| A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime when, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, he does one of several things. He either solicits the other person to commit the crime, and/or aids, agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime. State v JACKMON 305 N.J. Super. 274. (App. Div. 1997) 2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.? b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.? c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.? e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (1) He is a victim of that offense; (2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence. f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. http://www.njlaws.com/Accomplice_Liability_2C.2-6.html?id=325&a= |
To email Ken V, go here: http://www.njlaws.com/ContactKenV.html
Kenneth Vercammen is a Middlesex County Trial Attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on Criminal Law, Probate, Estate and litigation topics.
He was awarded the NJ State State Bar Municipal Court Practitioner of the Year.
He lectures and handles criminal cases, Municipal Court, DWI, traffic and other litigation matters.
To schedule a confidential consultation, call us or New clients email us evenings and weekends via contact box www.njlaws.com.
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C,
2053 Woodbridge Avenue,
Edison, NJ 08817,
(732) 572-0500
Monday, September 30, 2019
2C:002-006 Accomplice Liability
What to do in an Accident
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates Law Office helps people injured due to the negligence of others. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. The insurance companies will not help. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation if you are injured.
We sincerely hope that you and your family will enjoy safe motoring, free from accident. If however you do have an accident, to protect your legal rights, the following suggestions may be helpful:At The Accident Scene - 1. Stop . . . do not leave the scene of the accident (a) DIRECT OTHER TRAFFIC around the accident. (b) HELP THE INJURED but dont move them unless absolutely necessary. (c) CALL THE POLICE, tell them where the accident occurred and ask for medical help if needed. 2. Get names, addresses, and license numbers of all drivers involved. ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ 3. Get description and registration number and insurance information of all cars involved. _____________________________________ License Plate Number ____________________________________ Registration # Make ___________ Year _________ ____________________________________ Damage ______________________________________________________ Insurance Company ____________________________________ Insurance Policy Number 4. Get names and addresses of all witnesses (other than passengers) _________________________________________________ Name _______________________________________________ Address _________________________________________________ Phone ______________________________________________________ Name _______________________________________________ Address _________________________________________________ Phone 5. Police Officers __________________________________________________ Department ________________________________________________ Officer. _______________________________________________ Badge No. ______________________________________________________ Officer. ______________________________________________________ Badge No. 6. Accident Information _________________ _________________ Date Time ______________________________________________________ Location _______________________________________________________ No. of vehicles involved _____________________________________________________ Weather ______________________________________________________ Road conditions ________________________________________________________ Damage ______________________________________________________ Speed of the other car 6. Summary of accident _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ 7. Diagram of accident 8. Make sure no one is injured. If anyone is injured call an ambulance. If you have any reason to suspect you were injured in the accident, see a physician promptly. Youll want it on record that you sought treatment right away - not in a week or so . 9. Witnesses will be a tremendous help to you in any subsequent court action, if there is any question of liability involved. Get the names and addresses of as many witnesses as possible. If they refuse to identify themselves, jot down the license plate numbers of the their automobiles. Do not discuss the accident with the witnesses. Do not give the witnesses to anyone but the police, your attorney or your insurance company. 10. Do not assign or accept blame for the accident. - The scene of the accident is not the place to determine fault. Discuss the accident only with the police, your attorney and with representatives of your insurance company. Give the other party only your drivers license number, registration number and insurance information. - Be cooperative with the police. 11. Seek hospital attention. 12. Speak with your Doctor or Chiropractor 13. Call your insurance company to report the accident. 14. Call: Kenneth A. Vercammen, Attorney At Law (732) 572-0500 When you need help the most, we will be ready to help you. 15. Never give a signed statement to the claims adjuster representing the other drivers insurance company. The same goes for a phone recording. They may be used against you in court. 16 . What you must always have in your car..... a.- Drivers License b.- Car Registration c.- Insurance Card d.- This Flyer on Accidents e.- A Working Pen f. - Cell phone (Call Ambulance/First Aid and Police) http://www.njlaws.com/accident.html?id=1100&a= |
