, Somerset, New Jersey 08873. Filing fees are $325, paid by either the doctor/treatment provider or the patient. The check should be payable to the American Arbitration Association.
5a. NJSA 39:6A-5.1 sets forth in detail how AAA dispute resolution proceeds Dispute resolution proceedings shall include disputes arising regarding medical expense benefits provided under PIP law and disputes as to additional first party coverage benefits required to be offered. Disputes involving medical expense benefits may include, but not necessarily be limited to, matters concerning (1) interpretation of the insurance contract; (2) whether the treatment or health care service which is the subject of the dispute resolution proceeding is in accordance with the provisions pip law or the terms of the policy; (3) the eligibility of the treatment or service for compensation; (4) the eligibility of the provider performing the treatment or service to be compensated under the terms of the policy or under regulations promulgated by the commissioner, including whether the person is licensed or certified to perform such treatment; (5) whether the disputed medical treatment was actually performed; (6) whether diagnostic tests performed in connection with the treatment are those recognized by the commissioner; (7) the necessity or appropriateness of consultations by other health are providers; (8) disputes involving application of and adherence to fee schedules promulgated by the commissioner; and (9) whether the treatment performed is reasonable, necessary, and compatible with the protocols provided for pursuant to P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.).
The dispute resolution professionals may review the entire claims file of the insurer, subject to any confidentiality requirement established pursuant to State of federal law. All decisions of the dispute resolution professional shall be in writing, in a form prescribed by the commissioner, shall state the issues in dispute, the findings and conclusions on which the decision is based, and shall be signed by the dispute resolution professional. All decisions of a dispute resolution professional shall be binding. The dispute resolution organization shall provide for the retention of all documents used in dispute resolution proceedings under this section and section 25 of this amendatory and supplementary act, including the written decision for a period of at least five years, in a form provided by the commissioner, or such additional time as may be established by the commissioner. The written decisions of the dispute resolution professional shall be forwarded to the commissioner, who shall establish a record of the proceedings conducted under the dispute resolution procedure, which shall be accessible to the public and may be used as guidance in subsequent dispute resolution proceedings.
Under the pre-1999 no fault law, AAA arbitrations were heard by a single arbitrator chosen by AAA. The arbitrator would fix the time and place for each oral hearing. Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration are entitled to attend hearings. Parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material and shall produce such additional evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. The arbitrator may subpoena witnesses or documents on his own initiative or upon the request of any party. The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevancy and the materiality of the evidence offered, and conforming to legal Rules of Evidence is not necessary. An arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit, but it shall give it only such weight as the arbitrator deems it entitled to after consideration of any objections made to its admission.
According to the New Jersey No Fault Automobile Arbitration rules published by the American Arbitration Association "if the claimant prevails in the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator shall direct the insurer to pay all the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees.
5b. New Emergent- Relief Arbitration Under PIP Ordinarily, the minimum time for a regular arbitration is three months, including a 45 day initial waiting period and a 20 day notice of hearing. New Rule 3A of the American Arbitration Association's rules governing Personal Injury Protection Arbitration requires appointment of an arbitrator within one business day of the demand, the establishment of a schedule for consideration within two business days of the appointment and the granting of any relief within three additional days. 160 N.J.L.J. 373, NJ Law Journal May 1, 2000, p 5. The new rules were drafted by the state Department of Banking and Insurance. They went into effect April 1, 2000 and are posted on the AAA's Web site (www.adr.org/rules/state/nj no-fault rules.html).
6. SUIT IN SUPERIOR COURT INSTEAD OF ARBITRATION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FEES In Miskofsky v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 203 N.J. Super. 400 (Law Div. 1984) the court examined a Superior Court PIP suit and found medical benefits must be afforded. The court awarded attorneys fees, holding:
Counsel for plaintiff has submitted an affidavit of services based on an hourly rate of $100.00 which this court believes to be fair and reasonable. "I shall, therefore, award counsel fees against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $1,790.00 as well as costs representing actual disbursements in the amount of $123.12 or a total of $1,913.12" Miskofsky at 416 417.
