NJSA 2C:1-9 When Prosecution Barred by Former Prosecution for the Same Offense

2C:1-9. Double jeopardy When prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense. A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of the same provision of the statutes based upon the same facts as a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: a. The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal by a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside. b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the complaint had been filed or the indictment found, by a final order or judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and which necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense. This subsection shall not apply to an order or judgment quashing an indictment prior to trial. c. The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting a judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. In the latter two cases failure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of the defendant. d. The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this subsection, there is an improper termination of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the jury was impaneled and sworn or, in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper: (1) The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss or otherwise, his right to object to the termination. (2) The trial court finds that the termination is necessary because of the failure of the jury to agree upon a verdict after a reasonable time for deliberation has been allowed. (3) The trial court finds that the termination is required by a sufficient legal reason and a manifest or absolute or overriding necessity. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.