Accident Victims Rights Requiring Insurance to Pay for Medical/Chiropractic Treatment
| If injured in a car accident, it is important to immediately seek hospital and medical or chiropractic treatment. Under the New Jersey No Fault Act, car insurance companies are supposed to make timely payment of medical bills for the driver and passengers injured in their cars or other non-commercial vehicles. Doctors should let their patients know there are now minimum deductibles under the NJ Car No Fault Law (PIP). The following is helpful information for injured people and their doctors to obtain payment for bills. 1 Bills should be submitted to PIP & also to Major Medical and to Patient The medical provider must first submit the unpaid bills to the patient's car insurance carrier Personal Injury Protection (PIP carrier), and/or any Blue Cross/Blue Shield or other related medical provider, and fill out any documents required by the insurance company. 2. Deductibles There is an initial $250.00 deductible, and thereafter the car insurance company pays 80% of medical bills under a medical fee schedule established by the State Dept. of Insurance. After $5,000 the car insurance company pays 100% under the fee schedule, unless an independent medical exam (IME) recommends no further treatment. We recommend doctors adequately notify patients that they are the primary responsible person for payment, not insurance companies. They are also called the PIP (Personal Injury Protection) benefits under the No Fault Law. For unpaid portions after 80% or under the deductible, the chiropractor and also patient should submit portions of bills the car insurance does not pay to their major medical carrier (ex- Blue Cross, Connecticut General). Patients must be told that if they have the lawsuit/ verbal threshold, they cannot even sue the negligent driver for their unpaid medical bills. 3. 21 day notification to PIP A State Law signed in January, 1996 requires automobile insurers to be notified by the claimant or medical provider in writing within 21 days following commencement of treatment of injuries sustained in an accident for which personal injury protection medical expense benefits are claimed. NJSA 39:6A-5(b) In addition, under this new law P.L. 1995, c 407, every bill for such treatment shall be submitted to the insurer and submitted by the medical provider if within 30 days of the date that treatment was rendered. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5E (a) If the treating doctor does not give proper notification, the insurer can reserve the right to deny payment of the claim, and the treatment provider is prohibited from seeking a payment directly from the insured NJSA 39:6A-5(d) New Jersey Auto Insurance Law p 157 (GANN 2000). It is highly recommended that all doctors, hospitals, MRI facilities and physical therapy centers also send complete copies of all bills to the patient. Unfortunately, too often doctors or MRI facilities fail to advise patients of high unpaid bills, then put the patient in collection after the case is over for the unpaid bill. Patients should submit copies of all bills to your car insurance company even if they believe the doctor or medical providers may also have submitted the bill to PIP. The patient should later send the bill to major medical. If the doctor's office and injured person does not keep their attorney's office informed in writing of unpaid medical bills, the attorney will not have sufficient information to provide to the defendant's insurance company and the Court when trying to settle a case. 4. New Care paths in Car Accident Cases Starting in 1999, all medical providers must follow "care paths" and most non emergency treatment approved by the car insurance company. Please make sure all treatment and bills are pre- approved by the car insurance company. The treating doctor should also contact the car insurance company prior to MRI or extensive treatment. 5. Dispute Resolution to require Payment of Doctor and MRI Bills following a car accident The intent of the no fault statute is to require speedy payment of hospital and doctor bills and prevent delay by insurance companies. An aggrieved personal injury protection claimant is entitled to receive "prompt payment of medical expenses, lost wages, essential services, survivor benefits and funeral expenses... without having to wait the outcome of protracted litigation." Kubiak v. Allstate Insurance Co., 198 N.J. Super. 115, 119 (App. Div. 1984), cert. den. 101 N.J. 290; Hoqlin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.J. Super. 475, 479 (App. Div. 1976). This, together with the right to interest on overdue payments (then N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5(c)) and the ability under Rule 4:42 9(a)(6) to recover counsel fees if successful in the action should sufficiently guard against situations where an injured party is subjected to protracted aggravated consequences because of an insurer's failure to pay. Kubiak 198 N.J. Super. 