All other reported cases indicate attorneys fees should be awarded to Plaintiff's counsel. Additionally, the court in Olewinsky v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 234 N.J. Super. 429 (Law Div. 1988) examined an application and request for attorney's fees for services rendered in connection with the personal injury claim. The plaintiff was pregnant at the time she was involved in an automobile accident. Defendant Aetna refused to pay certain medical expenses to the plaintiff and for her child. A claim was brought for medical payments. Both claims were settled at a conference in which the court participated. Upon motion of the plaintiff, the court in Olewinsky held: "based upon consideration of the underlying purpose of Rule [4:42 9(a)(6)] allowing attorney's fees as well as the nature of PIP claims and the realities of PIP settlements, this court concludes that attorney's fees should be allowed when a case is settled at anytime after the commencement of suit, for a sum which exceeds the original offer by the insured made prior to the institution of suit". Id. at 432. The court also noted in a footnote that attorney's fees are also allowed under the PIP statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5, where an insured claimant prevails in an arbitration proceeding for PIP benefits.
The court concluded: The intent of the Rule allowing attorney's fees is to charge the insurer with additional expenses necessitated by an insured who is forced to bring suit for his claim. But, the realities of PIP settlements are that the insured must pay his own attorney fees. This effectively undermines the intent of the Rule. In order to implement the intent of the Rule, the definition of a "successful claimant" must be given liberal interpretation so as to encompass not only judgments and last minute settlements, but settlements effectuated prior to trial as well. Clearly, a claimant who obtains a judgment for the full amount of his claim is a "successful claimant". Similarly, a claimant who obtains a judgment for less than the full amount he seeks is also a "successful claimant" under the law. Therefore, logic should dictate that a claimant who obtains either a settlement for the full amount of his claim prior to the trial date or who obtains a settlement for a sum less than the full amount of his claim, but for more than that which he was offered prior to the institution of suit, should similarly be categorized as a "successful claimant". He is, after all, getting more than that which he would have obtained in the first place. In this respect, therefore, he is successful.
Finally, it is simply unfair to burden an insured with attorneys fees in order to receive moneys to which, at least in part, he was entitled to in the first place. Olewinsky . at 433 434.
The court in Olewinsky held that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The court held that the sum of $4,500.00 plus expenses, was fair and reasonable for payment of attorney's fees. Today, the statute N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5(c) requires that if a claimant prevails at arbitration, the insurer shall pay all costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. Thus, the imposition of attorney's fees is mandatory.
In Van Houten v. New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Co., 159 N.J. Super. 208 (Cty. Ct. 1978), aff'd 170 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1979), an insured who brought a cause of action against an insurer for failure to provide personal injury protection coverage for his medical expenses was determined to be a successful claimant and as provided by the Rule permitting attorney's fees. The court noted that a party need not prevail in every claim in order to be successful. Id. at 211. The court in Van Houten found persuasive plaintiff's argument that an insured is already a weak party to an insurance contract, and to make him hire an attorney throughout the trial or motion would put him at an even greater disadvantage. It is incongruous to require plaintiff to bypass a settlement offer and to proceed to trial in order to "earn" counsel fees, especially when a settlement and trial would have substantially achieved the same result. Also compelling plaintiff to try the case under these circumstances would be contrary to the strong public policy and judicial commitment that justice be served by encouraging the settlement of claims thereby avoiding or terminating litigation. Id. at 212. (Citations omitted). The court in Van Houten, concluded that had the plaintiff proceeded to trial, there is no doubt that the judge could have awarded a counsel fee. The court in Van Houten noted certain facts: 1. After the accident there was a substantial and unreasonable delay by defendant in conducting its investigation and providing a measure of coverage under No Fault. Such delay is distinguishable from mere tardiness by an insurer in forwarding payment. 2. This unnecessary delay on defendant's part induced plaintiff to seek the services of an attorney to intercede on his behalf, with the necessity of bringing suit. 3. After the complaint was filed, defendant continued to resist coverage under a color of contention which in this case was inappropriate. 4. And finally, after a period of eight months following the accident, defendant, just prior to trial, only then agreed to pay plaintiff an amount closely approximate to the original claim for loss of income coverage sought by the insured. 159 N.J. Super. at 215.
