Documents Helpful at Probate Appointment with Attorney-New articles, ABA newsletters and Community events

Documents Helpful at Probate Appointment with Attorney

Items that the executor of a Will may bring for the initial meeting with the attorney: 1. Original Death Certificates; 2. Original Wills and Codicils; 3. Completed Probate/Estate Administration interview sheet; 4. Any Trusts established by the decedent; 5. All bank books, certificates of deposit, check books, money markets, and the most recent back statements for any accounts that listed the decedent's name, including IRA or other qualified accounts; 6. Copies of all of the decedent's brokerage accounts, treasury direct accounts, book entry accounts, dividend reinvestment accounts and annuities that list the decedent's name including IRA or other qualified accounts; 7. Original certificates of stock or original bonds that list the decedent's name; 8. Information and documentation regarding all Life Insurance Policies owned by or insuring the life of the decedent; 9. A copy of any health insurance policy of the decedent; 10. Copies of any bills in the decedent's name or the estate's name for expenses and debts owed by the decedent or the estate including the last illness, funeral, repast, burial, monuments, etc. These bills should continue to be provided by the client as received; 11. A copy or list of any expenses paid by the client or any other individuals on behalf of the decedent or estate in connection with the decedent's funeral or last illness including telephone bills, stamps for cards, luncheons, travel expenses, etc.; 12. A copy of all credit cards in the decedent's name along with the most recent statement for each; 13. A copy of the title, registration, automobile insurance and any lease information for any vehicle owned by the decedent; 14. A copy of the homeowner's insurance policy for the decedent's Real Estate; 15. A copy of the Deed and Tax bill for any real property in the decedent's name; 16. A copy of any leases or contracts that the deceased was a party to at the time of his or her death; 17. The location of any Safe Deposit Box that includes the decedent's name along with an inventory of its contents; 18. A copy of the decedent's last Federal Income Tax Returns; 19. A copy of any Notes or Mortgages that include the decedent's name; 20. Any information concerning the decedent's pension or benefits from employment; and 22. An inventory of all the decedent's personal property.

Docketing of a Judgment in New Jersey Courts Based on Another States Judgment-New articles, ABA newsletters and Community events