119 120. Disputes between the insurer and claimant as to whether or not benefits are due under the PIP statute may be resolved, at the election of either the claimant or the insurer, either by binding arbitration or by civil litigation. NJSA 39:6A-5(i) and NJSA 39:6A-5.1a, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law p 159 (GANN 2000) If the insurance company continues to delay and fails to pay medical benefits, the insured can either file suit in the Superior Court or file a demand for dispute resolution with American Arbitration Association. In New Jersey their office is located 1 Executive Drive, Somerset, New Jersey 08873. Filing fees are $325, paid by either the doctor/treatment provider or the patient. The check should be payable to the American Arbitration Association. 5a. NJSA 39:6A-5.1 sets forth in detail how AAA dispute resolution proceeds Dispute resolution proceedings shall include disputes arising regarding medical expense benefits provided under PIP law and disputes as to additional first party coverage benefits required to be offered. Disputes involving medical expense benefits may include, but not necessarily be limited to, matters concerning (1) interpretation of the insurance contract; (2) whether the treatment or health care service which is the subject of the dispute resolution proceeding is in accordance with the provisions pip law or the terms of the policy; (3) the eligibility of the treatment or service for compensation; (4) the eligibility of the provider performing the treatment or service to be compensated under the terms of the policy or under regulations promulgated by the commissioner, including whether the person is licensed or certified to perform such treatment; (5) whether the disputed medical treatment was actually performed; (6) whether diagnostic tests performed in connection with the treatment are those recognized by the commissioner; (7) the necessity or appropriateness of consultations by other health are providers; (8) disputes involving application of and adherence to fee schedules promulgated by the commissioner; and (9) whether the treatment performed is reasonable, necessary, and compatible with the protocols provided for pursuant to P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.). The dispute resolution professionals may review the entire claims file of the insurer, subject to any confidentiality requirement established pursuant to State of federal law. All decisions of the dispute resolution professional shall be in writing, in a form prescribed by the commissioner, shall state the issues in dispute, the findings and conclusions on which the decision is based, and shall be signed by the dispute resolution professional. All decisions of a dispute resolution professional shall be binding. The dispute resolution organization shall provide for the retention of all documents used in dispute resolution proceedings under this section and section 25 of this amendatory and supplementary act, including the written decision for a period of at least five years, in a form provided by the commissioner, or such additional time as may be established by the commissioner. The written decisions of the dispute resolution professional shall be forwarded to the commissioner, who shall establish a record of the proceedings conducted under the dispute resolution procedure, which shall be accessible to the public and may be used as guidance in subsequent dispute resolution proceedings. Under the pre-1999 no fault law, AAA arbitrations were heard by a single arbitrator chosen by AAA. The arbitrator would fix the time and place for each oral hearing. Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration are entitled to attend hearings. Parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material and shall produce such additional evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. The arbitrator may subpoena witnesses or documents on his own initiative or upon the request of any party. The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevancy and the materiality of the evidence offered, and conforming to legal Rules of Evidence is not necessary. An arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit, but it shall give it only such weight as the arbitrator deems it entitled to after consideration of any objections made to its admission. According to the New Jersey No Fault Automobile Arbitration rules published by the American Arbitration Association "if the claimant prevails in the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator shall direct the insurer to pay all the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees. 5b. New Emergent- Relief Arbitration Under PIP Ordinarily, the minimum time for a regular arbitration is three months, including a 45 day initial waiting period and a 20 day notice of hearing. New Rule 3A of the American Arbitration Association's rules governing Personal Injury Protection Arbitration requires appointment of an arbitrator within one business day of the demand, the establishment of a schedule for consideration within two business days of the appointment and the granting of any relief within three additional days. 160 N.J.L.J. 373, NJ Law Journal May 1, 2000, p 5. The new rules were drafted by the state Department of Banking and Insurance. They went into effect April 1, 2000 and are posted on the AAA's Web site (www.adr.org/rules/state/nj no-fault rules.html). 6. SUIT IN SUPERIOR COURT INSTEAD OF ARBITRATION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FEES In Miskofsky v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 203 N.J. Super. 