A denial of counsel fees, would thwart the underlying public policy that insurers not raise groundless disclaimers, abandon their insured and induce costly and protracted litigation. Van Houten at 215. To require an insured to fully litigate his claim to a successful adjudication essentially because his accumulated counsel fees cannot otherwise be obtained is contrary to the principles of the rule and the spirit underlying the No Fault Act. Rather, it was the opinion of the Van Houten court that an award of counsel fees would more equitably serve the principals upon which No Fault is founded. Id. at 216. The court noted "upon review of the discovery section of the No Fault Act it is clear that the burden of investigating personal injury claims was primarily with the insurance carrier and not with the insured. N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13 et seq. Under the Act the injured person is essentially required to "...sign all forms, authorizations, releases for information ...which may be necessary to the discovery of the above facts, in order to reasonably prove the injured person's losses. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13(f)]. The Van Houten court was satisfied that the plaintiff substantially complied with these obligations. The carrier is entitled to substantial discovery from the claimant's doctor, hospital, clinic, etc. or from the carrier's own physician. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13(b) and (d). The court noted if defendant encountered difficulty with such discovery, then it ought to have sought the appropriate relief from plaintiff's doctor and/or employer. N.J.S.A. 39:6A -13(g). Van Houten. at 217.
It has been uniformly held by the courts that Rule 4:42 9(a)(6) permitting an award of counsel fees against an insured's personal insurance company was adopted in order to prevent or discourage groundless disclaimers by the insurance carrier. See e.g. Tooker v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 136 N.J. Super. 572, 576 (App. Div. 1975). Maros v. TransAmerica Insurance Co., 143 N.J. Super. 307 (Law Div. 1976); New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., 124 N.J. Super. 598 (Law Div. 1973). In each of the above cases the courts deemed that counsel fees be awarded with a view towards equity for the insured.
7. Interest on unpaid bills N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5 (g) provides “personal injury protection coverage benefits shall be overdue if not paid within 60 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and the amount of same. N.J.S.A 39:6A-5E (h) added that all overdue payments shall bear simple interest at the percentage of interest prescribed by the Court Rules. An insurer can avoid the payment of interest only where it "has reasonable proof to establish that the insurer is not responsible for the payment..." The allowance of interest is not, as defendant argues, dependent upon the presence or absence of good faith on the part of the insurer. Ortiz at 508-509 The court also affirmed the awarding of the counsel fee.
8. Statute of Limitations Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13.1 an action for payment of benefits must be commenced not later than 2 years after the expense, or when in the exercise of the reasonable diligence insured the should know the loss was caused by the accident, or not later than 4 years after the accident, whichever is earlier; provided, if benefits have been paid before then an action for further benefits may be commenced not later than 2 years after the last payment of benefits. In Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co., 98 N.J. 30 (1984), the Supreme Court adopted the principal that when an automobile liability insurance carrier has made payments of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits in connection with a compensable injury and is chargeable with knowledge at the time of its last payment that the injury will probably require additional treatment in the future, then the "two years after payment" provision of N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13.1 will not bar an action brought within a reasonable time after rejection of a prompt claim for payment of additional medical expenses for such treatment. Id. at 31 32. Our New Jersey Supreme Court has often rejected a limitations defense where the defendant has contributed to the delay. Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982)
CONCLUSION In conclusion, If the claimant is successful, case law, the statute and the AAA rules make counsel fees and interest available. Action must be taken to help the injured party have their medical bills paid prior to the expiration of any statute of limitation.
39:4-55. Action on steep grades and curves
39:4-55. Action on steep grades and curves
39:4-55. Action on steep grades and curves The driver of a motor vehicle traversing a steep grade or mountain highway shall hold the vehicle under control and as near the right-hand side of the highway as reasonably possible, and when traveling upon a down grade upon a highway, shall not coast with the gears of the vehicle in neutral. When approaching a curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of two hundred feet along the highway, he shall give audible warning with a horn or other warning device.
For information on points, fines, jail and suspension for this violation, go to http://www.njlaws.com/traffic_minimum_penalties.htm
Protect your Rights.
Before you pled guilty and face potentially thousands of dollars in fees and surcharges, schedule an in office appointment with our attorneys experienced in handling these matters. Contact the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C. For Legal Representation 732-572-0500
39:4-55. Action on steep grades and curves The driver of a motor vehicle traversing a steep grade or mountain highway shall hold the vehicle under control and as near the right-hand side of the highway as reasonably possible, and when traveling upon a down grade upon a highway, shall not coast with the gears of the vehicle in neutral. When approaching a curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of two hundred feet along the highway, he shall give audible warning with a horn or other warning device.
For information on points, fines, jail and suspension for this violation, go to http://www.njlaws.com/traffic_minimum_penalties.htm
Protect your Rights.
Before you pled guilty and face potentially thousands of dollars in fees and surcharges, schedule an in office appointment with our attorneys experienced in handling these matters. Contact the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C. For Legal Representation 732-572-0500
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