Docketing of a Judgment in New Jersey Courts Based on Another States Judgment

New Jersey's version of the UEFJA is this state's selected mechanism "for discharging its Full Faith and Credit obligations" under U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Singh v. Sidana, 387 N.J. Super. 380, 382 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 189 N.J. 428 (2007). As we held in Sonntag Reporting Serv. Ltd. v. Ciccarelli, 374 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div. 2005), "[t]he focus of the UEFJ is the enforcement of judgments." The statute was designed "merely as a facilitating device and was not intended to alter any substantive rights of the parties in an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment." Id. at 539. Therefore, "merit or substantive defenses," which could have been raised in the foreign state, must be raised in that state's proceedings and cannot be used to collaterally attack the domesticated New Jersey judgment. Id. at 540. However, the Constitutional requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause are predicated upon the judgment debtor having been accorded due process in the forum state. Id. at 538. A denial of due process occurs "when 'the rendering state 1) lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, 2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction, [or] 3) failed to provide the judgment debtor adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.'" Ibid. (quoting Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1995)). Thus, the judgment debtor may raise "due process defenses" in any enforcement action in New Jersey under the UEFJA. Sonntag, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 540. This is consistent with our jurisprudence that pre-dates the 1997 passage of the UEFJA. See James v. Francesco, 61 N.J. 480, 485 (1972) (Full Faith and Credit Clause only applies to foreign judgment grounded upon proper jurisdiction over the debtor). N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-26 defines a "foreign judgment" as "any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this State." (Emphasis added). Defendant argues since Maine's judgments were obtained without the required personal jurisdiction over SeKap, they are not entitled to full faith and credit in New Jersey, and, hence, are not foreign judgments for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(a) or (b). We reject this circular argument. No reported New Jersey case has considered the stay provisions contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29. However, a number of other jurisdictions have considered the equivalent statutory language found in their versions of the UEFJA in circumstances similar to those presented here. Almost uniformly, these other jurisdictions have required the judgment debtor to post adequate security in order to stay execution of any judgment domesticated in those states. In Jackson v. Alexander, 706 So.2d 364, 365 (Fla. App. 1998), the Florida appellate court interpreted that state's version of the UEFJA which specifically provided for a stay of enforcement of a domesticated foreign judgment in two circumstances: (1) If, within 30 days after the date the foreign judgment is recorded, the judgment debtor files an action contesting the jurisdiction of the court which entered the foreign judgment or the validity of the foreign judgment and records a lis pendens directed toward the foreign judgment, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment and the judgment lien upon the filing of the action by the judgment debtor. (2) If the judgment debtor shows . . . any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any . . . court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state. [Fla. Stat. § 55.509(1) and (2).] Thus, under subsection (1), the judgment debtor could specifically attack the forum state's lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, despite the omission of any security requirement in subsection (1), the Florida court, reading the statute in pari materia, concluded the debtor was required to post a bond before the action challenging jurisdiction and staying execution could proceed. Ibid.; accord Expedia Inc. v. McKenney's Inc., 611 So.2d 98, 100 (Fla. App. 1992) (interplay of two subsections of Fla. Stat. §55.509 requires posting of security before stay of alleged invalid foreign judgment); SCG Travel v. Westminster Financial, 583 So.2d 723, 726 (Fla. App.), app. dismissed, 591 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1991). In Segal v. Segal, 823 A.2d 1208 (Conn. 2003), the debtor sought a stay of enforcement of a domesticated Nevada judgment pending final decision of his appeal in Nevada. Id. at 1209. He argued that a judgment under appeal was not a judgment entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution and, thus, not a "foreign judgment" under the UEFJA. Id. at 1213-14. The lower court agreed, and determined that the Nevada judgment was not enforceable as a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit until the appeal was decided. Id. at 1210. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected this argument and concluded that without posting adequate security, the debtor was not entitled to stay enforcement of the domesticated judgment. It reasoned that any other interpretation of the statute would nullify the express provisions of the UEFJA which required the posting of adequate security pending direct appeal. Id. at 1214. In Ex Parte Lyon Financial Servs., Inc., 775 So.2d 181 (Ala. 2000), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's stay of enforcement of a Minnesota judgment against an Alabama debtor. Id. at 182. The debtor sought the stay based upon a third-party claim, initially brought in Minnesota, but dismissed by that court. Ibid. The debtor argued that it should be allowed to continue its litigation against the third-party in Alabama, and that all enforcement actions based upon the domesticated Minnesota judgment should be stayed pending the resolution of its suit. Ibid. Interpreting Alabama's version of N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(b), the court concluded that the debtor was not entitled to the stay because 1) the third-party claim would not properly result in a stay under Alabama law and 2) the debtor had not posted the required security. Id. at 184. Accord Hinkle, Cox, Eaton, Coffield & Hensley v. The Cadle Co., 676 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (Ohio App.) (holding debtor must post security to obtain a stay under Ohio's equivalent of N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(b)), discretionary appeal not allowed, 673 N.E.2d 143 (Ohio 1996). In Dependable Ins. Co. v. Automobile Warranty Corp., 797 P.2d 1308 (Colo. App. 1990), the court interpreted Colorado's stay provisions which are identical to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29. Id. at 1309-10. In that case, defendant debtor filed a direct appeal of the Florida judgment in Florida and then sought a stay of execution on its assets in Colorado based upon the domesticated Colorado judgment. Id. at 1309. Noting the "important purpose of a supersedeas bond" is "to protect the non-appealing party's rights during an appeal," the court concluded that despite the pending direct appeal in Florida, the debtor was required to post a bond to secure a stay of execution in Colorado. Id. at 1310. Otherwise, the statute's "purpose would be negated." Ibid. It then considered the debtor's second argument under Colorado's equivalent to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(b). Ibid. The court concluded that since Colorado law required the posting of security to obtain a stay, defendant's failure to post security required denial of the stay. Ibid. But see Pickwick Intern. v. Tomato Music Co., Ltd., 462 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1983) (holding under New York's equivalent of N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(b), court may, in its discretion, stay execution without posting of security because New York law permitted a stay under such circumstances). SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4284-05T24284-05T2 STATE OF MAINE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SEKAP, S.A. GREEK COOPERATIVE CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, S.A., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________ Argued January 24, 2007 - Decided April 17, 2007 Before Judges Wefing, Parker and Messano. In this appeal, we are required to interpret provisions of New Jersey's version of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (the UEFJA), N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-25 to -33, and in particular, N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29 which sets forth the procedure to stay execution of a foreign judgment domesticated in New Jersey. Defendant, SeKap, S.A. Greek Cooperative Cigarette Manufacturing Company, S.A. (SeKap), appeals the motion judge's orders vacating a stay of execution previously entered in its favor, and denying its cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm the judge's decision, but remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. I. In August, 2002, the state of Maine filed suit in Maine seeking to compel SeKap to deposit $312,945.38 into an escrow account. SeKap did not join in the 1998 national Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) wherein a number of states settled litigation against numerous cigarette manufacturers. After the settlement was reached, several states, including Maine, adopted model legislation which compelled non-settling cigarette manufacturers to establish escrow accounts in those various states and deposit monies in the accounts based upon the volume of cigarette sales in that particular state. These escrow accounts were designed to offset any competitive advantages non-settling manufacturers might otherwise gain by not participating in the MSA, and the monies in the escrow accounts were to be used to satisfy any judgments or settlements each state might obtain against the non-settling manufacturers. Maine's version of the model escrow statue is codified at 22 M.R.S.A. § 1580-I. Those manufacturers that do not establish and fund the mandatory escrow accounts are subject to monetary penalties pursuant to the statute. Maine's complaint alleged that SeKap had not established or funded the required escrow account for its cigarette sales in Maine under the brand names, "Marathon" or "GR," during 2001. The complaint sought judgment requiring SeKap to post the required amount, as well as a statutory penalty in the amount of $938,836.14. Maine alleged it had personal jurisdiction over SeKap because the company "transact[ed] business within . . . Maine by supplying tobacco products, either directly or through a distributor . . . within . . . Maine, to consumers within. . . Maine." Maine served its complaint through the Hague Convention and SeKap does not challenge the sufficiency of service. When SeKap failed to answer or appear, Maine successfully moved for default. In September, 2003, the Maine court entered judgment against SeKap for $1,251,781.50 and enjoined the sales of its cigarettes in Maine. This procedure was repeated with the filing of a second complaint in Maine in July, 2003 seeking additional monies and penalties for SeKap's alleged 2002 tobacco sales. Once again, SeKap failed to appear, and a second judgment was entered against it in December, 2004, in the amount of $1,128,646.50 along with similar injunctive relief. Utilizing the procedure set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-27 and -28, Maine applied to the Superior Court in New Jersey and docketed the two foreign judgments in March, 2005. In April, the New Jersey court entered writs of execution for both judgments which were served upon Wachovia Bank in Morristown. In May, SeKap moved via an order to show cause to temporarily restrain any execution on the account, to vacate the writs of execution and to vacate the docketed judgments, alleging Maine lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The motion judge granted the order to show cause, entered temporary restraints and set the matter down for a further hearing. After a hearing held on July 1, 2005, a second motion judge denied Maine's request to dissolve the temporary restraints, and entered an order that provided Defendant shall have sixty days in which to seek relief from judgment in Maine pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(a) and (b). Upon proof of compliance with section (a) and the posting of security to satisfy the judgment, enforcement shall be stayed. Otherwise, enforcement shall take effect on September 6, 2005. Thereafter, plaintiff may move before the court to dissolve the restraints. Sekap did not file an appeal in Maine, nor post security, within the sixty day period. In December, Maine moved to dissolve the restraints; SeKap cross-moved for summary judgment seeking to vacate the writs of execution and the docketed New Jersey judgments. In support of its cross-motion, SeKap argued that it need not post any security in order to stay execution of the writs and challenge the New Jersey judgment because the Maine judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. It supplied the certification of its Director, Yiannis Bitos, that contained the following facts: SeKap was organized as a Greek co-operative under Greek law; it has no offices, branches, employees or agents in any state in the United States; it does not maintain an agent for service of process in the United States; it owns no property in, has no assets in, and has never contracted with anyone in Maine; no officer, agent or director of SeKap has physically been present in Maine; and, SeKap has never solicited or advertised its products in Maine. The certification explained that SeKap contracted with a Cypriot corporation, Denova, Serives, Ltd. (Denova), for the distribution of tobacco products in North America. SeKap has no control or ownership interests in Denova, nor does it control the marketing, pricing or sales of its products in the United States. Lastly, Bitos certified that SeKap did not "dictate, require or request that [its] product be sold in Maine." On February 6, 2006, a third judge heard the motion and cross-motion. He noted that SeKap had not complied with the prior order of the court since it had not filed an appeal in Maine challenging jurisdiction. He further found that defendant had not complied with N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(a) or (b) which "sets forth the applicable procedures for appealing the enforcement of domesticated judgments." He dissolved the restraints. Turning to SeKap's cross-motion, he concluded [T]here has been no showing that the defendant ever sought any relief from the judgment in the State of Maine and, basically, I'm denying the cross-motion because defendant counsel failed to provide the Court with any evidence that Maine lacked jurisdiction over the defendant. That's an issue that they should be taking up in the court in Maine, not here. (Emphasis added.) The cross-motion was denied. Sekap moved for reconsideration. In part, defense counsel requested the court to reconsider the Bitos certification which was apparently unsigned when it accompanied the original motion papers. He advised the court that a signed, notarized certification had indeed been faxed to the court prior to the original motion being heard. Once again the motion judge concluded that SeKap had not "pa[id] the judgment, or deposit[ed] the security to stay the judgment pending resolution of the jurisdictional issue in the State of Maine." He found no basis for reconsideration and denied Sekap's motion. This appeal ensued. II. We begin by By asserting Maine lacked personal jurisdiction over the company, SeKap raised a "due process defense." It contends that until New Jersey courts decide the jurisdictional question, it is entitled to a stay of execution on any New Jersey assets if the writ of execution is based upon the challenged judgment. On this point, we disagree. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29, entitled "Appeal, stay of execution, enforcement," provides a. If the judgment debtor shows the Superior Court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished security for the satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered. b. If the judgment debtor shows the Superior Court any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of the Superior Court would be stayed, the Superior Court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this State. SeKap argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29 only applies to valid foreign judgments -- judgments predicated upon proper due process guarantees -- and not to domesticated foreign judgments founded upon an improper extension of personal jurisdiction in the forum state. It contends that the UEFJA's definition of the term "foreign judgment" supports this interpretation. SeKap has not brought to our attention any authority to the contrary. Our Legislature specifically provided that the UEFJA "shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-33. We have looked to the decisional law of sister states in interpreting other provisions of the UEFJA. Sonntag, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 540-41. Moreover, in other circumstances where the Legislature has spoken so clearly, we have held that sister-state's interpretations of uniform legislation are "persuasive authority." New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection v. Pace, 374 N.J. Super. 57, 64 (App. Div. 2005), (noting out-of-state decisions are persuasive given requirement that the UCC be construed uniformly), aff'd 186 N.J. 123 (2006). Returning to the issue presented in this case, SeKap failed to demonstrate "an appeal from the foreign judgment [was] pending or [would] be taken, or that a stay of execution [had] been granted" in Maine. Thus, separate and apart from the posting of any security, SeKap was not entitled to a stay of execution of Maine's domesticated judgments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(a). Additionally, SeKap was not entitled to a stay of execution pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(b). Although it may have "show[n] the Superior Court a[] ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of the Superior Court would be stayed" - Maine's lack of personal jurisdiction - it failed to post "the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this State." Although not specifically advanced as one of defendant's contentions, we note that N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-27 provides that a properly domesticated foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a Superior Court of this State and may be enforced in the same manner. Thus, a judgment debtor might argue that the obligation to post security required by N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(b) is "subject to the same procedures . . . and proceedings for . . . staying [] a judgment" in New Jersey. We recognize that SeKap's challenge to Maine's jurisdiction must be initially brought in the Law Division. As we noted in Sonntag,Trial courts of sister states may inquire into defenses of lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court or fraud in procurement of the judgment, provided that those issues have not been litigated in the forum court. [Sonntag, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 538.] Therefore, our standard governing the granting of a stay of enforcement of a money judgment on appeal is not applicable. See R. 2:9-5(a) (while the court may exercise its discretion to consider each request on its facts, absent a showing of good cause, the posting of a bond or cash is required); Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 2:9-5(a) (2007). R. 4:50-1 allows for the granting of relief from a judgment or order "upon such terms as are just." In the context of an application to vacate a default judgment, the court's discretion must be liberally exercised. Housing Authority of the Town of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283-84 (1994). We have held that absent "extraordinary circumstances," a court should not condition the vacation of a default judgment upon the debtor's posting of a bond. Regional Const. Corp. v. Ray, 364 N.J. Super. 534, 544 (App. Div. 2003). Rather, a "less burdensome alternative" -- permitting the judgment to remain in place while execution is stayed -- should be employed. Ibid. We have once before, however, limited the scope of R. 4:50-1 in the context of its application to the UEFJA. In Sonntag, we concluded that despite the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-27, relief under the rule was limited to New Jersey judgments. Sonntag, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 539; Pressler, supra, comment 1 on R. 4:50-1 (2007). Since "the UEFJA . . . was not intended to alter any substantive rights of the parties," we construed N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-27 and R. 4:50-1(f) to permit a collateral challenge in New Jersey to a domesticated foreign judgment only on due process grounds. Sonntag, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 539. Such a narrow construction was necessary to harmonize the UEFJA with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. at 539-40. We now hold that in order to stay execution of a foreign judgment pursuant to the UEFJA, a judgment debtor must strictly comply with the statute's provisions and post "security for satisfaction of the judgment" before a stay is issued. Any other interpretation would lead to the anomalous result that a judgment debtor would be required to post security or obtain a stay from the rendering state while directly appealing the judgment in that state, N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(a), but not be required to post security to obtain a stay while it raised an identical due process defense in New Jersey. Such a result would give the debtor "more rights here . . . than the rendering state gives him there." SCG Travel, supra, 583 So.2d 726. We are satisfied that the Legislature never intended such a result since it would fail to "effectuate [the UEFJA's] general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-33. Furthermore, construing N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-27 and 29(b) in this manner assures "the constitutional right of a judgment creditor to enforcement of the judgment in a sister state . . . is not curtailed." Sonntag, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 539. III. Although we conclude that SeKap was not entitled to stay the enforcement of Maine's judgments because it failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29(a) or (b), we nonetheless remand the question of whether the judgments are void for lack of personal jurisdiction to the trial court. In this regard, the motion judge did not consider the Bitos certification at the first hearing. On the motion for reconsideration, he may have considered the certification, but he mistakenly applied the wrong standard to this aspect of SeKap's cross-motion for summary judgment. He concluded that SeKap could not raise the jurisdictional argument until it "pa[id] the judgment, or deposit[ed] the security to stay the judgment pending resolution of the jurisdictional issue in the State of Maine." As noted above, consistent with Constitutional mandates and the UEFJA, the judgment debtor may challenge jurisdiction collaterally in New Jersey by raising a due process defense. Sonntag, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 540. The motion judge mistakenly applied the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29 to deny all the relief sought by SeKap, including the underlying challenge it made to the validity of the foreign judgments. The UEFJA requires neither the direct appeal of the default judgments in Maine, nor the posting of adequate security in New Jersey, before Sekap may assert a due process challenge to the domesticated judgments. By its express terms, the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29 only apply to the debtor's request of a stay of execution. Therefore, on remand, the judge must decide SeKap's jurisdictional challenge to Maine's judgments and determine whether Maine possessed adequate personal jurisdiction over SeKap. A remand is required because we cannot resolve the issue on the current record. In opposing the jurisdictional argument made in SeKap's cross-motion for summary judgment, and its motion for reconsideration, Maine provided little by way of factual proofs that demonstrated its basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over the company. Attached to counsel's certification were two unreported decisions, one from a court in Maine, and one from a court in Ohio, neither of which involved SeKap as a party. Counsel also submitted a copy of a contract between SeKap and ITW Manufacturing, dated December 14, 2000, in which SeKap agreed to manufacture "Marathon" brand cigarettes "for the United States market." "When a defendant asserts lack of personal jurisdiction, 'the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant's contacts with the forum state are sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the court.'" Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, 309 N.J. Super. 443, 454 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Giangola v. Walt Disney World Co., 753 F. Supp. 148, 154 (D.N.J. 1990). As we noted in Jacobs, "In the early stages of a proceeding 'where the factual record consists of only pleadings and affidavits, plaintiff's burden is satisfied by establishing a prima facie case of jurisdiction.'" Jacobs, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 454 (quoting Cresswell v. Walt Disney Prod., 677 F. Supp. 284, 286 (M.D.Pa. 1987)). While determination of the issue may be made upon affidavits, our Court Rules specifically allow for oral testimony, depositions and cross-examination when affidavits do not suffice. R. 1:6-6; see also Jacobs, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 454. In short, further discovery is permitted and may be necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Id. at 462; see also Makopoulos v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 221 N.J. Super. 513, 518 (App. Div. 1987) (remand for further discovery required to determine whether solicitation provided basis for personal jurisdiction), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 661 (1989). Maine authority recognizes that an evidentiary hearing may be necessary when "written submissions raise disputed issues of fact" as to personal jurisdiction. Dorf v. Complastik, Corp., 735 A.2d 984, 989 (Me. 1999). Discovery may be particularly useful when the relationship between a party and an affiliate must be explored. Jacobs, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 456. Here, the relationship between SeKap and Denova might properly be the subject of "[a]dditional discovery [that] may establish by competent evidence the mechanics of the arrangement." Id. at 457. Likewise, SeKap should be entitled to challenge Maine's conclusory statements that SeKap "transacted business in the State of Maine" because it contracted to manufacture cigarettes "for the United States market." IV. In summary, we hold that the motion judge properly concluded that SeKap was not entitled to any stay of execution because it failed to post the security required by N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-29. We also conclude that on the record presented, SeKap's cross-motion for summary judgment was properly denied. We hold that the assertion of a "due process defense" to the domesticated judgment may be properly raised without the posting of any security and we remand the matter to the motion judge to consider SeKap's jurisdictional challenge. In remanding the matter to the trial court, we do not imply any particular resolution of the jurisdictional issue. We only hold that the current record makes resolution of the issue impossible. The parties shall advise the motion judge whether they wish to engage in jurisdictional discovery, or otherwise supplement the record on the issue. We leave to the sound discretion of the judge control over the nature and scope of any discovery requested. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