400 (Law Div. 1984) the court examined a Superior Court PIP suit and found medical benefits must be afforded. The court awarded attorneys fees, holding: Counsel for plaintiff has submitted an affidavit of services based on an hourly rate of $100.00 which this court believes to be fair and reasonable. "I shall, therefore, award counsel fees against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $1,790.00 as well as costs representing actual disbursements in the amount of $123.12 or a total of $1,913.12" Miskofsky at 416 417. All other reported cases indicate attorneys fees should be awarded to Plaintiff's counsel. Additionally, the court in Olewinsky v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 234 N.J. Super. 429 (Law Div. 1988) examined an application and request for attorney's fees for services rendered in connection with the personal injury claim. The plaintiff was pregnant at the time she was involved in an automobile accident. Defendant Aetna refused to pay certain medical expenses to the plaintiff and for her child. A claim was brought for medical payments. Both claims were settled at a conference in which the court participated. Upon motion of the plaintiff, the court in Olewinsky held: "based upon consideration of the underlying purpose of Rule [4:42 9(a)(6)] allowing attorney's fees as well as the nature of PIP claims and the realities of PIP settlements, this court concludes that attorney's fees should be allowed when a case is settled at anytime after the commencement of suit, for a sum which exceeds the original offer by the insured made prior to the institution of suit". Id. at 432. The court also noted in a footnote that attorney's fees are also allowed under the PIP statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5, where an insured claimant prevails in an arbitration proceeding for PIP benefits. The court concluded: The intent of the Rule allowing attorney's fees is to charge the insurer with additional expenses necessitated by an insured who is forced to bring suit for his claim. But, the realities of PIP settlements are that the insured must pay his own attorney fees. This effectively undermines the intent of the Rule. In order to implement the intent of the Rule, the definition of a "successful claimant" must be given liberal interpretation so as to encompass not only judgments and last minute settlements, but settlements effectuated prior to trial as well. Clearly, a claimant who obtains a judgment for the full amount of his claim is a "successful claimant". Similarly, a claimant who obtains a judgment for less than the full amount he seeks is also a "successful claimant" under the law. Therefore, logic should dictate that a claimant who obtains either a settlement for the full amount of his claim prior to the trial date or who obtains a settlement for a sum less than the full amount of his claim, but for more than that which he was offered prior to the institution of suit, should similarly be categorized as a "successful claimant". He is, after all, getting more than that which he would have obtained in the first place. In this respect, therefore, he is successful. Finally, it is simply unfair to burden an insured with attorneys fees in order to receive moneys to which, at least in part, he was entitled to in the first place. Olewinsky . at 433 434. The court in Olewinsky held that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The court held that the sum of $4,500.00 plus expenses, was fair and reasonable for payment of attorney's fees. Today, the statute N.J.S.A. 39:6A 5(c) requires that if a claimant prevails at arbitration, the insurer shall pay all costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. Thus, the imposition of attorney's fees is mandatory. In Van Houten v. New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Co., 159 N.J. Super. 208 (Cty. Ct. 1978), aff'd 170 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1979), an insured who brought a cause of action against an insurer for failure to provide personal injury protection coverage for his medical expenses was determined to be a successful claimant and as provided by the Rule permitting attorney's fees. The court noted that a party need not prevail in every claim in order to be successful. Id. at 211. The court in Van Houten found persuasive plaintiff's argument that an insured is already a weak party to an insurance contract, and to make him hire an attorney throughout the trial or motion would put him at an even greater disadvantage. It is incongruous to require plaintiff to bypass a settlement offer and to proceed to trial in order to "earn" counsel fees, especially when a settlement and trial would have substantially achieved the same result. Also compelling plaintiff to try the case under these circumstances would be contrary to the strong public policy and judicial commitment that justice be served by encouraging the settlement of claims thereby avoiding or terminating litigation. Id. at 212. (Citations omitted). The court in Van Houten, concluded that had the plaintiff proceeded to trial, there is no doubt that the judge could have awarded a counsel fee. The court in Van Houten noted certain facts: 1. After the accident there was a substantial and unreasonable delay by defendant in conducting its investigation and providing a measure of coverage under No Fault. Such delay is distinguishable from mere tardiness by an insurer in forwarding payment. 2. This unnecessary delay on defendant's part induced plaintiff to seek the services of an attorney to intercede on his behalf, with the necessity of bringing suit. 3. After the complaint was filed, defendant continued to resist coverage under a color of contention which in this case was inappropriate. 4. And finally, after a period of eight months following the accident, defendant, just prior to trial, only then agreed to pay plaintiff an amount closely approximate to the original claim for loss of income coverage sought by the insured. 159 N.J. Super. at 215. A denial of counsel fees, would thwart the underlying public policy that insurers not raise groundless disclaimers, abandon their insured and induce costly and protracted litigation. Van Houten at 215. To require an insured to fully litigate his claim to a successful adjudication essentially because his accumulated counsel fees cannot otherwise be obtained is contrary to the principles of the rule and the spirit underlying the No Fault Act. Rather, it was the opinion of the Van Houten court that an award of counsel fees would more equitably serve the principals upon which No Fault is founded. Id. at 216. The court noted "upon review of the discovery section of the No Fault Act it is clear that the burden of investigating personal injury claims was primarily with the insurance carrier and not with the insured. N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13 et seq. Under the Act the injured person is essentially required to "...sign all forms, authorizations, releases for information ...which may be necessary to the discovery of the above facts, in order to reasonably prove the injured person's losses. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13(f)]. The Van Houten court was satisfied that the plaintiff substantially complied with these obligations. The carrier is entitled to substantial discovery from the claimant's doctor, hospital, clinic, etc. or from the carrier's own physician. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13(b) and (d). The court noted if defendant encountered difficulty with such discovery, then it ought to have sought the appropriate relief from plaintiff's doctor and/or employer. N.J.S.A. 39:6A -13(g). Van Houten. at 217. It has been uniformly held by the courts that Rule 4:42 9(a)(6) permitting an award of counsel fees against an insured's personal insurance company was adopted in order to prevent or discourage groundless disclaimers by the insurance carrier. See e.g. Tooker v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 136 N.J. Super. 572, 576 (App. Div. 1975). Maros v. TransAmerica Insurance Co., 143 N.J. Super. 307 (Law Div. 1976); New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., 124 N.J. Super. 598 (Law Div. 1973). In each of the above cases the courts deemed that counsel fees be awarded with a view towards equity for the insured. 7. Interest on unpaid bills N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5 (g) provides “personal injury protection coverage benefits shall be overdue if not paid within 60 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and the amount of same. N.J.S.A 39:6A-5E (h) added that all overdue payments shall bear simple interest at the percentage of interest prescribed by the Court Rules. An insurer can avoid the payment of interest only where it "has reasonable proof to establish that the insurer is not responsible for the payment..." The allowance of interest is not, as defendant argues, dependent upon the presence or absence of good faith on the part of the insurer. Ortiz at 508-509 The court also affirmed the awarding of the counsel fee. 8. Statute of Limitations Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13.1 an action for payment of benefits must be commenced not later than 2 years after the expense, or when in the exercise of the reasonable diligence insured the should know the loss was caused by the accident, or not later than 4 years after the accident, whichever is earlier; provided, if benefits have been paid before then an action for further benefits may be commenced not later than 2 years after the last payment of benefits. In Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co., 98 N.J. 30 (1984), the Supreme Court adopted the principal that when an automobile liability insurance carrier has made payments of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits in connection with a compensable injury and is chargeable with knowledge at the time of its last payment that the injury will probably require additional treatment in the future, then the "two years after payment" provision of N.J.S.A. 39:6A 13.1 will not bar an action brought within a reasonable time after rejection of a prompt claim for payment of additional medical expenses for such treatment. Id. at 31 32. Our New Jersey Supreme Court has often rejected a limitations defense where the defendant has contributed to the delay. Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982) CONCLUSION In conclusion, If the claimant is successful, case law, the statute and the AAA rules make counsel fees and interest available. Action must be taken to help the injured party have their medical bills paid prior to the expiration of any statute of limitation. http://www.njlaws.com/AccidentChiro2.html?id=322&a= |
39:4-55. Action on steep grades and curves
The driver of a motor vehicle traversing a steep grade or mountain highway shall hold the vehicle under control and as near the right-hand side of the highway as reasonably possible, and when traveling upon a down grade upon a highway, shall not coast with the gears of the vehicle in neutral. When approaching a curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of two hundred feet along the highway, he shall give audible warning with a horn or other warning device.