DMV Surcharge Not Subject to Discharge; in Re Schick 418 F. 3d. 321 (3rd Cir. 2005)-New articles, ABA newsletters and Community events

DMV Surcharge Not Subject to Discharge; in Re Schick 418 F. 3d. 321 (3rd Cir. 2005)

The circuit panel considers whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a lien held by the N.J. Motor Vehicles Commission for unpaid motor vehicle surcharges and interest constitutes a judicial lien -- which may be avoided by the debtor to the extent that it impairs her entitlement to a homestead exemption -- or a statutory lien, which may not be avoided. Noting the split among the district courts on this issue, the panel holds that the lien is statutory, and affirms the decision of the District Court in this case.

DMV and Points-New articles, ABA newsletters and Community events

DMV and Points

Traffic Fines, Points, Jail. 39:4-49.1 Operation of a motor vehicle while in possession of controlled dangerous substance- Fine and 2 years suspension of driver's license $50 Plus MVC/DMV restoration fee; plus additional car insurance eligibility points. 39:4-50 Operating under the influence- DWI (See chart at kennethvercammen.com) Plus MVC/DMV points; plus additional car insurance eligibility points. 39:4-50.2 Refusal to undergo breathalyzer test- (See chart at kennethvercammen.com) 39:4-50.14 Operation of motor vehicle by person whose blood alcohol is between .01% and .10% and is under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages- Loss of license for not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days and perform community service for not less than 15 days nor more than 30 days. In addition, must satisfy program and fee requirements of the IDRC or participate in a program of alcohol education and highway safety. Penalties shall be in addition to the penalties which the court may impose under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15, N.J.S.A. 33:1-81, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, or any other law. See DWI fines and penalties at kennethvercammen.com. 39:4-51a Consumption of alcoholic beverage by operator or passenger- First offense: $200 Second or subsequent offense: Fine $250 or 10 days community service 39:4-51b Possession of open container of alcohol in passenger compartment- First offense: $200 Subsequent offense: Fine $250 or 10 days community service 39 :4-52 Racing on highway- First offense $25-$100 5 MVC/DMV points, 5 car insurance points 39:4-66.2 Operation of motor vehicle on public or private property to avoid traffic signal- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and violation stays on MVC/DMV abstract forever and 2 additional car insurance points and increase in car insurance, usually for three years. 39:4-81 Failure to obey traffic control device- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points, usually for three years. 39:4-82 Failure to keep right- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points, usually for three years. 39:4-82.1 Failure to drive on right-hand roadway- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points, usually for three years. 39:4-83 Failure to keep to right at intersection- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points, usually for three years. 39:4-84 Failure to pass to right when proceeding in opposite direction- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 5 MVC/DMV points and 5 additional car insurance points. Also, Judge/Magistrate can suspend driver's license. 39:4-85 Failure to pass to left when overtaking- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 4 MVC/DMV points and 4 additional car insurance points. Also, Judge/Magistrate an suspend Driver's license. 39:4-85.1 Wrong way on one-way street- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points, usually for three years. 39:4-86 Failure to overtake and pass properly- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 4 MVC/DMV points and 4 additional car insurance points. 39:4-87 Failure to give overtaking vehicle right of way- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-88 Failure to drive properly in marked lanes- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-89 Following vehicle too closely- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 5 MVC/DMV points and 5 additional car insurance points. Also, Judge/Magistrate can suspend driver's license. 39:4-90 Failure to yield right of way at intersection- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-90.1 Entering or leaving limited access highways improperly- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-91 Failure to yield right of way to emergency vehicles- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-92 Failure to pull over for emergency vehicles and following an emergency vehicle too closely- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 39:4-96 Reckless driving- First offense: Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or both $50-$200 Second or subsequent offense: Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months, or both $100-$500 5 MVC/DMV points and 5 additional car insurance points. Also, Judge/Magistrate can suspend driver's license. 39:4-97 Careless driving- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-97a Motor vehicle operation causing property damage- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-97.1 Slow speed as to block traffic- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-97.2 Operating a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner, endangering persons or property First offense; $250 surcharge (for offenses occuring on or after July 1, 2004) $50 $150 Second offense; $250 surcharge (for offense occuring on or after July 1, 2004) $100 $250 Third or subsequent offense; $250 surcharge (for offenses occuring on or after July 1, 2004) $200 $500 39:4-98 Speeding- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200, double fine on certain highways 1-14 mph over limit: 2 points, 15-29 mph over limit: 4 points, 30 or more mph over limit: 5 points Judge/Magistrate can suspend driver's license for speeding. Also, in 65 mph zone, fines are doubled 39:4-115 Failure to make proper turn- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 3 MVC/DMV points and 3 additional car insurance points. 39:4-119 Failure to observe flashing traffic signals- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-122 Failure to obey whistle of police officer- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-123 Failure to make proper turn- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 3 MVC/DMV points and 3 additional car insurance points. 39:4-124 Failure to turn as indicated by buttons or markers at intersection- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 3 MVC/DMV points and 3 additional car insurance points. 39:4-125 U-Turn on curve or grade where view obstructed or No-U-Turn sign- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 3 MVC/DMV points and 3 additional car insurance points. 39:4-126 Failure to signal before starting, turning or stopping- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 3 additional car insurance points. 39:4-127 Backing or turning in street- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-127.1 Failure to stop at railroad crossings- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points. 39:4-127.2 Failure to stop at approaches to movable span bridges- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 additional car insurance points 39:4-128.1 Passing school bus while picking up or discharging- First offense: Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days or 15 days community service, or both $100. Community service may be collecting trash cans or working at recycling center or landfill. Subsequent offense: Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $250 none 5 MVC/DMV points and 5 additional car insurance points. 39:4-129(a) Leaving the scene of accident involving injury or death- First offense: Fine or 180 days imprisonment, or both, and suspension of driving privileges for 1 year from date of conviction $2500-$5000 Imprisonment shall be imposed only if injury to another person. 8 points. Subsequent offense: Fine or 180 days imprisonment from date of conviction, or both, and permanent forfeiture of driver's license $1000-$2000 Imprisonment shall be imposed only if injury to another person. 39:4-129(b) Leaving the scene of accident involving damages to attended vehicle or property- First offense: Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, or both, and suspension of driving privileges for six months from date of conviction $200-$400. Subsequent offense: Fine or imprisonment not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days, or both, and suspension of driving privileges for 1 year from date of conviction $400-$600 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 car insurance points. 39:4-129(d) Leaving the scene of accident involving damages to unattended vehicle or property- First offense: Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, or both, and suspension of driving privileges for six months from date of conviction. $200 $400 Subsequent offense: Fine or imprisonment not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days, or both, and suspension of driving privileges for 1 year from date of conviction. $400-$600 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 car insurance points 39:4-130 Failure to report accident- $30-$100 39:4-144 Failure to obey Stop or Yield Right of Way signs- Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both $50-$200 2 MVC/DMV points and 2 car insurance points 39:6B-2 Failure to carry motor vehicle insurance coverage- First offense: Fine and a period of community service as determined by the court, and suspension of driving privileges for 1 year $300-$1000 Community service can be working at recycling or landfill. Subsequent offense: Fine and shall be subject to 14 days imprisonment, and 30 days community service and suspension of driving privileges for 2 years from date of conviction $5000 Community service can be working at recycling or landfill. .NJ.A.C. 13:19-10.2 Point Accumulation; period of suspension (a) The Director shall, except for good cause, suspend a person's license to operate a motor vehicle and/or motorized bicycle in accordance with the following schedule: POINTS ACCUMULATED PERIOD OF SUSPENSION 12 to 15 points in a period of two years or less; 30 days 16 to 18 points in a period of two years or less; 60 days 19 to 21 points in a period of two years or less; 90 days 22 to 24 points in a period of two years or less; 120 days 25 to 27 points in a period of two years or less; 150 days 28 or more points in a period of two years or less; not less than 180 days 15 to 18 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days 19 to 22 points in a period greater than two years; 60 days 23 to 26 points in a period greater than two years; 90 days 27 to 30 points in a period greater than two years; 120 days 31 to 35 points in a period greater than two years; 150 days 36 or more points in a period greater than two years; not less than 180 days 12 to 14 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days (b) For good cause shown, the Director may in his discretion permit a person to attend a driver improvement course of the Division of Motor Vehicles in total or partial satisfaction of a period of suspension imposed under (a) above. In exercising his discretion, the Director shall consider the person's driving record prior warnings or driver improvement school attendance maturity and any other aggravating or mitigating factor.

Divorce, alimony and Child Support in New Jersey-New articles, ABA newsletters and Community events