Fine $50 or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both
MVC points 2
Car insurance points 2
For information on points, fines, jail and suspension for this violation, go to KennethVercammen.com/traffic_minimum_penalties.htm
Protect your Rights.
Before you pled guilty and face potentially thousands of dollars in fees and surcharges, schedule an in office appointment with our attorneys experienced in handling these matters. Contact the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C. For Legal Representation 732-572-0500 http://www.njlaws.com/action_on_steep_grades_and_curves.html?id=327&a= |
2C:024-008 Abandonment, Neglect of Elderly Person, Disabled Adult; Third Degree Crime
| 1. a. A person having a legal duty to care for or who has assumed continuing responsibility for the care of a person 60 years of age or older or a disabled adult, who abandons the elderly person or disabled adult or unreasonably neglects to do or fails to permit to be done any act necessary for the physical or mental health of the elderly person or disabled adult, is guilty of a crime of the third degree. For purposes of this section "abandon" means the willful desertion or forsaking of an elderly person or disabled adult. b. A person shall not be considered to commit an offense under this section for the sole reason that he provides or permits to be provided nonmedical remedial treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in lieu of medical care, in accordance with the tenets and practices of the elderly person's or disabled adult's established religious tradition, to an elderly person or disabled adult to whom he has a legal duty to care for or has assumed responsibility for the care of. c. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude or limit the prosecution or conviction for any other offense defined in this code or in any other law of this State. L.1989,c.23,s.1; amended 1999, c.8. http://www.njlaws.com/2c_24-8abandonment.html?id=257&a= |
AAA Attorney Fee Reimbursement
AAA Attorney Fee Reimbursement |
Attorney's Fees Reimbursement Service when you hire Ken Vercammen, Esq.
In order to assure a fair hearing for members accused of certain traffic violations, the AAA Club offers an attorney's fees reimbursement service. The Club does not in any way practice law nor does it establish attorney's fees, since such fees will be dependent entirely upon the circumstances surrounding the particular case. The attorney must be chosen by the member and the attorney's fees must be paid in full by the member. The paid receipt should then be submitted to the Club for consideration of reimbursement based on the reimbursement schedule contained herein.The attorney's fees reimbursement service is strictly for the purpose of helping defray the costs incurred when a member retains the services of an attorney to assist in the defense of charges of common moving violations resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle where the member feels unjustly accused, and desires a fair and impartial trial. Schedule of Reimbursable Attorney's Fees (This schedule provides the maximum amount to be reimbursed per listed violation for regular AAA members, as well as for AAA members who have the additional benefit of AAA PLUS, provided all conditions for eligibility have been satisfied.) Regular PLUS Members Members For defense of Reckless Driving or Endangerment, not exceeding 35.00 400.00 If appealed not more than additional 35.00 200.00 For defense of alleged moving violations of traffic laws, not exceeding 25.00 100.00 For lawyer's representation at hearings on suspension or revocation of license or registration by the Dept. of Motor Vehicles, up to 0 100.00 AAA member Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. is available for representation. To schedule an confidential consultation, please contact The Law Office of KENNETH A. VERCAMMEN, 732-572-0500 |
Wednesday, August 7, 2019
Tuesday, August 6, 2019
2C :12-1 Assault. a. Simple assault.
2C :12-1 Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
2C :12-1 Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.
b. Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or
(2) Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(4) Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or
(5) Commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subsection a. of this section upon:
(a) Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer; or
(b) Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a fireman; or
(c) Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or
(d) Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver or other employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a member or employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a school bus driver; or
(e) Any employee of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an employee of the division; or
(f) Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of his status as a member of the judiciary; or
(g) Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or
(h) Any Department of Corrections employee, county corrections officer, juvenile corrections officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer or any sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a Department of Corrections employee, county corrections officer, juvenile corrections officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer, sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer; or
(i) Any employee, including any person employed under contract, of a utility company as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.224 (C.2A:42-86) or a cable television company subject to the provisions of the "Cable Television Act," P.L.1972, c.186 (C.48:5A-1 et seq.) while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties in regard to connecting, disconnecting or repairing or attempting to connect, disconnect or repair any gas, electric or water utility, or cable television or telecommunication service; or
(j) Any health care worker employed by a licensed health care facility to provide direct patient care, any health care professional licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to Title 26 or Title 45 of the Revised Statutes to practice a health care profession, except a direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession; or
(k) Any direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession, provided that the actor is not a patient or resident at the facility who is classified by the facility as having a mental illness or developmental disability; or
(6) Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or
(7) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or
(8) Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion. For purposes of this paragraph, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or
(9) Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or
(10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection v. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate, threaten or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or
(11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority. As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm; or
(12) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly causes significant bodily injury to a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19); or
(13) Knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly obstructs the breathing or blood circulation of a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), by applying pressure on the throat or neck or blocking the nose or mouth of such person, thereby causing or attempting to cause bodily injury.
Aggravated assault under paragraphs (1) and (6) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the second degree; under paragraphs (2), (7), (9) and (10) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree; under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the fourth degree; and under paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. Aggravated assault under paragraph (8) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree. Aggravated assault under paragraph (11) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree. Aggravated assault under paragraph (12) or (13) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree but the presumption of non-imprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for a first offense of a crime of the third degree shall not apply.
c. (1) A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.
(2) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and bodily injury results.
(3) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the second degree if serious bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:
(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;
(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or
(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.
Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel in violation of this paragraph.
A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (3) of this subsection.
It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.
(4) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and bodily injury results. For purposes of this paragraph, "driving a vehicle in an aggressive manner" shall include, but is not limited to, unexpectedly altering the speed of the vehicle, making improper or erratic traffic lane changes, disregarding traffic control devices, failing to yield the right of way, or following another vehicle too closely.
As used in this subsection, "vessel" means a means of conveyance for travel on water and propelled otherwise than by muscular power.
d. A person who is employed by a facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of this section upon an institutionalized elderly person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).
f. A person who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subsection a. of this section in the presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or community sponsored youth sports event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. The defendant shall be strictly liable upon proof that the offense occurred, in fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age. It shall not be a defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any liability on the part of a participant in a youth sports event or to abrogate any immunity or defense available to a participant in a youth sports event. As used in this act, "school or community sponsored youth sports event" means a competition, practice or instructional event involving one or more interscholastic sports teams or youth sports teams organized pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter or which are member teams in a youth league organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department and shall not include collegiate, semi-professional or professional sporting events.
amended 1979, c.178, s.22; 1981, c.290, s.14; 1983, c.101; 1985, c.97, s.2; 1985, c.444; 1990, c.87, s.1; 1991, c.237, s.2; 1991, c.341, s.2; 1993, c.219, s.2; 1995, c.6, s.1; 1995, c.181; 1995, c.211, s.1; 1995, c.307, s.2; 1997, c.42; 1997, c.119; 1999, c.77; 1999, c.185, s.2; 1999, c.281; 1999, c.381; 2001, c.215; 2001, c.443, s.2; 2002, c.53; 2003, c.218; 2005, c.2; 2006, c.78, s.2; 2010, c.109; 2012, c.3; 2012, c.16, s.6; 2012, c.22, s.2; 2015, c.98, s.1; 2015, c.100, s.1; 2017, c.240.