Divorce, alimony and Child Support in New Jersey

The following is a portion of the NJ Court Rules which apply to all Divorce, alimony and child support cases RULE 5:7. DIVORCE, NULLITY, SEPARATE MAINTENANCE (Child Support and Alimony) 5:7-1. Venue Except as otherwise provided by law, venue in actions for divorce, nullity and separate maintenance shall be laid in the county in which plaintiff was domiciled when the cause of action arose, or if plaintiff was not then domiciled in this State, then in the county in which defendant was domiciled when the cause of action arose; or if neither party was domiciled in this State when the cause of action arose, then in the county in which the plaintiff is domiciled when the action is commenced, or if plaintiff is not domiciled in this State, then in the county where defendant is domiciled when service of process is made. For purposes of this rule, in actions brought under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(c), the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen three months after the last act of cruelty complained of in the Complaint. 5:7-2. Application Pendente Lite (a) Support Pendente Lite. Applications for support, counsel fees and costs pendente lite, whether made with the complaint or by notice of motion thereafter, shall be accompanied by a completed case information statement in the form set forth in Appendix V to these rules pursuant to R. 5:5-2. If this form has previously been submitted, amendments thereto must be filed with the court no later than eight days prior to the motion hearing date. A completed case information statement shall accompany the response to the application pendente lite. If previously submitted, amendments thereto must be filed with the court no later than eight days prior to the hearing date. (b) Restraints; Contempt. If pendente lite relief is sought, by way of preliminary restraint or to hold a party in contempt, the application shall be on petition and order to show cause. 5:7-3. Corroboration All elements of a claim for divorce or nullity may be proved without corroboration. 5:7-4. Alimony and Child Support Payments (a) Allocation of Support. In awarding alimony, maintenance or child support, the court shall separate the amounts awarded for alimony or maintenance and the amounts awarded for child support, unless for good cause shown the court determines that the amounts should be unallocated. In awarding child support, payments for health care, child care and other expenses necessary to maintain the child or children shall be designated as part of the child support award unless good cause is shown why such amounts should be separated. (b) Payments Through the Probation Division. The judgment or order shall provide that payments be made to the New Jersey Family Support Payment Center. When an obligor's county of residence changes, the transfer of the responsibility for the collection and enforcement of such judgment or order shall be governed by the policies established by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Alimony, maintenance or child support payments not presently made through the Probation Division shall be so made upon application of either party to the Probation Division unless the other party, upon application to the court, shows good cause to the contrary. In non-dissolution support proceedings, the court shall record its decision using the Uniform Order for Summary Support shown in Appendix XVI of these Rules. Upon the signing of any order that includes support or health insurance provisions to be administered by the Probation Division, the court shall, immediately after the hearing, send to the appropriate Probation Division one copy of the order which shall include statements prepared by the parties or their attorneys providing the names, dates of birth, Social Security Numbers, and mailing addresses of the parents and the children; the occupation and driver's license number of the parent who is ordered to pay support; the policy number and name of the health insurance provider of the parent who is ordered to insure the children; and, if income withholding is ordered, the name and address of the obligor's employer. When a party or attorney must prepare a formal written judgment or order pursuant to a judicial decision that includes support or health insurance provisions to be administered by the Probation Division, the court shall, on the date of the hearing, record the support and health insurance provisions on a Temporary Support Order using the form prescribed in Appendix XVII of these Rules and shall immediately have such order delivered to the Probation Division so that a support account can be established on the Automated Child Support Enforcement System (ACSES). The Probation Division shall establish a support account on ACSES within eight business days of the date the court order was signed. Demographic information provided on the Temporary Support Order shall be limited to that which is required to establish an ACSES account and send case initiation documents to the parties and the obligor's employer. In addition to the information provided to the court with the final order or judgment as required by this paragraph, the parties and their attorneys shall provide additional family and benefit information at the request of the Probation Division. The Temporary Support Order shall remain in effect until a copy of the final judgment or order is received by the Probation Division. After a judgment or order is entered and the Probation Division has established an ACSES support account, the obligor shall notify the appropriate Probation Division of any change of employer, health insurance provider or address and the obligee shall notify the Probation Division of a change of address or a change in the status of the children as may be required in the order or judgment within 10 days of the change, and any judgment or order that includes alimony or support shall so provide. Failure to provide information as to change of employer, health insurance provider or address shall be considered a violation of the order. Judgments or orders amending the amounts to be paid through the Probation Division shall be treated in the same manner. (c) Income Withholding. All complaints, notices, pleadings, orders and judgments which include child support filed or entered on or after October 1, 1990 shall comply with the income withholding provisions of Rule 5:7-5. (d) Notices Applicable to All Orders and Judgments That Include Child Support Provisions. The judgment or order shall include notices stating: (1) that, if support is not paid through immediate income withholding, the child support provisions of an order or judgment are subject to income withholding when a child support arrearage has accrued in an amount equal to or in excess of the amount of support payable for 14 days. The withholding is effective against the obligor's current and future income from all sources authorized by law; (2) that any payment or installment of an order for child support or those portions of an order which are allocated for child support shall be fully enforceable and entitled to full faith and credit and shall be a judgment by operation of law on or after the date it is due; (3) that no payment or installment of an order for child support or those portions of an order that are allocated for child support shall be retroactively modified by the court except for the period during which the party seeking relief has pending an application for modification as provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a; (4) that the occupational, recreational, and professional licenses, including a license to practice law, held or applied for by the obligor may be denied, suspended or revoked if: 1) a child support arrearage accumulates that is equal to or exceeds the amount of child support payable for six months, or 2) the obligor fails to provide health care coverage for the child as ordered by the court within six months, or 3) a warrant for the obligor's arrest has been issued by the court for obligor's failure to pay child support as ordered, or for obligor's failure to appear at a hearing to establish paternity or child support, or for obligor's failure to appear at a child support hearing to enforce a child support order and said warrant remains outstanding; (5) that the driver's license held or applied for by the obligor may be denied, suspended, or revoked if 1) a child support arrearage accumulates that is equal to or exceeds the amount of child support payable for six months, or 2) the obligor fails to provide health care coverage for the child as ordered by the court within six months; and (6) that the driver's license held or applied for by the obligor shall be denied, suspended, or revoked if the court issues a warrant for the obligor's arrest for failure to pay child support as ordered, or for failure to appear at a hearing to establish paternity or child support, or for failure to appear at a child support hearing to enforce a child support order and said warrant remains outstanding.. (e) Additional Notices for Orders and Judgments Payable Through the Probation Division. Orders and judgments payable through the Probation Division shall include notices, in addition to those listed in paragraph (d), stating: (1) that the amount of child support and/or the addition of a health care coverage provision in Title IV-D cases shall be subject to review, at least once every three years, on written request by either party to the Division of Family Development, P.O. Box 716, Trenton, NJ 08625-0716 and adjusted by the court, as appropriate, or upon application to the court; (2) that the parties are required to notify the appropriate Probation Division of any change of employer, address or health care coverage provider within 10 days of the change and that failure to provide such information shall be considered a violation of the order; (3) that, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b, the custodial parent may require the non-custodial parent's health care coverage provider to make payments directly to the health care provider by submitting a copy of the relevant sections of the order to the insurer; and (4) that Social Security numbers are collected and used in accordance with section 205 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405), that disclosure of an individual's Social Security number for Title IV-D purposes is mandatory, that Social Security numbers are used to obtain income, employment and benefit information on individuals through computer matching programs with federal and state agencies, and that such information is used to establish and enforce child support under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.). 5:7-5. Failure to Pay; Enforcement by the Court or Party; Income Withholding for Child Support; Suspension and Revocation of Licenses for Failure to Support Dependents; Execution of Assets for Child Support; Child Support Judgments and Post-judgment Interest (a) Contempt and Relief in Aid of Litigant's Rights. If a person fails to make payments or provide health insurance coverage as directed by an order or judgment, the Probation Division responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance shall notify such person by mail that such failure may result in the institution of contempt proceedings. Upon the accumulation of a support arrearage equal to or in excess of the amount of support payable for 14 days or failure to provide health insurance coverage as ordered, the Probation Division shall file a verified statement setting forth the facts establishing disobedience of the order or judgment. The court in the county in which the person against whom the award is made resides, unless another court is designated by order or Rule 5:7-6(a) otherwise provides, may then, in its discretion, institute contempt proceedings in accordance with Rule 1:10-2, and an aggrieved party, or the Probation Division on that person's behalf, may apply to the court for relief in accordance with Rule 1:10-3. If the aggrieved party states under oath in the application that he or she is indigent and unable to pay the required filing fees, the court, if satisfied of the fact of indigency, may waive the payment of such fees. If the application for relief is made on behalf of a party by the Probation Division, filing fees shall be waived, and may, in the discretion of the court, subsequently be assessed against the adverse party if it is determined that he or she has not complied with the order or judgment being enforced. For past-due alimony or child support payments that have not been docketed as a civil money judgment with the Clerk of the Superior Court, the court may, on its own motion or on motion by the party bringing the enforcement action, assess a late interest charge against the adverse party at the rate prescribed by Rule 4:42-11(a). For past-due child support payments that have been docketed as a civil money judgment, see paragraph g of this Rule. (b) Immediate Income Withholding. All orders that include child support shall be paid through immediate income withholding from the obligor's current and future income unless the parties agree, in writing, to an alternative arrangement or either party shows, and the court finds, good cause for an alternative arrangement. If included in the same order as child support, the court may, in its discretion, garnish a separate amount for alimony, maintenance or spousal support in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-50 