Sunday, August 4, 2019
Friday, August 2, 2019
2C:33-2.1 Loitering to Obtain or Distribute CDS drugs
2C:33-2.1 Loitering to Obtain or Distribute CDS drugs
Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
Loitering to obtain or distribute CDS 2C:33-2.1.
Sometimes we try to convince prosecutor to change a drug possession charge to Loitering because there is no mandatory license suspension.
"Public place" defined; Loitering to obtain or distribute CDS is a disorderly persons offense 1. a. As used in this section:
"Public place" means any place to which the public has access, including but not limited to a public street, road, thoroughfare, sidewalk, bridge, alley, plaza, park, recreation or shopping area, public transportation facility, vehicle used for public transportation, parking lot, public library or any other public building, structure or area.
More info at http://www.njlaws.com/loitering_to_obtain_or_distribute_cds.htm
b. A person, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, commits a disorderly persons offense if (1) he wanders, remains or prowls in a public place with the purpose of unlawfully obtaining or distributing a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog; and (2) engages in conduct that, under the circumstances, manifests a purpose to obtain or distribute a qcontrolled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.
c. Conduct that may, where warranted under the circumstances, be deemed adequate to manifest a purpose to obtain or distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog includes, but is not limited to, conduct such as the following:
(1) Repeatedly beckoning to or stopping pedestrians or motorists in a public place;
(2) Repeatedly passing objects to or receiving objects from pedestrians or motorists in a public place;
(3) Repeatedly circling in a public place in a motor vehicle and on one or more occasions passing any object to or receiving any object from a person in a public place.
d. The element of the offense described in paragraph (1) of subsection b. of this section may not be established solely by proof that the actor engaged in the conduct that is used to satisfy the element described in paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section.
Disorderly person criminal offenses- ex Simple Assault, shoplifting & cases in Municipal Court
Jail 2C: 43- 8 jail 6 month maximum
probation 1-2 year max
community service 180 days maximum
Disorderly- fines: $1,000 Fine maximum under 2C: 43- 3
plus mandatory costs, VCCO and other penalties
There are many other penalties that the court must impose in criminal cases, including DNA testing. There are dozens of other penalties a court can impose, depending on the type of matter.
Drug offenses: in addition to above penalties, mandatory minimum $500 DEDR penalty, mandatory lab fee and other court costs over $200, mandatory 6 month- 2 year loss of license, plus usual Probation, drug testing, DNA testing and other penalties. If attorney's Conditional Discharge motion is granted for first time offender. penalty can be reduced. In certain drug cases, the fine can be up to $75,000.
Consequences of a Criminal conviction
1 You will have a criminal record
2 You may go to Jail or Prison.
3. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.
4. You could be put on Probation for up to five years.
5. You must wait 3-5 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3
6. In Drug Cases, a mandatory DEDR penalty of $500-$1,000, and lose your driver's license for 6 months - 2years.
7 When you are on Probation or Parole, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.
8. You may be required to do Community Service.
9 You lose the presumption against incarceration in future cases. 2C:44-10 You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.
10. Future employers may not hire you because you have a criminal record. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty and may be barred from any future city, state, federal or school employment
11. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be removed/deported by virtue of your plea of guilty or prevented from citizenship.
The defense of a person charged with a criminal offense is not impossible. There are a number of viable defenses and arguments, which can be pursued to achieve a successful result. Advocacy, commitment, and persistence are essential to defending a client accused of a criminal offense.
Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/ municipal court tickets including drivers charged with Driving While Intoxicated, Refusal and Driving While Suspended.
Kenneth Vercammen was the NJ State Bar Municipal Court Attorney of the Year and past president of the Middlesex County Municipal Prosecutors Association.
Criminal and Motor vehicle violations can cost you. Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal motor vehicle violations.
When your job or drivers license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter.
Our website www.njlaws.com provides information on traffic offenses we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for traffic violations and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations.
Contact the Law Office of
Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
at 732-572-0500
for an appointment.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
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