et seq. and include such amount in the immediate income withholding order. (1) Application. Immediate income withholding applies to all orders which include child support that are established or modified on or after October 1, 1990. (2) Procedure. If an order or judgment contains a child support provision, the child support shall be paid through immediate income withholding, and the withholding may include amounts for alimony, maintenance or spousal support, unless the parties agree, in writing, to an alternative arrangement or either party shows and the court finds good cause for an alternative arrangement. The court shall forward the order to the Probation Division which shall prepare and send a Notice to Payor of Income Withholding to the obligor's employer or other source of income. (3) Advance Notice. Every complaint, notice or pleading for the entry or modification of a child support order shall include the following written notice: In accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.7 et seq., the child support provisions of a court order are subject to income withholding on the effective date of the order unless the parties agree, in writing, to an alternative arrangement or either party shows and the court finds good cause to establish an alternative arrangement. The income withholding is effective upon all types of income including wages from current and future employment. (c) Initiated Income Withholding. When any child support order that is not subject to immediate income withholding in accordance with paragraph (b) has an accumulated arrearage equal to or exceeding the amount of support payable for 14 days, the Probation Division supervising the support order shall initiate an income withholding against the obligor's current and future income that is subject to income withholding. (1) Application. Initiated income withholding applies to all orders which include child support (a) that are entered prior to October 1, 1990, (b) that are entered or modified after October 1, 1990 which do not include a provision for immediate income withholding or (c) in which the parties have agreed, in writing, to an alternative arrangement and an arrearage equal to or in excess of the amount of support payable for 14 days exists. Initiated income withholding does not apply to alimony, maintenance or spousal support provisions. (2) Procedure. When any order that includes child support is in default in an amount equal to or in excess of the amount of support payable for 14 days, the Probation Division of the County responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the order or judgment shall initiate an income withholding against any of the obligor's income that is subject to income withholding. The Probation Division shall send, by regular mail, a Notice to Obligor of Income Withholding to the obligor's last known address. This notice shall be postmarked no later than 10 days after the date on which the case was identified as having the requisite 14-day arrearage and shall be mailed at the same time as the notice to the payor. The notice shall inform the obligor of the amounts withheld for current support and for the liquidation of arrearages and state that the withholding has commenced. An obligor may contest the withholding only on the basis of mistake of fact. If an obligor objects to the withholding, the Probation Division shall schedule a hearing or administrative review within 20 days after receiving notice of the contest of the withholding. Payment of arrearages after the due date shall not constitute good cause to terminate the withholding. No later than five days after the hearing or administrative review, the Probation Division shall notify the obligor, in writing, whether the withholding shall continue. (3) Advance Notice. All orders that include child support and that are not subject to immediate income withholding as described in paragraph (b) shall include a notice to the obligor stating that: The child support provisions of a support order are subject to income withholding when a child support arrearage has accrued in an amount equal to or in excess of the amount of support payable for 14 days. The withholding is effective against the obligor's current and future income from all sources authorized by law. (d) Rules Applicable to All Withholdings. The income withholding shall be binding on the obligor's employer or other source of income and successive payors of the obligor's income immediately after service of the Notice to Payor of Income Withholding upon the payor of such income. An employer or other source of income is not required to alter normal pay cycles to comply with the withholding but shall withhold and forward the required amount beginning with the first pay period that ends immediately after the notice is postmarked and each time the obligor is paid thereafter. The Notice to Payor of Income Withholding shall state that the payor of the obligor's income, except for the Division of Unemployment and Temporary Disability, may deduct a fee of $1.00 for each payment. Such fee shall be deducted from the obligor's income in addition to the amount withheld for child support. The total amount of the withholding shall not exceed the maximum amount permitted under section 303(b) of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1673(b)). If the court modifies any support order based upon changed circumstances, the Probation Division shall notify the payor to change the income withholding accordingly. When the Probation Division is unable to locate the obligor's current employer or other source of income to effectuate an income withholding, it may use any other procedures authorized by law to obtain this information. An income withholding for child support shall have priority over all other legal processes under State law without regard to the date of entry. If the obligor has more than one support order subject to withholding, the employer or other source of income shall withhold the payments on a pro-rata basis. The income withholding shall remain in effect until such time as the court enters an order to the contrary and the Probation Division delivers a Notice of Termination of Income Withholding to the employer or other source of income. An employer may not use an income withholding as a basis for discharge, discipline or discrimination in hiring. An aggrieved obligor may institute court action against the employer or other source of income as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.12. If the obligor's source of income fails to comply with a Notice to Payor of Income Withholding, it is liable for amounts that should have been withheld. The employer or other source of income shall notify the Probation Division promptly upon termination of the obligor's employment. If an employer or other source of income fails to comply with the terms of the income withholding or any withholding provision in this paragraph, the court may, upon application of the Probation Division, issue an Order to Show Cause for Contempt against the payor and proceed with contempt proceedings under Rule 1:10-3. The forms and notices required herein shall be prescribed by the Administrative Director of the Courts. (e) Suspension and Revocation of Licenses for Failure to Support Dependents. (Professional license ex. - Doctor, CPA, Landscaper, Plumber) (1) General Provisions. If a child support arrearage equals or exceeds the amount of child support payable for six months, or court-ordered health care coverage for a child is not provided within six months of the date that it is ordered, or the obligor fails to respond to a subpoena relating to a paternity or child support action, or a warrant for the obligor's arrest has been issued by the court due to the failure to pay child support as ordered, failure to appear at a hearing to establish paternity or child support, or failure to appear at a child support hearing to enforce a child support order, and said warrant remains outstanding, and the obligor is found to possess a license in the State of New Jersey, including a license to practice law, and attempts to enforce the support provisions through income withholding, withholding of civil lawsuit awards, and the execution of assets, when available, have been exhausted, the Probation Division shall send a written notice to the obligor, by certified and regular mail, return receipt requested, at the obligor's last-known address or place of business or employment, stating that the obligor's licenses may be revoked or suspended unless, within 30 days of the postmark date of the notice, the obligor pays the full amount of past-due child support, or provides proof that health care coverage for the child has been obtained, or responds to a subpoena, or makes a written request for a court hearing to the Probation Division. If a child support-related warrant exists, the license revocation or suspension will be terminated if the obligor pays the full amount of the child support arrearage, provides proof that health care coverage for the child has been obtained, or surrenders to the county sheriff or the Probation Division. No license revocation action shall be initiated if the Probation Division has received notice that the obligor has pending a motion to modify the child support order if that motion was filed prior to the date that the notice of the license suspension or revocation was sent by the Probation Division. If the court issues a warrant for the obligor's arrest for failure to pay child support as ordered, or for failure to appear at a hearing to establish paternity or child support, or for failure to appear at a child support hearing to enforce a child support order, and said warrant remains outstanding, the Probation Division shall immediately notify the Division of Motor Vehicles of the warrant and the requirement to suspend the obligor's driving privileges pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.41. (2) Suspension by Default of the Obligor. If, after receiving notice of a proposed license suspension or revocation, the obligor fails to take one of the actions specified in paragraph (e)(1) of this Rule, the Probation Division shall provide the court with a certification setting forth the obligor's non-compliance and failure to respond to the written notice of the pending license revocation or suspension as well as proof of service of the written notice of license suspension or denial. If, based on the papers filed by the Probation Division, the court is satisfied that service on the obligor was effective as set forth below, it shall, without need for further due process or hearing, enter an order suspending or revoking all licenses held by the obligor except that if the obligor is an attorney licensed to practice law in New Jersey, the order shall notify the Supreme Court to suspend the obligor's license to practice law. (3) Service of the Notice of Proposed License Suspension or Revocation. For the purpose of license suspensions or revocations initiated in accordance with this paragraph, simultaneous certified and regular mailing of the written notice shall constitute effective service. The court may deem procedural due process requirements for notice and service of process to be met with respect to a party thereto upon delivery of written notice to the most recent residential or employer address filed with the Probation Division for that party. If a party fails to respond to a notice and no proof is available that the party received the notice, the Probation Division shall document to the court that it has made a diligent effort to locate the party by making inquiries that may include, but are not limited to: the United States Postal Service, the Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Transportation, the Division of Taxation in the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Corrections, and the Department of Labor. The Probation Division shall provide an affidavit to the court presenting such documentation of its diligent effort, which certifies its inability to locate the party. If the United States Postal Service returns the mail to the Probation Division within the 30-day response period marked "moved, unable to forward," "addressee not known," "no such number/street," "insufficient address," or "forwarding order expired," the court may deem procedural due process requirements for notice and service of process to be met upon a finding that the Probation Division has provided the affidavit documenting the diligent effort to locate the party. If the certified mail is returned for any other reason without the return of the regular mail, the regular mail service shall constitute effective service. If the mail is addressed to the obligor at the obligor's place of business or employment, with postal instructions to deliver to the addressee only, service will be deemed effective only if the signature on the return receipt appears to be that of the obligor. Acceptance of certified mail notice signed by the obligor, the obligor's attorney, or a competent member of the obligor's household above the age of 14 shall be deemed effective service. (4) License Suspension or Revocation Hearings. If the obligor requests a hearing, the Probation Division shall file a petition for a court hearing, which shall occur within 45 days of the obligor's request. If, at or prior to the hearing, the obligor pays the full amount of the child support arrearage or provides proof that health care coverage for the child has been obtained or responds to the subpoena or surrenders to the county sheriff or the Probation Division, the license revocation process shall be terminated. The court shall suspend or revoke the obligor's licenses (if the obligor is an attorney licensed to practice law in New Jersey, the order shall notify the Supreme Court to suspend the obligor's license to practice law) if it finds that: (a) all appropriate enforcement methods have been exhausted, (b) the obligor is the holder of a license, (c) the requisite child support arrearage amount exists or health care coverage for the child has not been provided as ordered, (d) no motion to modify the child support order, filed prior to the date that the notice of the license suspension or revocation was sent by the Probation Division, is pending before the court, and (e) there is no equitable reason, such as involuntary unemployment, disability, or compliance with a court-ordered plan for the periodic payment of the child support arrearage amount, for the obligor's non-compliance with the child support order. If the court is satisfied that these conditions exist, it shall first consider suspending or revoking the obligor's driver's license prior to a professional or occupational license. If the obligor fails to appear at the hearing after being properly served with notice, the court shall order the suspension or revocation of all licenses held by the obligor except that if the obligor is an attorney licensed to practice law in New Jersey, the order shall notify the Supreme Court to suspend the obligor's license to practice law. In the case of a driver's license, if the court finds that the license revocation or suspension will result in a significant hardship to the obligor, to the obligor's legal dependents under 18 years of age living in the obligor's household, to the obligor's employees, or to persons, businesses, or entities to whom the obligor provides goods or services, the court may allow the obligor to pay 25% of the past-due child support amount within three working days of the hearing, establish a payment schedule to satisfy the remainder of the arrearages within one year, and require that the obligor comply with any current child support obligation. If the obligor agrees to this arrangement, no suspension or revocation of any licenses shall be ordered. Compliance with the payment agreement shall be monitored by the Probation Division. If the obligor has good cause for not complying with the payment agreement within the time permitted, the obligor shall immediately file a motion with the court and the Probation Division requesting an extension of the payment plan. The court may extend the payment plan if it is satisfied that the obligor has made a good faith effort to comply with the plan and is unable to satisfy the full amount of past-due support within the time permitted due to circumstances beyond the obligor's control. In no case shall a payment plan extend beyond the date that the dependent child reaches the age of 18. If the obligor fails to comply with the court-ordered payment schedule, the court shall, upon receipt of a certification of non-compliance from the Probation Division, and without further hearing, order the immediate revocation or suspension of all licenses held by the obligor. If the obligor is an attorney licensed to practice law in New Jersey, the order shall notify the Supreme Court to suspend the obligor's license to practice law. If required by existing law or regulation, the court shall order that the obligor surrender the license to the issuing authority within 30 days of the date of the order. (5) Transmittal of Order Suspending or Revoking License. If the court issues an order suspending or revoking a license pursuant to paragraph (e) of this Rule, the Probation Division shall forward a copy of the order to the obligor and all appropriate licensing authorities. If the order notifies the Supreme Court to suspend a license to practice law in New Jersey, the Probation Division shall forward the order to the Clerk of the Supreme Court and a copy to the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics. The suspension of a license to practice law in the State of New Jersey pursuant to paragraph (e) of this Rule, shall be governed by R. 1:20-11A. (6) Relief From Suspension or Revocation Due to Mistaken Identity. If the licensee, upon receipt of the notice of suspension or revocation from the licensing authority, disputes that he or she is the obligor, the licensee shall notify the licensing authority and the Probation Division by registered mail within 20 days of the postmark date of the notice and request a hearing. Upon receipt of the licensee's request for a hearing, the Probation Division shall determine if the licensee is the obligor. If the Probation Division determines that the licensee is not the obligor, the Probation Division shall so notify the licensee and the licensing authority. If the Probation Division determines that the licensee is the obligor and the licensee still disputes this finding, the Probation Division shall file a petition for a court hearing to resolve the issue. The hearing shall be held within 30 days of the date that the Probation Division determines that a hearing is required. If a hearing is held to determine if the licensee is the obligor, the Probation Division shall notify the licensing authority of the court's finding. (7) Term of Suspension/Restoration of License. A license suspension or revocation ordered by the court remains in effect until the obligor files with the licensing authority either a court order restoring the license or a Probation Division certification attesting to the full satisfaction of the child support arrearage. Within three working days of the full payment of the child support arrearage, the Probation Division shall provide the court with a certification stating that the obligor has satisfied the past-due child support amount. Upon receipt of the certification, the court shall issue an order restoring the obligor's licenses. The Probation Division shall immediately forward the restoration order or certification to the obligor. The obligor is responsible for filing the court order or Probation certification with the licensing authority. If a license to practice law in New Jersey was suspended by the Supreme Court pursuant to R. 1:20-11A, the attorney shall forward the Chancery Division, Family Part order that recommends the restoration of the license to the Clerk of the Supreme Court and a copy of the order to the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics. The reinstatement of a license to practice law in New Jersey shall be governed by R. 1:20-11A. When the court issues an order to vacate a child support-related warrant or local law enforcement authorities execute the warrant, the Probation Division shall send a certification or the court's order to the obligor and to the Division of Motor Vehicles indicating that the child support-related warrant is no longer effective. The Division of Motor Vehicles, upon receipt of the order or certification, may reinstate the obligor's driving privileges, provided that the obligor pays the Division's restoration fee. (f) Execution on Assets to Collect Alimony and Child Support. If an order is issued pursuant to R. 4:59-1(b) authorizing the Probation Division to execute on cash or cash-equivalent assets as defined therein to collect alimony and child support judgments payable through the Probation Division, the Probation Division may assist judgment creditors by preparing the writ of execution, serving the writ on the holder of the debtor's asset by registered or certified mail, and scheduling the matter before the court to obtain an order to turn over funds. Service of the writ shall freeze the asset for the amount of the judgment, but no turnover of funds shall be made or required to be made until ordered by the court. The writ of execution shall be signed by the judgment creditor or the attorney for the judgment creditor and may, subject to the limitations of this rule, be issued by the Vicinage Chief Probation Officer acting as deputy clerk of the Superior Court pursuant to R. 4:59-1(b). The Probation Division shall mail a notice to the debtor as required by R. 4:59-1(g) immediately after the writ has been served on the holder of the asset. The Probation Division shall send a copy of all writs of execution issued pursuant to R. 4:59-1(b) to the Family Division Case Management Office. No costs or fees shall be assessed by the Probation Division for aiding in the execution of a judgment for alimony or child support. With respect to assets other than cash or cash-equivalents as defined in R. 4:59-1(b), the Probation Division may assist the judgment creditor in preparing the writ of execution and such other forms relating to the execution as may be required, and in referring the judgment creditor to the sheriff of the county where the asset is located. (g) Child Support Judgments and Post-judgment Interest. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a, past-due child support payments are a judgment by operation of law on or after the date due and are subject to post-judgment interest at the rates prescribed in Rule 4:42-11 at the time of satisfaction or execution. Past-due child support payable through the Probation Division shall be automatically docketed as civil judgments with the Clerk of the Superior Court on the first day of the month following the date the payment was due. The Probation Division may, with the authorization of a child support judgment creditor, assist that party in calculating post-judgment interest in accordance with Rule 4:42-11 at the time an offer of satisfaction is tendered or an execution of assets is initiated. For child support that is not payable through the Probation Division, the obligee shall file a motion with the court asking that the amount of past-due child support be fixed and that a judgment be entered for that amount. The obligee shall be responsible for filing the judgment with the Clerk of the Superior Court. Alternatively, the obligee may procure a judgment by filing an application with the Probation Division requesting that past-due and future child support payments be made through that office in accordance with Rule 5:7-4(b). 5:7-6. Consolidated Enforcement and Modification Proceedings (a) Where an order or judgment requires payment of support or alimony through a probation office in a county other than the county of venue and where motions are pending both for modification and enforcement of the order or judgment, all such motions shall be heard in the county of venue. Prior to such hearing, the amount of arrearages shall be fixed in the county where payments are required to be made either by certification of the probation office or, if its certification is contested, by the court in that county. Where motions are pending both for modification and enforcement, a certification of arrears shall be forwarded by the probation office to the court of original venue seven (7) days prior to the return date. (b) Where any judgment requires payment through a probation office, all motions for modification or enforcement shall be served by both regular and certified mail upon the probation office in that county as if it were a party to the action. 5:7-7. Delay in Prosecution: Order to Proceed In divorce and nullity actions, a party either resisting an order of dismissal pursuant to R. 1:13-7 or seeking an order to proceed after such dismissal shall file an affidavit stating the reason for the delay, the relations of the parties toward each other since the commencement of the action, and any agreements or understandings between them. 5:7-8. Bifurcation Bifurcation of trial of the marital dissolution or custody dispute from trial of disputes over support and equitable distribution shall be permitted only with the approval of the Family Presiding Judge, which approval shall be granted only in extraordinary circumstances and for good cause shown. To file motions your attorney will need copies of all prior orders. The following is a portion of the additional information your attorney will need to draft a Motion: 1. Your Full Name: ___________________________________________________ First Last 2 Your Street Address: ________________________________ City ________________ State __ Zip Code ___________ 3. Telephone Number: Day: ____________________ Cell: ____________________ Night: _________________ 4. E-mail address: ______________________________________ 5.(a)Referred by: _____________________________________ 6. Your Date of Birth: ________________ SS # ____________ Month Day Year 7 Date of Marriage, if any _____________________________ 8 Other parent ____________________________________________________ First Last name 9 Street Address _________________________ City ______________ State/Zip ______________ 10 Name, Address, & Birthdate of all Child(ren); Person with whom Child(ren) Child's Full Name Address Birthdate Resides with _________________ ___________________ MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION: 1. Name and Address of Your Employer (Provide Name and Address of Company if Self- Employed) Name of Employer _______________________________ Address ___________________________ BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OR CONCERN? ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ The above information is a brief outline of work an experienced attorney can do for you. Always schedule an in- office consultation whenever an important legal matter arises.

Divorce in NJ-New articles, ABA newsletters and Community events

Divorce in NJ

When individuals have family problems, family and service groups can often offer advice and help resolve problems. If separation or divorce is unavoidable, you should see an attorney for advice on how to protect your rights. Areas to Discuss at Initial Interview When you first meet with your attorney, you should discuss and ask questions regarding the following: -Resolving marital problems -Financial concerns involving child support, alimony, spousal support, pendente lite support and equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage -Determining child custody and visitation -Grounds for divorce -Domestic Violence Act and Restraining Order -Legal Rights and procedures in court -Retaining the attorney and payment for legal services and costs Emergency Decision By The Court If necessary the Superior Court can make temporary decisions regarding: -Restraints to keep a violent spouse from harassing and interfering with your life -Occupancy of your house, apartment or condominium -Temporary custody and visitation of minor child -Temporary financial support for children and spouse -Injunction against disposal of personal property, real estate and other assets -Other temporary orders in the discretion of the Judge Grounds For Divorce Under NJ laws a divorce may be granted for any of the following causes: -Adultery -Willful and continued desertion for 12 or more months, either physical desertion or refusal to have sexual relations with the other spouse may establish this cause. -Extreme cruelty, including any physical or mental cruelty that endangers your safety or health, or which makes continued living together improper or unreasonable. -Separation, if separate and different places of living have been maintained for a least 18 consecutive months or more and there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation. -"No-Fault" is the familiar term for a divorce based on the separation for at least 18 months. Neither side needs to set forth allegations of fault or abuse. Court appearances are still required. -Voluntarily-induced addiction or habituation to a narcotic drug or habitual drunkenness for 12 or more consecutive months. -Mental illness which resulted in the spouse being kept in an institution for 24 or more consecutive months after the marriage was begun. -Imprisonment of the spouse for 18 or more consecutive months after the marriage was begun. ( This cause for divorce can be charged after the defendants release from prison only if the husband and wife have not resumed living together after imprisonment of the spouse ended.) What The Defendant Spouse Must Do If served with a Complaint or demand letter from an attorney, you should immediately consult an attorney for advice. If you contest any of the statements in the complaint, you must have a formal pleading called an "answer" filed on your behalf. You can contest alimony, custody, child support and/or equitable distribution of property. You can also file your own complaint called a "Counter-Claim." Even if you do not object to the divorce, you should speak with your attorney because other issues could effect you for many years in the future. If an answer is not filed, a default will be entered against you and a judge will make a decision without your opinion. Thereafter, you will bound by the decision of the judge. Failure to obey all portions of the court order can result in financial penalties and arrest. Case Information Statement If child support, alimony and equitable distribution are in issue, both spouses must fill out a Case Information Statement (CIS). This demands comprehensive information regarding your weekly, prior year and current assets, and liabilities. The court will use financial information contained in the CIS to make a determination as to the amount of child support. Discovery In addition to the CIS, in a contested matter, Court rules permit the attorneys to require the parties to supply written answers to interrogatories (questions), depositions, (verbal answers), produce documents or admit details. Property Settlement Agreement The parties may agree on signing a written agreement dividing marital property and setting forth support payments. A written agreement can be made prior to the complaint or pending trial. The agreement can provide for custody, visitation, alimony, medical expenses and insurance coverage. After a husband and wife separate, and especially if they intend to divorce, it is desirable for them to enter into a written contract to provide for: -division of real estate and personal property; -support, if any, payable to the dependent spouse and children; responsibility for debts and legal fees; -health and life insurance arrangements; -custody and visitation of children. Also included are many other items which set forth the mutual rights and duties of the two people. Such an agreement is a contract, but may be enforced as though it is an order of court, (except certain portions such as child custody, support and visitation, which may be modified by the Court), depending on its terms and contents. It is written by your attorneys and follows negotiations between you and your spouse and your attorneys. Child Support The judge will follow written guidelines when determining child support. The judge will look at the income of both parties and make an order compelling child support within the guidelines. The judge could also order medical and dental insurance, the payment of day-care and baby-sitting, private school tuition, and life insurance on each parents life with the child as the beneficiary. The court may also order payment of future college tuition. Who is responsible for the support of the children? The law imposes a duty on both parents to support their children. This obligation exist even if the parents are not married, and it continues after divorce. In determining the amount of child support to be paid by one parent to the other, the court will consider the respective incomes, earning capacities, assets and needs of both parents, and the needs of the children. The Judge has a "chart" in which he must follow to determine the amount of support that can be compelled. What is the procedure for obtaining spouse and child support? A person seeking spouse and/or child support may file a motion for support in the Family Court, in many cases and in all cases involving welfare, a conference will be held by a hearing officer at which both parties will be required to disclose their respective incomes and assets and prove their respective needs. An attempt will be made by the hearing officer to have the parties reach an agreement as to the amount of support. If an agreement cannot be reached, the usual procedure is for the hearing officer to submit a recommendation to the court. If either party is not satisfied with the recommendation, he or she may demand a hearing before the court at which the order could be modified. If both parties are satisfied with the order entered by the court on the hearing officers recommendation, it will be the final order. Can a support order be changed? Either spouse or parent may seek modification (increase or reduction) of a support order if he or she can demonstrate that a material and substantial change of circumstances has taken place since the order was entered. An increase or decrease in earnings or an increase in the needs of the children as they grow older are examples of material and substantial changes in circumstances. Once a child reaches age 18, and is out of school the parents generally are no longer required to support that child. A motion must be made in the Superior Court to reduce or end support. However, if the child is unable to support himself or herself because of some physical, mental or emotional disability, the duty of support continues beyond 18. Parents may also be required to pay support to a child who is attending college. Custody And Visitation The "best interest of the child" is the basis on how the judge awards custody of the child. The mother is no longer automatically given custody of the children. The judge looks at the age and sex of the child, ability of the parent to care for the child, personal relationships and, if older, the wishes of the child. Visitation will also be ordered under most circumstances. An equal sharing of physical custody of children is also possible in appropriate cases. As children get older, greater weight is given by the court to the childs preference as to which parent he or she wishes to reside. An important factor considered by the court is the continued residency of children in a familiar and stable home environment. Courts are reluctant to disturbance existing arrangement if the children are doing well. The courts are also reluctant to split children between two parents because courts believe that it is in the best interest of brothers and sisters to remain together even though their parents have separated or are divorced. Equitable Distribution Most parties eventually reach an agreement to divide property. In New Jersey, each spouse is entitled to a share of the property acquired during the marriage. There is not an automatic 50/50 split. Rather, the judge will make an "equitable distribution" of property after hearing testimony. There is no magic formula. The judge has discretion. Final Judgment Upon agreement or after a trial, the judge will enter a "Final Judgment of Divorce". This will declare that the marriage has ended. The judge will sign the Final Judgment of Divorce and it will be filed with the Superior Court in Trenton. The Final Judgment will also set forth items agreed upon or ordered, such as custody, support, and equitable distribution. After the Divorce, to make a change in support, custody, visitation etc, a formal motion must be made to the Superior Court. In this motion you must demonstrate a change in circumstances. Our hourly retainer rates are $300 per hour in office and $325 per hour outside office. Minimum fee in uncontested Divorce $1,750 where the parties have no children and have a written property settlement agreement.